This article is devoted to a legal analysis of the events of 23 May 2021 involving a Polish Boeing 737-800 with registration number SP-RSM, performing a flight from Athens to Vilnius, specifically the actions of the Belarusian authorities (air traffic services and special services) that led to the forced landing of this aircraft in Minsk, which allowed the arrest of Roman Protasevich and his partner. The basis of the considerations in the first part of the article is the interpretation of the relevant international and Belarusian law in the context of the revealed circumstances surrounding the incident under investigation. The author’s aim was to answer the question of whether the actions of the Belarusian authorities were legal. Ultimately, it was shown that on 23 May 2021, a number of legal rules governing air navigation were violated in relation to the Polish aircraft, which raises the question of who should bear responsibility for it and on the basis of which legal norms. The second part of the article is devoted to this issue. The conclusion is that under international law, the responsibility for the illegal forced landing of Boeing 737-800 should be borne by the Belarusian state, and under internal criminal law regulations - by individual Belarusian officials.

In the current legal status, during the organisation in Poland of conferences, events, ceremonies or other events, significant due to their scale or rank, especially those of international character, security activities are carried out on the basis of general provisions - primarily pragmatic acts of services and other institutions carrying out these activities or episodic acts. Polish legislation, however, has not introduced regulations permanently defining detailed principles of conduct and the subject and object scope of responsibility for the preparation and security of such events, unless they are qualified as mass events. This article is an attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of the specific legal instruments used in the case of securing this type of events. Based on the analysis carried out, de lege ferenda conclusions have been formulated, including the introduction of a new legal institution permanently into the Polish legal order, referred to for the purposes of this article as a ‘special event’. As a result of granting a given event or celebration the status of a special event, it would be possible to apply legal instruments hitherto found only in episodic acts, but which are of significant importance from the perspective of ensuring a security standard adequate to the threat.

During the Cold War, Western states repeatedly accused the Soviet bloc of supporting international terrorism. The declassification of many documents from the archives of the former intelligence services in Central and Eastern Europe has made it possible to verify these accusations and has also made it possible to take a broader look at the links between the socialist states and terrorist groups. The aim of the article is to present the factors determining the establishment and maintenance of secret contacts between the Soviet bloc states and terrorist organisations, to indicate the genesis of these contacts and to present their actual course, and in this context also the experience of the People’s Republic of Poland against the background of other communist countries.

The use of vehicles as tools for terrorist attacks, which has been occurring over the past few years, has led to the increasing use of anti-terrorist blockades around critical infrastructure buildings and in public spaces. This process has progressed as awareness and knowledge of the existence of this type of threat has increased among decision-makers. The variety of devices used to protect against attacks and their selection is not obvious and easy to implement. In this article, the author attempts to describe the occurrence of risks to critical infrastructure facilities from road vehicles used as weapons to carry out attacks. He describes the possibilities of preventing this type of event and recommends solutions to help in the design and implementation of external building security systems. The guidelines contained in the article can be a source of knowledge for those responsible for the security of facilities, but in addition to the theoretical basis in the design of external security of facilities, it is necessary in each case to carry out a specialised risk assessment, carried out by a qualified consultant.

In the second part of the article on the case of Anders Behring Breivik, the author answers the questions of whether the attack could have been prevented and what impact it had on public sentiment, the nature of the changes to internal security policy in Norway and the performance of the country’s security services. In addition, he analyses Breivik’s actions in terms of whether he meets the criteria of a lone wolf terrorist, as well as describing terrorist attacks prepared or carried out by his imitators.

Previous research on radicalisation suggests that this process is the result of an accumulation of factors that generate a person’s susceptibility to extremist narratives. The authors of this article analysed the biographies of the perpetrators of terrorist attacks and, given the frequent references in these biographies to the abuse of various stimulants by the attackers, attempted to summarise the available knowledge on the relationship between psychoactive substance addiction and radicalisation. Although no simple causal relationship between addictions and radicalisation was found, the effects of addictions partly overlap with identified vulnerabilities to extremist narratives. A comprehensive approach to terrorism prevention should therefore take into account that addictions may contribute to increasing the vulnerability of some individuals to radicalisation leading to terrorism.

This article is devoted to a legal analysis of the events of 23 May 2021 involving a Polish Boeing 737-800 with registration number SP-RSM, performing a flight from Athens to Vilnius, specifically the actions of the Belarusian authorities (air traffic services and special services) that led to the forced landing of this aircraft in Minsk, which allowed the arrest of Roman Protasevich and his partner. The basis of the considerations in the first part of the article is the interpretation of the relevant international and Belarusian law in the context of the revealed circumstances surrounding the incident under investigation. The author’s aim was to answer the question of whether the actions of the Belarusian authorities were legal. Ultimately, it was shown that on 23 May 2021, a number of legal rules governing air navigation were violated in relation to the Polish aircraft, which raises the question of who should bear responsibility for it and on the basis of which legal norms. The second part of the article is devoted to this issue. The conclusion is that under international law, the responsibility for the illegal forced landing of Boeing 737-800 should be borne by the Belarusian state, and under internal criminal law regulations - by individual Belarusian officials.

In the current legal status, during the organisation in Poland of conferences, events, ceremonies or other events, significant due to their scale or rank, especially those of international character, security activities are carried out on the basis of general provisions - primarily pragmatic acts of services and other institutions carrying out these activities or episodic acts. Polish legislation, however, has not introduced regulations permanently defining detailed principles of conduct and the subject and object scope of responsibility for the preparation and security of such events, unless they are qualified as mass events. This article is an attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of the specific legal instruments used in the case of securing this type of events. Based on the analysis carried out, de lege ferenda conclusions have been formulated, including the introduction of a new legal institution permanently into the Polish legal order, referred to for the purposes of this article as a ‘special event’. As a result of granting a given event or celebration the status of a special event, it would be possible to apply legal instruments hitherto found only in episodic acts, but which are of significant importance from the perspective of ensuring a security standard adequate to the threat.

During the Cold War, Western states repeatedly accused the Soviet bloc of supporting international terrorism. The declassification of many documents from the archives of the former intelligence services in Central and Eastern Europe has made it possible to verify these accusations and has also made it possible to take a broader look at the links between the socialist states and terrorist groups. The aim of the article is to present the factors determining the establishment and maintenance of secret contacts between the Soviet bloc states and terrorist organisations, to indicate the genesis of these contacts and to present their actual course, and in this context also the experience of the People’s Republic of Poland against the background of other communist countries.

The use of vehicles as tools for terrorist attacks, which has been occurring over the past few years, has led to the increasing use of anti-terrorist blockades around critical infrastructure buildings and in public spaces. This process has progressed as awareness and knowledge of the existence of this type of threat has increased among decision-makers. The variety of devices used to protect against attacks and their selection is not obvious and easy to implement. In this article, the author attempts to describe the occurrence of risks to critical infrastructure facilities from road vehicles used as weapons to carry out attacks. He describes the possibilities of preventing this type of event and recommends solutions to help in the design and implementation of external building security systems. The guidelines contained in the article can be a source of knowledge for those responsible for the security of facilities, but in addition to the theoretical basis in the design of external security of facilities, it is necessary in each case to carry out a specialised risk assessment, carried out by a qualified consultant.

In the second part of the article on the case of Anders Behring Breivik, the author answers the questions of whether the attack could have been prevented and what impact it had on public sentiment, the nature of the changes to internal security policy in Norway and the performance of the country’s security services. In addition, he analyses Breivik’s actions in terms of whether he meets the criteria of a lone wolf terrorist, as well as describing terrorist attacks prepared or carried out by his imitators.

Previous research on radicalisation suggests that this process is the result of an accumulation of factors that generate a person’s susceptibility to extremist narratives. The authors of this article analysed the biographies of the perpetrators of terrorist attacks and, given the frequent references in these biographies to the abuse of various stimulants by the attackers, attempted to summarise the available knowledge on the relationship between psychoactive substance addiction and radicalisation. Although no simple causal relationship between addictions and radicalisation was found, the effects of addictions partly overlap with identified vulnerabilities to extremist narratives. A comprehensive approach to terrorism prevention should therefore take into account that addictions may contribute to increasing the vulnerability of some individuals to radicalisation leading to terrorism.

This article is devoted to a legal analysis of the events of 23 May 2021 involving a Polish Boeing 737-800 with registration number SP-RSM, performing a flight from Athens to Vilnius, specifically the actions of the Belarusian authorities (air traffic services and special services) that led to the forced landing of this aircraft in Minsk, which allowed the arrest of Roman Protasevich and his partner. The basis of the considerations in the first part of the article is the interpretation of the relevant international and Belarusian law in the context of the revealed circumstances surrounding the incident under investigation. The author’s aim was to answer the question of whether the actions of the Belarusian authorities were legal. Ultimately, it was shown that on 23 May 2021, a number of legal rules governing air navigation were violated in relation to the Polish aircraft, which raises the question of who should bear responsibility for it and on the basis of which legal norms. The second part of the article is devoted to this issue. The conclusion is that under international law, the responsibility for the illegal forced landing of Boeing 737-800 should be borne by the Belarusian state, and under internal criminal law regulations - by individual Belarusian officials.

In the current legal status, during the organisation in Poland of conferences, events, ceremonies or other events, significant due to their scale or rank, especially those of international character, security activities are carried out on the basis of general provisions - primarily pragmatic acts of services and other institutions carrying out these activities or episodic acts. Polish legislation, however, has not introduced regulations permanently defining detailed principles of conduct and the subject and object scope of responsibility for the preparation and security of such events, unless they are qualified as mass events. This article is an attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of the specific legal instruments used in the case of securing this type of events. Based on the analysis carried out, de lege ferenda conclusions have been formulated, including the introduction of a new legal institution permanently into the Polish legal order, referred to for the purposes of this article as a ‘special event’. As a result of granting a given event or celebration the status of a special event, it would be possible to apply legal instruments hitherto found only in episodic acts, but which are of significant importance from the perspective of ensuring a security standard adequate to the threat.

During the Cold War, Western states repeatedly accused the Soviet bloc of supporting international terrorism. The declassification of many documents from the archives of the former intelligence services in Central and Eastern Europe has made it possible to verify these accusations and has also made it possible to take a broader look at the links between the socialist states and terrorist groups. The aim of the article is to present the factors determining the establishment and maintenance of secret contacts between the Soviet bloc states and terrorist organisations, to indicate the genesis of these contacts and to present their actual course, and in this context also the experience of the People’s Republic of Poland against the background of other communist countries.

The use of vehicles as tools for terrorist attacks, which has been occurring over the past few years, has led to the increasing use of anti-terrorist blockades around critical infrastructure buildings and in public spaces. This process has progressed as awareness and knowledge of the existence of this type of threat has increased among decision-makers. The variety of devices used to protect against attacks and their selection is not obvious and easy to implement. In this article, the author attempts to describe the occurrence of risks to critical infrastructure facilities from road vehicles used as weapons to carry out attacks. He describes the possibilities of preventing this type of event and recommends solutions to help in the design and implementation of external building security systems. The guidelines contained in the article can be a source of knowledge for those responsible for the security of facilities, but in addition to the theoretical basis in the design of external security of facilities, it is necessary in each case to carry out a specialised risk assessment, carried out by a qualified consultant.

In the second part of the article on the case of Anders Behring Breivik, the author answers the questions of whether the attack could have been prevented and what impact it had on public sentiment, the nature of the changes to internal security policy in Norway and the performance of the country’s security services. In addition, he analyses Breivik’s actions in terms of whether he meets the criteria of a lone wolf terrorist, as well as describing terrorist attacks prepared or carried out by his imitators.

Previous research on radicalisation suggests that this process is the result of an accumulation of factors that generate a person’s susceptibility to extremist narratives. The authors of this article analysed the biographies of the perpetrators of terrorist attacks and, given the frequent references in these biographies to the abuse of various stimulants by the attackers, attempted to summarise the available knowledge on the relationship between psychoactive substance addiction and radicalisation. Although no simple causal relationship between addictions and radicalisation was found, the effects of addictions partly overlap with identified vulnerabilities to extremist narratives. A comprehensive approach to terrorism prevention should therefore take into account that addictions may contribute to increasing the vulnerability of some individuals to radicalisation leading to terrorism.

This article is devoted to a legal analysis of the events of 23 May 2021 involving a Polish Boeing 737-800 with registration number SP-RSM, performing a flight from Athens to Vilnius, specifically the actions of the Belarusian authorities (air traffic services and special services) that led to the forced landing of this aircraft in Minsk, which allowed the arrest of Roman Protasevich and his partner. The basis of the considerations in the first part of the article is the interpretation of the relevant international and Belarusian law in the context of the revealed circumstances surrounding the incident under investigation. The author’s aim was to answer the question of whether the actions of the Belarusian authorities were legal. Ultimately, it was shown that on 23 May 2021, a number of legal rules governing air navigation were violated in relation to the Polish aircraft, which raises the question of who should bear responsibility for it and on the basis of which legal norms. The second part of the article is devoted to this issue. The conclusion is that under international law, the responsibility for the illegal forced landing of Boeing 737-800 should be borne by the Belarusian state, and under internal criminal law regulations - by individual Belarusian officials.

In the current legal status, during the organisation in Poland of conferences, events, ceremonies or other events, significant due to their scale or rank, especially those of international character, security activities are carried out on the basis of general provisions - primarily pragmatic acts of services and other institutions carrying out these activities or episodic acts. Polish legislation, however, has not introduced regulations permanently defining detailed principles of conduct and the subject and object scope of responsibility for the preparation and security of such events, unless they are qualified as mass events. This article is an attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of the specific legal instruments used in the case of securing this type of events. Based on the analysis carried out, de lege ferenda conclusions have been formulated, including the introduction of a new legal institution permanently into the Polish legal order, referred to for the purposes of this article as a ‘special event’. As a result of granting a given event or celebration the status of a special event, it would be possible to apply legal instruments hitherto found only in episodic acts, but which are of significant importance from the perspective of ensuring a security standard adequate to the threat.

During the Cold War, Western states repeatedly accused the Soviet bloc of supporting international terrorism. The declassification of many documents from the archives of the former intelligence services in Central and Eastern Europe has made it possible to verify these accusations and has also made it possible to take a broader look at the links between the socialist states and terrorist groups. The aim of the article is to present the factors determining the establishment and maintenance of secret contacts between the Soviet bloc states and terrorist organisations, to indicate the genesis of these contacts and to present their actual course, and in this context also the experience of the People’s Republic of Poland against the background of other communist countries.

The use of vehicles as tools for terrorist attacks, which has been occurring over the past few years, has led to the increasing use of anti-terrorist blockades around critical infrastructure buildings and in public spaces. This process has progressed as awareness and knowledge of the existence of this type of threat has increased among decision-makers. The variety of devices used to protect against attacks and their selection is not obvious and easy to implement. In this article, the author attempts to describe the occurrence of risks to critical infrastructure facilities from road vehicles used as weapons to carry out attacks. He describes the possibilities of preventing this type of event and recommends solutions to help in the design and implementation of external building security systems. The guidelines contained in the article can be a source of knowledge for those responsible for the security of facilities, but in addition to the theoretical basis in the design of external security of facilities, it is necessary in each case to carry out a specialised risk assessment, carried out by a qualified consultant.

In the second part of the article on the case of Anders Behring Breivik, the author answers the questions of whether the attack could have been prevented and what impact it had on public sentiment, the nature of the changes to internal security policy in Norway and the performance of the country’s security services. In addition, he analyses Breivik’s actions in terms of whether he meets the criteria of a lone wolf terrorist, as well as describing terrorist attacks prepared or carried out by his imitators.

Previous research on radicalisation suggests that this process is the result of an accumulation of factors that generate a person’s susceptibility to extremist narratives. The authors of this article analysed the biographies of the perpetrators of terrorist attacks and, given the frequent references in these biographies to the abuse of various stimulants by the attackers, attempted to summarise the available knowledge on the relationship between psychoactive substance addiction and radicalisation. Although no simple causal relationship between addictions and radicalisation was found, the effects of addictions partly overlap with identified vulnerabilities to extremist narratives. A comprehensive approach to terrorism prevention should therefore take into account that addictions may contribute to increasing the vulnerability of some individuals to radicalisation leading to terrorism.