VOLUME 7
1982
NUMBER 1

THE ALIGARH JOURNAL OF ENGLISH STUDIES

Editor :

ASLOOB AHMAD ANSARI

EDITORIAL BOARD

A. A. Ansari
M. Hasan
Salamatullah Khan
Z. A. Usmani

The Aligarh Journal of English Studies is edited by A.A. Ansari and published by him on behalf of the Department of English, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh. The *Journal* aims at bringing out twice a year (March and October), critical and research articles dealing with subjects in all the main areas of English studies (but with special attention to Shakespeare) together with detailed and careful reviews. Contributions should be addressed to the Editor. They should be neatly typed, double-spaced, and with notes and references at the end. Stylistic and other conventions as recommended in *MHRA Style Book* should be strictly adhered to.

Annual Subscription :

Rs 30.00
£ 3.50 $ 6.00

Single Copy :

Rs 20.00

Volume 7 1982 Number 1

THE ALIGARH JOURNAL OF ENGLISH STUDIES

CONTENTS

EDWARD H. STRAUCH Implications of Jung's Archetypal approach for Literary Study 1

LAURENCE LERNER Progress and Evil 18

JACK R. SUBLETTE Imagery of Time and Change in *Richard II* 34

A. A. ANSARI No Clock in the Forest of Arden 55

J. J. M. TOBIN Macbeth and Christs Teares over Jerusalem 72

BOOK REVIEWS

Z. A. USMANI *Selected Essays in Criticism* By L. C. Knights 79

S. WIQAR HUSAIN *Lost Angels of a Ruined Paradise* By Erika Gottlieb 86

A. A. ANSARI *Visionary Physics* By Donald Ault 92

Edward H. Strauch

IMPLICATIONS OF JUNG'S ARCHETYPAL APPROACH FOR LITERARY STUDY

In the *Introduction to the Essence of Mythology*, which discusses the archetype of the divine child, Jung gives us the key to the implications of the archetypes for literary study. To begin with, archetypes emerge as mental images in order to protect and deliver the psyche from danger.[1] Although primitive man may have distinguished himself by neophobia and an attachment to tradition,[2] the archetypes in mythology, religion, and poetry actually exhibit a creative tendency to synthesize experience, integrate personality, and synchronize energies with spiritual goals. The theme of the infant in myth and literature displays man's inherent intuition to create a superior self which can come to terms with both good and evil.

In his discussion of the divine child myth, Jung emphasizes how an archetype has a purpose as definite as the function of any organ in the body.[3] The function of the child archetype is to correct the peculiarities and extravagances of the conscience.[4] Although Jung is rendering the image of the divine child only, one is led to infer that the emergence of any archetype in myth, folktale, or literature directly or indirectly aids in the synthesis of the conscious and unconscious elements of the artist's and the reader's personality.[5] By reuniting contrasts, the child archetype, therefore, abets the process of individuation in both artist and reader.

In an analogy to man's organic and phylogenic nature, Jung sees the archetype as striving to realize a similar *entelechy* which represents the totality or wholeness sought out through individuation.[6] Despite the constraints of one's personal or ethnic consciousness, an archetype thrusts itself into one's cognizance. Acknowledgment of its presence affects one like a law of nature and becomes a means of maturation and self-transformation from a limited to a larger self and from an inferior to a superior awareness.

Archetypes as psychic residue or the genetic capacity of the individual, inherited from thousands of generations of survivors, represent a direct line from man's archaic origins to the present moment. The presence of archetypes in myth, folktales, and poetry is a clue to the significance of the racial experience embodied in literature. Such archetypes depict the existential situations and problems man has faced and solved, and where man has failed to resolve these crises, the archetypes show why, for their lesson everywhere is the need for man to draw on his ageless experience and in a sense to create form out of the inchoate.

Hence the archetypes are positive powers and patterns or generative forms and functions with which mankind is endowed by reason of the survival of the most creatively fit individuals and species. Even as instincts, archetypes are guides to survival. For this reason, the study of archetypes in literature should not be considered a mere academic preoccupation but be viewed as a vital part of man's education to the chances of survival.

Is the Artist a Neurotic ?

In contrasting the psychological and visionary modes of artistic creation, Jung made clear his opposition to Freud's psychoanalytical interpretation of the poet's psyche according to the artist's traumata, neuroses, and possibly psychoses. In my own view, Freud's choice of Leonardo da Vinci to illustrate the efficacy of his psychoanalytical method could not have been a worse choice for two reasons. First, Freud demonstrated how tenuous and far-fetched his reasoning could go on the basis of the flimsiest evidence. Certainly no *bona fide* scientist would accept Freud's evidence of da Vinci's homosexuality as a proof of anything. Secondly, da Vinci's whole inventive and experimental approach to a wide variety of fields of knowledge and art transcends any causal explanation of his imaginative mind or works. Da Vinci exemplifies the archetypal creative mind, which largely frees itself from the limitations of one's historical and sociological influences and even from one's own psychic past. In transforming the known and unknown to the new, the creative mind transcends the 'law of causality'.

Therefore, what Jung shows is that art is not repression due to some complex, but is release, and this release is not merely Freudian sublimation, transforming the instinctual into the socially acceptable. On the part of the artist, this release helps him to surpass the past and integrate his new self, which seeks to express the stages of the growing personality.

Freud's disciple, Dr. Ernest Jones, committed an error similar to that of his teacher in Freud's da Vinci essay by selecting to study Shakespeare's complexes via the tragedy *Hamlet*. Since Jones emulated Freud, one is tempted to say, 'Like father, like son.' Fortunately, as with Jung versus Freud or with Aristotle versus Plato, some spiritual sons enrich the knowledge of the world by surpassing the limitations of the spiritual father. These instances are further proof that a causal interpretation of human events in life or literature is fruitless.

The 'Case History' Versus Literature

Personages in literature seldom exhibit any neurotic or psychotic traits, and therefore, they rarely represent 'case histories' in the psychoanalytical sense of that expression. To be sure, twentieth century authors have made use of Freudian theory to write vivid works. Examples of artists who have consciously explored Freudian themes are Sherwood Anderson, Eugene O'Neill, William Faulkner, and D. H. Lawrence. On the other hand, it can be argued that O'Neill, Faulkner and Lawrence actually delved into archetypal depths of psyche as well as into Freudian neuroses and that the archetypal dimension is what actually makes their fictional works effective and unforgettable.

The fact that personages seldom manifest neurotic or psychotic traits should prompt the conscientious critic to exercise precaution when examining a literary work as an amateur psychologist or psychoanalyst. In other words, Occidental literature hardly offers statistical evidence that literary works largely portrary 'case histories' of mental patients or that authors are usually neurotics or psychotics working out their mental aberrations through fictions. Unlike the case history which depicts how a patient succumbs to his particular mental illness, the overwhelming majority of literary works show how the hero struggles to overcome evil, danger, or injustice. Put another way, the hero strives to reinstate goodness, justice, and peace in his world. To achieve this goal the hero must solve his dilemma creatively, and this ability to solve problems is manifestly archetypal. Throughout the ages, existential circumstances and events have tested, strengthened and developed this creative gift in man.

If it is prudent to exercise caution in psychoanalyzing an artist or a literary work, it is also wise to think twice before applying scientific determinism to literature. Let us take the case of nineteenth century naturalistic fiction in England (Thomas Hardy) and in France (the Goncourt brothers, de Maupassant, and Zola). As every literature student knows, literary naturalism showed man as a vicitim of heredity, envirnoment and natural selection. To interpret such works according to the avowed theory of the naturalist authors seems a perfectly logical direction to take. After all, bad *genes* and an unwholesome milieu can largely account for individual tragedy. However, to the thoughtful reader, these fictional figures also reveal other patterns of existence where, in order for the species to survive, the individual must learn to overcome his physiological weakness and the environmental perils around him. These other patterns, revealed in the grim lessons of survival, become part of man's archetypal experience. Thus naturalistic fiction, in fact, transcends its own theory when it serves much the same purpose as ancient myths and folktales —warning man against what would extinguish him. Wherever mankind is confronted with extinction, his instinct for survival requires brave deeds and creative thinking, and there we have archetypal situations and themes. Seen in this light, scientific determinism, whether as part of Freudian psychoanalysis or of literary naturalism, is simply an inadequate means of analyzing man's archetypal capacity for survival, and it is this capacity that literature largely depicts.

Causality versus Synchronicity

The fundamental disagreement between Jung and Freud reflects the disenchantment of twentieth century scientific thought with nineteenth century determinism and its all-encompassing explanation of natural phenomena via the concept of causality. This mechanistic concept asserts that every effect has a cause, whether direct or indirect. Having its source in the physical sciences and Newtonian physics at that, the concepts could be effectively used to explain the laws governing motion and matter as distinct from those governing chemistry of living things. When behavioural scientists unconvincingly attempted to explain human choice as the result of inherited or environmental factors, the philosophy of determinism and the concept of causality discovered the limits of its applicability. In sum, to twentieth century scientists, the analogy of causality drawn from the physical sciences simply proved itself an overextended simile which does not work when trying to account for matters of biology or of human thought and deed.

It is in this context that we can better understand Jung's own stand. In his 'Foreword' to the Chinese literary work *I Ching or Book of the Changes*,[7] Jung maintains, 'The axioms of causality are being shaken to their foundations: we know that what we term natural laws are merely statistical truths and thus must necessarily allow for exceptions.[8] Since causality is not an absolute but only 'a working hypothesis of how events evolve one out of another' Jung offers the term *synchronicity* which takes 'the coincidence of events in space and time as meaning something more than mere chance, namely, a peculiar interdependence of objective events among themselves as well as with the subjective (psychic) states of the observer.'[9] Thus in agreement with the millennia-old mind represented in *I Ching*, Jung considers coincidence as prevailing over human events. In other words, the conditions and circumstances of an archetypal situation are not caused, and this state of affairs challenges man's ability to interpret correctly and acutely what his situation is, to accept it or to resolve it.

There may be an even more fundamental reason for the difference in viewpoint between Jung and Freud than the evolution of scientific thought between nineteenth century determinism and twentieth century acausality. The differences between the depth psychologists seem to bear some similarity to the distinctions between two cultural currents in western civilization. In an essay entitled 'Hebraism and Hellenism', Matthew Arnold perceptively described these historical influences.[10] Both Hebraism and Hellenism arose out of wants in human nature, and together they represent a law of human development. Indeed, both aim at man's salvation and perfection. On the one hand, Old Testament Hebraism stressed man's needs to obey the will of God so that *strictness of conscience* became the uppermost virtue of the Hebraic mind. Consciousness of sin and abhorring and fleeing it was the Hebrew's lifetime duty. Thus self-conquest was the main striving of the Hebraic personality. By contrast, Greek Hellenism strove to see things as they really are, yet enjoyed an unimpeded play of thought. Sweetness and light may be said to be the attitude they sought to develop by seeing things in all their beauty. Hence Hellenism is most strikingly characterized by *spontaneity of consciousness*.[11]

To a certain extent Freud truly represented the ancient Hebraic mind in his emphasis on neuroses, psychoses, and complexes whereas Jung clearly adhered to the outlook that man's myths, religions and folklore reflect man's natural spontaneity of consciousness. In a very broad sense, the fearful, obedient, and awed attitude of archaic Hebraism versus the hopeful, disobedient, self-confident and creative attitude of Greek antiquity both seem to reflect archetypal tendencies in western man, and as such, these archetypes present a more convincing argument in favour of Jung's philosophy than it does of Freud's because Jung takes into account both the dark and the lighted side of man's collective unconscious and man's ethnic consciousness. Most of all, the Hellenic spontaneity of consciousness represents an argument against the causal interpretation of psyche and offers additional evidence that Jung's concept of synchronicity is a truer explanation of psychic phenomena and existential events.

Matthew Arnold's interpretation of Hebraic and Hellenic influence on the development of the western mind finds a corollary in Friedrich Nietzsche's version of the psychic forces which shaped Occidental culture. In his *Birth of Tragedy* (1872), Nietzsche describes the Appollonian and Dionysian impulses inherited from ancient Greece. As absolute, non-rational powers, they work through a poet but transcend his personal life or feelings.

To the ancient Greeks, Apollo was the god of medicine, the arts, light and prophecy. For Nietzsche, Apollo symbolizes the poet's intuition of form which enables the artist to create a symmetric, beautiful, and understandable world. By contrast, Dionysus characterizes the poet's musical sense, which indicates his awareness of the irrationality, pain, and suffering in existence. Dionysus' tale assured his worshippers that death would be followed by resurrection. This faith was part of the Eleusinian mysteries, and out of this form of worship Greek drama was bron.

Now it is obvious that faith in resurrection after death rejects the causal interpretation of existence and asserts that the teleological purpose of the universe ultimately transcends the natural law of earth. Moreover, it is self-evident that the Christian belief in a life after death also denies causality as an adequate explanation of human destiny. Implicit in Christianity is a sense of life's synchronicity; that is, any given moment in life may challenge us to decide our future in eternity. Although no modern Christian would deny the influence of the subconscious and of society on human decision, the decision is still ours to make. Whatever the coincidence of circumstances, we often are inspired to surpass the impasse of what seems a hopeless situation.

For Nietzsche, Aeschylus' tragedy best illustrated the interaction of Apollonian and Dionysian forces. Although Socrates' irony and skepticism taught us to separate reality from appearance, and although modern rationalism taught men to speak of the 'objective' and 'subjective' sides of their nature, Nietzsche regarded the Apollonian and Dionysian impulses as perennial archetypal forces able at any time to recreate great tragedy and to make man whole and great once more.

Thomas Mann supported the view that music is a materialization of ageless Dionysian power in his literary works, *Tristan, Death in Venice,* and *Doktor Faustus.* Furthermore, Mann's consciousness of the conflict and interaction of the Apollonian and the Dionysian is clearly manifest in *The Magic Mountain* where the spiritual duel between Settembrini and Naphta represents the intellectul struggle of western culture to find, in Jungian terms, a synthesis which would dialectically resolve the archetypal opposition. More important, Mann makes clear that the Apollonian-Dionysian dialectic has no predictable outcome. Even though causality may influence human affairs, writers like Matthew Arnold, Nietzsche, and Thomas Mann point to a synchronicity of dialectical powers within and without man as being a greater influence in human affairs.

Jung's concept of synchronicity, therefore, shows striking affinities to major world views: the Taoist explanation of change in human life, ancient Greek spontaneity of consciousness influencing man's development along with Hebraic strictness of conscience, the interaction of man's Appollonian and Dionysian forces, and the Christian credo of the soul's survival after biological death. Taken altogether, these world views offer considerable cultural evidence that nineteenth century determinism with its concept of causality is inadequate wholly to explain the synchronicity of men caught up in actual events.

Further weight to Jung's central argument is lent by the advent of nineteenth and twentieth century existentialism. Developed through thinkers like Kierkegaard, Jaspers, and Heidegger and through fiction writers like Unumuno, Dostoyevsky, and Kafka, existentialism emerged in the 1940's as the doctrine that man is what he makes himself. Regarding life as dynamic and in a constant state of flux, the literary existentialists—Jean Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir—refused to consider man as predestined by society, biology, or God. Instead of the individual being determined by forces outside himself, he possessed the free will to decide his destiny and has, therefore, the responsibility to choose an authentic way to live. The existentialists believe in taking firm, positive action called *engagement*, even though they at the same time acknowledge the presence of irrationality in human affairs. The fact that Western man has come to think of himself as a rational being is the reason that, faced with the realization that existence is actually absurd,man feels in our age a keen subconscious and conscious anxiety.

At the center of atheistic existentialism is the conviction that *contingency* hovers over human destiny. In other words, the outcome of events is unpredictable because accident and uncertainty play such an important part in whatever occurs in life. The only thing that can be said with any certainty is that crircumstances may make an event probable. In short, the sure predictability associated with causal explanations of the physical world simply proves impossible for human life in general. Obviously this contingency bears marked similarities to Jung's definition of synchronicity.

To further examine the implications of Jung's concept in a very general way, let us consider the well-known figures of Don Juan, Romeo and Juliet, and Tristan and Isolde to see whether their destinies may be regarded as caused or whether synchronicity provides a better context by which to interpret their stories.

In his *Archetypes of the Collective unconscious, Jung* delineates the psychological aspects of the mother complex in the son. A boy may have quite opposife reactions to the fixation. He may become impotent, turn homosexual, or develop characteristics of Don Juanism, which means that he unconsciously seeks his mother in every woman he meets.[12] However, beyond these psychopathological limitations, a man with a mother complex may develop 'a finely differentiated Eros instead of homosexuality,' in which case he may become a supremely gifted teacher 'due to his almost feminine insight and tact.' In addition, he may have a sense of history and keen receptivity to spiritual experiences.[13] Or in opposition to the negative side of Don Juanism, he may be bold and resolute, 'striving after the highest goals,' willing to make sacrifices for the sake of justice, persevering, tough, and endowed with 'a couriosity that does not shrink from the riddles of the universe.'[14]

From these possible destinies springing out of a single synchronic situation, we can draw a number of conclusions. Probably it will always remain a mystery as to why a son follows one direction rather than another. However, it should be quite clear that the mother did not *cause* the boy to become Don Juan rather than a homosexual or *vice versa*. In fact, if the boy had the intelligence or receptivity to tap a deeper archetype, he might become a supremely gifted teacher or a decoder of the riddles of the universe. In this way he would creatively overcome his complexes. To be sure, his temperament influenced him to take one direction and not another. Furthermore, multiple circumstances of his milieu were present to condition his choice. Yet ultimately Don Juan did choose the more virile rather than the more passive way to love and live. As teacher or researcher, the son would pursue a destiny freed from the debilitating influences of his 'complex' and of the past. Thus synchronicity set the stage, causes were at work, but the son decided; and such decision meant that he made a creative choice in so far as his subsequent actions consciously avoided humiliation and self-destruction and sought out an archetypal destiny with intellectual rewards and spiritual fulfilment.

Literary examples also illustrate the difference between causality and synchronicity. In Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*, the lovers are kept apart by the fact that their families are enemies. The social and ethnic circumstances should, therefore, have caused the youngsters to fear or even to hate each other out of loyalty to their families and out of respect to the blood spilt on each side. However the fact remains that love, the most powerful and noblest form of all human emotions, simply overwhelmed all the 'causes' against it. The story of Romeo and Juliet, the 'star-crossed lovers', dramatizes how circumstances and the influence of sheer chance (the plague which separated them for a while) 'fated' them to take their lives. For to them life without love was not life at all. Yet the example of their love finally freed the families from the ancient enmity, proving the efficacy of spiritual powers in human life and the capacity of men, faced with tragedy, to free themselves from the past by sensitive and sensible decision.

In *Romeo and Juliet* love is recognized as a higher self in human nature, in contrast to hatred 'caused' by our bestial or selfish instincts. The recognition of a higher and nobler self, awakened by love, can only be associated with man's intuition of teleological purpose. For love, the ultimate archetypal wisdom, urges one to grow beyond one's lustful, selfcentred being, to recognize the humanity and beauty in another person; love moves us to found a loving family, to be worthy fathers and mothers, to be faithful in all one does for the sake of one's offspring and the future. In a Jungian context, love leads us to emulate God the Father and Sophia the Mother. Love awakens us to a higher Self.

The story of Tristan and Isolde is another literary example As the emissary of his uncle of his uncle's betrothed, Isolde, Tristan is supposed to respect the relationship. Both the young persons owe a kind of loyalty to the uncle, for a marriage had been agreed to. Respect for one's solemn word, for society, law, order, and decency should have been sufficient 'cause' to prevent any breach of promise, and yet the promise was broken. Whether the young couple yielded to lust, due to their drinking a magic potion as some medieval versions of the story imply, or whether they simply yielded to their mutual youthful attraction, the same archetypal event took place between them. They experienced an irresistible passion for one another.

Because the tale of Tristan and Isolde may be regarded as nothing more than a story of brute sexuality in chivalric disguise, an astute reader would point out that the tale exemplifies Freud's theory of the power of the libido. Of course, there is no small truth to that allegation. Yet why in virtually all love stories is the world nearly always on the side of the lovers against convention, taboos, social restrictions, family obedience, and the like ? The reason is that love is the universally recognized source of human happiness. It not only reassures the human race of survival but true love requited, as portrayed in the medieval tale of Aucassin and Nicolette and numberless other stories down through the ages, is the revelation of free choice—two persons choosing one another for all life against all odds, for better or for worse. Love leading to a marriage of sincere minds and true hearts seems touched by a holy power. As creative choice beyond brute pleasures, such love cannot be considered a neurotic or psychotic complex waiting to destroy the individual. Rather, out of ageless human experience, the feeling of love strongly urges the individual to freely decide to pursue a nobler life. For this reason genuine love represents the highest archetypal destiny open to common mortals.

There are good reasons for critics and writers to be drawn to Jung's theory of psyche. A well-known example is Thomas Mann. In his speech 'Freud and the Future', delivered on the occasion of the celebration of his eightieth birthday in 1936, the novelist highlights his artistic transition from a basically Freudian view of human character to an appreciation of the mythical identities manifest in literature and scripture.

In retracing the evolution of his growing awareness of the archetypal in human existence, Thomas Mann refers to Arthur Schopenhauer's essay, 'Transcendent Speculations on Apparent Design in the Fate of the Individual'. The great idea contained in the essay was that our own will leads us inexorably to our own fate and that 'we are actually ourselves bringing about what seems to be happening to us'.[15] Mann makes reference to another article, 'On the Psychology of the older School of Biography,' which stresses how many human beings unconsciously live 'the destiny of a class or rank or calling.' This article, says Mann, gives us 'the precise point at which the psychological interest passes over into the mythical'.[16] Thus for Mann, myth is the timeless schema which provides us with insights into the higher, authentic, and eternal truths in life. As such, the mythical gives value to the present and acts as 'a fresh incarnation of the traditional upon earth.' Life is a sacred repetition.[17]

Ortegoy Gasset thought ancient man searched into the past for a pattern to live by. In ancient times a woman or a man sought significance through reliving a myth in flesh and blood as did Cleopatra fulfilling her Aphrodite destiny onto death and Jesus following his 'lofty messianic sense of self.'[18] Yet Mann believed mythical identification or 'imitation' is psychologically possible at all time.[19]

Playfully tying in the celebration of his own birthday with celebration as part of a religious act, Mann speaks of how ancient feasts involved a dramatic performance or a retelling of the story of a god, such as the life and suffering of Osiris. In other words, a feast took place ceremoniously according to a mythical prototype. To Mann the mystery play of the Christian Middle Ages with its scenes of heaven, earth, and the torments of hell also charaterizes the mythical dimension as does Goethe's *Faust.*[20] Clearly archetypal in subject, theme, and form, such literature exemplifies Jung's interpretation of human experience.

Mann also speaks of the mythical identification one has with one's father, one's imitation of him, one's developing through such emulation a higher and more evolved character of one's own.[21] This shpaping of the human being, this *Bildung*, is engendered through admiration and love, through the child's identification with the father image because of the profound affinities which exist between them. Ultimately, such emulation becomes *imitateo dei.*[22] Thus in myth lies concealed the seeds of our figure as individual and as humanity.[23]

Mann's observations urge us to look back over the history of man's creative efforts and that glance makes us realize that the thousands of geniuses who have made contributions to art. literature, and philosophy can hardly have been preponderantly neurotic or psychotic in Freud's sense of those terms. The mentally ill rarely produce coherent beauty. To corroborate their thesis, the Freudians might point to a handful of artists as Novalis, Baudelaire, and afew others who took narcotics, were confined to mental institutions, or committed suicide. However, the hundreds of geniuses who did not yield to such self-destructive tendencies point, rather, to a healthy and virile force in the human personality which we can call the archetype of creativity. Thanks to this archetype, man has created and developed societies, cultures and civilizations.

Indeed, creativity seems to be the intuitive and intellectual manifestation of our embryonic and phylogenic heritage and history, and the mandalas of the arts focus our archetypal search for wholeness and meaning, where meaning signifies the birth of a higher stage of awareness and understanding. Implicit in this process is the self-transformation of both the individual and the race. Called forth from the collective unconscious and modified by ethnic consciousness, creativity decides which archetypes to actualize.

In general, world literature dramatizes those quasi-universal, existential situations that human beings can do something about. Art and literature rarely depict situations where the possibility of human decision does not exist. Although life does face man with cataclysmic events and biological death, literature usually shows man at grips with his destiny, not as an unresourceful victim.

If we bear in mind that the races alive today are the survivors of the past, that indicates that those races developed the capacity to survive the archetypal situations which threatened to extinguish the individual and the race. Not only did the physically fittest survive but also those with the greatest cunning, shrewdness, and creativity. In order to survive, men needed keen perception, some form of communication, inventiveness, and an effective means of accomplishing things to supplant the magic that did not work. That means that a man or race survided by learning, obeying, and improving the racial consciousness into which he was born.

Once we grasp the fact that man is not blindly impelled by the influences of the past, we come to a new understanding of human destiny. To be sure, life is full of confrontations demanding decision and action, but it is the unique synchronicity of each crisis that alerts and actuates an archetype to respond to the total situation—and each individual reacts differently according to time and place. Because learning promises survival, human intelligence represents man's archetypal capacity to learn and to think. This creative capacity is the key to the acausal interpretation of experience in life and literature. We must learn how man learns; we must understand how man has learned to think. More than life itself, literature provides us with archetypal examples of how man has learned to survive by thinking creatively.

Literature shows this capacitiy for creativity in action, for literature largely dramatizes those situations in which the hero or victim personates the potentials we all carry within us. Hence when literature draws on man's collective unconscious and his ethnic consciousness, it portrays the pathos and ethos of *anthropos* himself confronted as he is with problems which call forth his inherited creativity. The reason-for-being of literature seems to be to exercise this archetype.

Department of English
University of Maidugri
Maidugri, Nigeria

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] C, G. Jung and Ch. Kerenyi, *Introduction a l'essencede la Mythologie, L'enfant divin, La Jeune fille divine,* (Paris, Petite Bibliotheque Payott; no publication date given but the Preface to the new edition gives 1951 as the date it was written,) French transl. from German, H. E. Del Medico. p. 112.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 121,

[3] *Ibid.* p. 118

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 120

[5] *Ibid.*, p. p. 122-123

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 123

[7] C.G.Jung's 'Foreword' to Richard' Wilhelm's translation of *I Ching or the Book of Changes,* English translation by C. F. Baynes, (Princeton, N. J., 1950). The *I Ching* is a book of hexagrams with scholarly commentary and interpretation. Based on a vision of existence as manifesting continuous transformation, the Taoist philosophy supporting the *I Ching* regards the female and male

principle, or the powers of dark and light *(yin* and *yang),* as effecting the continuous change man experiences in the life around him.

[8] *Ibid.,* p. xxii

[9] *Ibid.,* p. xxiv

[10] Matthew Arnold, 'Hebraism and Hellenism', *Culture and Anarchy,* (1869)

[11] Cf. Erich Auerbach's Chapter 1, 'Odysseus' Scar', *Mimesis, The Representation of Reality in Western Literature,* (Garden City N.Y., 1957).

[12] C.G. Jung, *Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious,* p. 28

[13] *Ibid.,* p. 87

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] Thomas Mann, 'Freud and the Future' in *Criticism: the Major Texts,* ed., J. W. Bate, (N. Y., 1970), p. 668

[16] *Ibid.,* p. 670

[17] *Ibid.,* p. 671

[18] *Ibid.,* pp. 671-72

[19] *Ibid.* This revaluation of the term 'imitation' may be of considerable consequence for students of literature not only in the context of Aristotle's *Poetics* but also in that of the whole history of mimetic literary theory. Although the first chapter in Erich Auerbach's *Mimesis* is rather clearly archetypal in implications, many other chapters related to various periods of European literature implicate revaluation in terms of archetypal mimesis.

[20] *Ibid.,* p. 672

[21] *Ibid.,* pp. 672-73

[22] *Ibid.,* p. 673

[23] Thomas Mann's *Joseph and his Brothers* (1933-43) also manifests archetypal themes with its recounting of the Old Testament story. Implicit in it is the fact that by recognizing an archetype as God, one's psychic preoccupation with it can lead one to live a life according to the image.

Laurence Lerner

PROGRESS AND EVIL*

In the fifth book of Spenser's *Faerie Queene* an encounter takes place between the hero, Artegall, who represents Justice, and a giant with a huge pair of scales in his hand, who boasts

> That all the world he would weigh equally
> If ought he had the same to counterpoise.
> For want whereof he weighed vanity
> And filled his balance full of idle toys:
> Yet was admired much of fools, women and boys.

This giant has a number of ambitious technological projects : to rearrange land and sea, to supersede the weather, to 'balance heaven and hell together', to restore the earth to its pristine smoothness and reduce all things 'unto equality'. These projects earn him great popular esteem :

> Therefore the vulgar did about him flock. . .
> In hope by his great benefit to gain,
> And uncontrolled freedom to obtain.

Artegall disputes with the giant, telling him that he must first know what everything was like 'of yore': all things were created 'in goodly measure', in a state of harmony, and all are in their place now in a well-ordered world which it is blasphemy to think of rearranging : 'All change is perilous, and all chance unsound./Therefore leave off to weigh them all again'. In reply, the giant maintains 'how badly all things present be', and insists that both protuberances and inequalities should be smoothed out. 'Therefore I will throw down these mountains high,/And make them level with the lowly plain'; and, as a parallel activity, he will overthrow tyrants, 'And lordings curb, that commons overawe;/And all the wealth of rich men to the poor will draw.' Artegall replies that for all the apparent changes taking place, things stay essentially the same. Both kinds of inequality (geographical and political) are good because decreed by God :

---

* The text of this paper will appear in Laurence Lerner's volume of essays, *The Literary Imagination,* to be published by the Harvester Press.

> The hills do not the lowly dale disdain;
> The dales do not the lofty hills envy.
> He maketh kings to sit in sovereignty,
> He maketh subjects to their power obey;
> He pulleth down, he setteth up on high.

For the giant to seek to rearrange the world is not only wrong but futile: no one can withstand God's 'mighty will'. The giant's projects are vain because he does not know the causes of things.

The showdown comes when Artegall challenges the giant to weigh words, and to weigh right and wrong, which he cannot do, because, as Artegall explains, it must be done in the mind. Whereupon *(ultima regum ratio !)* he has the giant thrown into the sea and drowned. This produces an uprising among the common people ('that rascal rout'), which is suppressed through their being knocked down by Talus, Artegall's iron follower.

Spenser's prescience in this episode is uncanny, and would have astonished and distressed him. In the figure of the giant he has foretold a good deal of the history of modern thought. The giant's scientific world picture is set against Artegall's traditional theological view, based on order and degree and the acceptance of God's universe. The giant has read his Archimedes, who declared he would move the world if he had somewhere to place himself; his science is based on mathematics, and issues in technology, so that while Artegall is concerned with the place of everything in a prearranged plan, he is busy measuring—the truly revolutionary procedure. Natural scientists at this time were still drawing up taxonomies, a procedure that offered little threat to the traditional world order; whereas it is as if Spenser's giant was aware of Whitehead's observation that Aristotle had told scientists to classify when he should have told them to measure. Like a good positivist, too, the giant is unhistorical: it is Artegall who maintains that to understand the world you must know how it was of yore. Where philosophy is traditional, conservative and hierarchical, science is democratic, even socialist, for it abolishes old distinctions: the quaint ambiguity of 'equality' is a shrewd social insight. As for Artegall's way of winning the argument—there is as much ambiguity and confusion in his case as in the giant's, but he has him thrown into the sea—it seems such an admission that new ideas can be kept down only by force, that one could almost believe it was smuggled into Spenser's text by some irreverent radical.

A later system of thought, that does not fully exist yet, is here condemned as if it were a wicked misunderstanding of the world; and a very similar point can be made about *King Lear*. As all students know, two views of Nature are used in the play, normative and neutral. Normative Nature is now familiar to us as part of the Elizabethan world picture: it is God's ordered universe, which responds with shock when the basic moral law is transgressed. Duncan's horses take leave of their share of natural reason when Duncan is murdered; unnatural events take place in the heavens when Julius Caesar is about to be killed. The positive side of the doctrine is stated by the friar in *Romeo and Juliet* who explains, as he gathers medicinal herbs, that everything in Nature has its own virtue, and that there are curative and harmful properties in plants corresponding to sin and grace in mankind. In *Lear* it functions as a standard to invoke against 'unnatural' behaviour:

> Hear, Nature, hear! dear Goddess, hear!
> Suspend thy purpose, if thou didst intend

> To make this creature fruitful!
> Into her womb convey sterility!
> Dry up in her the organs of increase,
> And from her derogate body never spring
> A babe to honour her! If she must teem,
> Create her child of spleen, that it may live
> And be athwart disnature'd torment to her!

Because Goneril was a thankless child, it is possible to appeal to Nature, the dear Goddess who has arranged for the bond of love and gratitude to bind parents and children; and Nature can answer the prayer either by the physical curse of sterility or by the moral curse of giving her a thankless child: the two are parallel and complementary, for physical and moral are not independent of each other. To give birth, that holy act of fruitful Nature, would in her case be degraded into 'teeming'. Lear of course is not himself moved by natural piety: he is dictating to Nature, and he has already transgressed against the family bond by inviting love in return for financial reward. But it is not difficult to distinguish the doctrine itself from Lear's perversion of it; and my immediate concern is not the dramatic action of the play but the implications of its conception of Nature. When Lear, recovering from his great passion, is being tended by Cordelia, she is told that there are simples designed to bring about the foster-nurse of nature, repose : the same doctrine as that stated by the Friar. To this she responds:

> All blest secrets,
> All you unpublishad virtues of the earth
> Spring with my tears! be aidant and remediate
> In the good man's distress!

It is impossible to be sure if this is a conceit or the direct statement of a doctrine. The hope that simples will flourish if we water them with our tears sounds like a charming poetic fancy, deriving from Shakespeare's craftsmanship or Cordelia's intensity; but Nature, in the normative view, can and does respond to the appeal of a loving heart, so that Cordelia's plea ('be aidant and remediate') is at least as much prayer as conceit.

In contrast to this is the Nature of instinctual drives and natural law, the nature that contrasts with society and what Edmund calls 'the curiosity of nations'. Edmund the bastard is the natural child, in the revealing phrase which implies that wedlock is unnatural—as perhaps the word *wedlock* already suggests. There is a complication here, in that to the Christian wedlock is not natural either, but supernatural: marriage is a sacrament to the Catholic, and even to the Protestant requires the blessing of the Church. But since Nature is imbued with the spirit of God, the natural, by the normative view, includes the supernatural: whereas Edmund's Nature is quite different from, even opposite to, Lear's 'dear goddess'. It is the nature of natural science.

Now as it happens a modern play provides us with the perfect contrast to all this. In Sartre's retelling of the Orestes story, *Les Mouches,* there is a confrontation between Oreste and Jupiter just before the climax, in which the hitherto shifty and undignified god manages, through rhetoric and sound effects, to impress and overawe. Speaking now in a grandiose manner, he describes the revolution of the planets and the cycle of generations in language that recalls the Elizabethan world picture :

> Par moi les especes se perpetuent, j' ai ordonne
> qu'un homme engendre toujours un homme, et que le
> petit d'un chien soit un chien, par moi la douce
> langue des marees vient lecher le sable et se
> retire a heure fixe...

This last detail restates exactly what Artegall said to the giant: that constant movement does not mean disorder. Then, having asserted that physical order involves a moral order, Jupiter points out to Oreste that his attempted defiance will be repudiated by the earth itself, which will crumble under his feet. Oreste replies by reasserting his rejection of Jupiter's world :

> Qu'elle s' effrite! Que les rochers me condannent, et que les plantes se fanent sur mon passage: tout ton univers ne suffira pas a me donner tort. Tu es le roi des Dieux, Jupiter, le roi des pierres et des etoiles, le roi des vagues de la mer. Mais tu ne'es pas le roi des hommes.

This defiance constitutes his freedom: 'je suis condanne de n'avoir d'autre loique ela mienne.' Jupiter pities the humans to whom Oreste will offer the 'obscene et fade existence' that will remain to them after refusing integration in his scheme of things. Oreste does not dispute that this is what awaits them, but 'pourquoi leur refuserais—je le desespoir qui est en moi, puisque c'est leur lot ?' Liberty, for Sartre, is emancipation from the Great Chain of Being and the Elizabethan world picture.

It is as if Oreste is asserting a historical point: that a new worldview was perceived by the old, but perceived as evil, or despicable. In order to claim the future, all Oreste needs to do is reverse the moral judgment. Jupiter is not saying all this for the first time, as we've already seen: already in the fourteenth century, a preacher responded to social mobility by saying 'God made the clergy knights and labourers, but the devil made the burghers and usurers'—that is, the new classes. Nietzsche's aphorism on the subject is more openly cynical: 'History treats almost exclusively of bad men who have later been declared good men.'

So far, what we have seen rebuked is science and democracy; to these we can add individual self-reliance and social mobility. What Samuel Smiles admired, Langland deplored: 'Ac sythe bondesmen barnes han be made bisshopes,/And barnes bastardus han be erchedekens.' The opposite view—that social conflict results from discrepancies of wealth—is found in *Piers Plowman,* but placed in the mouth of one of the Deadly Sins: egalitarianism is preached by Wrath. The intellectual questioning of Spenser' giant is also found, and also rebuked, in *PP:* the dreamer is reproached by Reason for wondering at the marvels of the world (how birds have the wit to build their nests), instead of drawing moral lessons from Nature, and for wanting to know why the world is in such a bad state.

Why should literature perceive the future as evil? The obvious answer is that the imagination is conservative, and cannot accept a radically new way of perceiving reality, either social or natural: and its way of handling the unacceptable is to fit it into existing (moral) categories, so that repudiation takes the form of moral disapproval. The tension that results when the future grows more and more actual can persist for a very long time—as we see from the case of social mobility. Langland's disapproval, in varying form, persisted throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, not only in asides and incidentals, but as a central element in Jacobean satire and comedy. The well-born rake, whose sexual and financial behaviour displays little more than direct self-interest, is almost invariably depicted sympathetically in the comedies of Middleton and Massinger; in contrast, the city merchant, set on financial gain and buying his way into a higher social level, is a monster (or, if he is depicted as sensible and knowing his place, then his wife and daughters are monsters). Massinger in particular turned such figures into brilliant grotesques, Overreach in the misleadingly titled *New way to Pay Old Debts* (it shows a very old way to handle new men), and Luke in *The City Madam*. Here is Luke enjoying the spectacle of the virtuous family he has ruined :

> Ha, ha, ha !
> This move me to compassion, or raise
> One sign of seeming pity in my face!
> You are deceived : it rather renders me
> More flinty and obdurate. A south wind
> Shall sooner soften marble, and the rain
> That slides down gently from his flaggy wings
> Shall wrest compunction from me. Tis my glory
> That they are wretched, and by me made so;

> It sets my happiness off : I could not triumph
> If these were not my captives.

The motives of the banker or money-lender who forecloses and perhaps ruins his debtor involve a whole change of social ethos. He operates under a financial code in which debts are paid and contracts honoured because they are debts and contracts, not because he takes a gleeful delight in watching others suffer or cutting out a pound of flesh. His morality is that of contract, not of natural justice or divine authority, and his dealings are determined by questions of legal right and obligation, not by the total human situation; if his actions cause suffering, he may genuinely regret it, but the responsibility rests with the sufferer who entered on the contract. What Massinger sees, however, is not the morality of contract but the immorality of cruelty; Luke is presented as if his chief aim is to enjoy the suffering. When to this is added the self-dramatisation of the Elizabethan villain, we get the diabolic chuckling of a speech like this, imperceptive as social interpretation, but full of linguistic vitality.

An almost exact parallel to the view I am suggesting, that the future is first perceived as evil, is found in Durkheim's theory of crime. Durkheim shocked his contemporaries by asserting that crime is a normal phenomenon, for in all societies some individuals must diverge from the collective type, among which divergences some must be criminal. He then went on to defend this divergence as necessary for social change. If the *conscience collective* imposed itself on individual *consciences* with complete success, a situation would arise in which no change was possible: crime is therefore necessary, in general as a sign that the moral situation is not frozen, and in particular but rare cases the criminal may himself be an innovator, the precursor of a new morality.

If progress is seen as evil, does this mean the reverse is true ? That what an age (including, no doubt, our own) sees as evil must represent the morality of the future ? The thought is almost too alarming to contemplate, and (perhaps for that reason) it is not easy to formulate reasons for rejecting it. The crucial question will concern the social basis of values, the fact that the same position can be seen either in moral terms or in historical terms: either as a statement of what conforms to a general principle, or attributed to the particular social group who are likely to hold it. Take, for instance, happiness.

> But the whim we have of Happiness is somewhat thus. By certain valuations, and averages, of our own striking, we come upon some sort of average, terrestrial lot; this we fancy belongs to us by nature, and of indefeasible right. It is simple payment of our wages, of our deserts; requires neither thanks nor complaint: only such overplus as there may be do we account Happiness; any deficit again is Misery. Now consider that we have the valuation of our own deserts ourselves, and what a fund of self-conceit there is in each of us,—do you wonder that the balance should so often dip the wrong way, and many a Blockhead cry : See there, what a payment; was ever worthy gentleman so used; —I tell thee Blockhead, it all comes of thy Vanity; of what thou fanciest those same deserts of thine to be.
>
> Fancy that thou deservest to be hanged (as is most likely), thou wilt feel it happiness to be only shot: fancy that thou deservest to be hanged in a hair-halter, it will be a luxury to die in hemp.
>
> So true it is, what I then said, that the Fraction of Life can be increased in value not so much by increasing your Numerator as by lessening your Denominator. Nay, unless my Algebra deceive me, Unity itself divided by Zero will give Infinity. Make thy claim of wages a zero, then; thou hast the world under thy feet. Well did the Wisest of our time write : 'It is only with Renunciation (Entsagen) that Life, properly speaking, can be said to begin'.

So Thomas Carlyle, transcendentalist philosopher and poet manque, in 1835; and here, in contrast, Daniel Lerner (no relation to the present writer), sociologist, in 1963 :

> The spread of frustration in areas developing less rapidly than their people wish can be seen as the outcome of a deep imbalance between achievement and aspiration. In simple terms, this situation arises when many people in a society want far more than they can hope to get. This disparity in the want-get ratio has been studied intensively in the social sciences literature in terms of achievement and aspiration. The relationship we here propose foı study can be expressed by the

> following equation (adapted from an ingenious formula of William James):
>
> $$\text{Satisfaction} = \frac{\text{Achievement}}{\text{Aspiration}}$$
>
> ...It is a serious imbalance in this ratio that characterises areas beset by rising frustrations. Typically in these situations the denominator increases faster than the numerator...
>
> How does such an imbalance in the want-get ratio occur? How can it be prevented or cured?...There are six institutions which function as the principal agencies of social change (or its inhibition): the economy, the police, the family, the community, the school, the media.

The differences between these two passages are important, and fascinating. The most important difference lies in their style. Each, as it happens, quotes from an authority he respects, but whereas Lerner names him without evasion, Carlyle coyly presents Goethe as 'the wisest of our time', with a brief indication that he wrote in German. Is he being ironic? The whole texture of Carlyle's prose suggests irony: the archaisms, the Germanisms, the exaggerated imperatives, all convey the feel of someone playing with the language. In this playfulness lies his individuality, but it is never allowed to conceal the fact that deep down he means what he is saying; and once we have arrived at Carlyle's deep earnestness through the medium of his linguistic oddity, we are left feeling that we have made his message our own, as we could not otherwise have done.

The only detail in Daniel Lerner's sober sociological prose that corresponds to all this is the liveliness of the phrase 'the want-get ratio'. No doubt he is proud of it (the two blunt Saxon verbs qualifying the very abstract noun), but he does not play with it: and for the rest, he uses his prose as a window, which is to say, he has no style.

This stylistic difference is far more important than what at a first glance might appear more fundamental, the fact that one author uses imperatives, the other indicatives—that is, one is writing moral exhortation, the other dispassionate analysis. For with a little ingenuity, we could remove this difference. Instead of 'consider', 'see there', 'make thy claim', we could cause Carlyle to write 'in the case of those whose claims are zero, we will observe...', or Lerner to write 'put thy trust in the following institutions...' (or at any rate, if we want to keep him in the same stylistic universe, 'I suggest to the reader that he try putting his trust in...'). The fact that we can make this change and make it so easily shows us how much these two passages have in common, and makes it easier to accept the clear fact that the content of what they are saying is identical.

The relation between value judgment and social reality can be plotted on a continuum, whose two extreme positions are first, that moral criteria are wholly independent of what happens, and, at the other end, that morality is derived from society and must be understood historically. The first is formulated in Hume's celebrated distinction between is and ought and, more recently and succinctly, by Wittgenstein:

> The sense of the world must lie outside the world...If there is any value which is of value, it must lie outside all happening and being so. For all happening and being so is accidental. (Tractatus 6 : 41)

For a statement of the second in its full crudity we can turn to a practical politician—Lenin, for instance:

> Our morality is completely subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat...Morality is that which serves to destroy the old exploiting society. (Therefore) we deny all morality that is drawn from some conception beyond men, beyond class. We say that it is a fraud and a deception...a fraud and a stultification of the minds of the workers and peasants in the interests of the landowners and capitalists.

Social reality, to the Marxist, determines moral perception; and since it is constantly changing, so is morality. The change in the material base results from interactions between different elements of economic activity, which act on each other not like two billiard balls, but by interpenetrating and causing changes in each other. There are innumerable accounts of the Marxist theory of how value is determined by the dialectical activity of the social base, and I shall here choose Lukacs' exposition in *History and Class Consciousness* (from which I have already taken the analogy in the previous sentence). He explains that the solution to every insoluble problem is to be found in history: it may be insoluble if the contending elements remain the same, but historical understanding will show that they don't. To those who perceive only immediate reality, 'every true change must seem incomprehensible', and the undeniable fact of change, when it occurs, will appear to be a catastrophe, a sudden unexpected turn of events that comes from outside and eliminates all mediations. Hence Lukacs' attack on absolutist forms of thinking, which he contrasts with a true understanding of the dialectical nature of historical process. So the absolutist ethical standpoint from which Artegall condemns the giant, or Massinger Luke, is the sign of a failure in historical understanding. Unless ethical judgments are made with such understanding, they will be bound by the class limitations of whoever makes them. And the first class to be capable of a truly objective social understanding will be the proletariat: since they exploit no one, they don't need an ideology (that is, an understanding of the world with built-in distortions to protect their class interests). So Lukacs can assert that 'whether an action is functionally right or wrong is decided ultimately by the evolution of proletarian class-consciousness.'

To the Humean, Daniel Lerner is being reductivist; to the Marxist, Carlyle is wasting his time. Lerner's mistake consists in posing the question of the nature of happiness and then reducing it to a consequence of the situation of whoever asks it without admitting that the *criteria* for happiness must be independent of the situation which is judged against them. Carlyle's contrary error consists in treating the happiness formula as if it was an absolute, as if mere exhortation could lead us to reduce the denominator; only the form is absolute, and the actual determining of the fraction results from the material situation of the individual.

The argument of this essay is clearly incompatible with the

Humean extreme, for if value is independent of reality, it cannot make any real difference that the future has become the present; does that mean that I am driven to the other extreme, and that the claim that progress is initially perceived as evil necessarily implies the philosophical position of Lukacs ?

All theories that see theory as a symptom are in danger of cutting off the branch they are sitting on. The Freudian claim that resistance to psycho-analytic interpretations is a rationalisation of our reluctance to admit the truth about ourselves is subject to the reply that the offering of those interpretations can itself be explained as a rationalisation (say of some aggressive impulse). And if all moral judgment is a rationalisation of class interest, why is this not true of the theory that moral judgment is based on class interest ? Can the Marxist, who does not believe it possible to emerge from history, claim to have done so himself? It is a powerful strength in Marxism that it admits this point. It would not have been possible for dialectical materialism to emerge at any earlier point in history: only when the bourgeois revolution had taken place, and the possibility of a proletarian revolution had been realistically formulated (i.e. its material basis perceived) did it become possible to understand not only that morality is class-based, but that a non-ideological morality might come into being, based on the one non-exploiting class. Marxism is not outside history, but this does not invalidate its insights, since it knows where it stands.

I must now explain why I do not regard progress-as-evil as necessarily a Marxist theory, though I doubt if I could have formulated it in this way had there been no Marxism. I believe it possible to make use of Marxist insights without accepting Marxism as a system. For first, Marxism is not the only theory that sees moral thinking as a function of society, for it is not necessary that such a theory be materialist. Suppose we took the formulation 'interactions between different elements of economic activity', and replaced the last phrase by 'economic and intellectual activity', or 'economic activity and social habit', or even 'intellectual activity and social habit', one would then have a theory of social change in which the fundamental elements were no longer classes; and the form of the dialectic could be preserved, despite this alteration. There is a good deal of sociological theory that does just this. Durkheim is as strong an instance as Marx of a thinker who derives consciousness from society and discusses moral propositions by tracing them back to the situation that gives rise to them: to the extent that his critics directed at him what is essentially the same criticism as Popper makes of Marx, of sliding from social pressures to moral rules. Yet at the same time Durkheim is explicitly anti-materialist, since he regarded religion not economic activity as the most primitive of all social phenomena, from which other institutions derive. And among recent historians Keith Thomas offers an interesting parallel. His explanation of witchcraft treats it as the consequence of social change, in particular of the rise of economic individualism; and it has much in common with the progress-as-evil theory, in that a new individualist ethic appears in the consciousness of accuser as guilt (which he projects onto the accused) before it is openly held and defended. This looks like an economic explanation but it leaves open the question of whether new economic activity caused a change of attitude, or *vice-versa;* and when it comes to explaining the decline of witchcraft, Thomas is quite explicitly anti-materialist: 'the change which occurred in the seventeenth century was not so much technological as mental'. Since attacks on materialism have usually taken the form of statements of faith (that it is demeaning to human dignity, or to human liberty, to regard beliefs as determined by the substructure), it is important to realise that there are scrupulously documented theories which reject it on the ground that the evidence points against it.

And second, despite the finesse that I have praised, there is no complete escape from the problem of sawing off one's branch. The Marxist claim that it does not suffer from the limitations of class morality is based, essentially, on the claim that the proletariat is the class of the future. There are great conveniences in locating one's material basis in the future: it leaves one more room for adaptation and unconstrained thought, for a material reality that has not yet come about is not very different from idealism. But once that future starts arriving, it may take on a definite and not necessarily attractive form, and to regard it as unavoidable will then turn into a doctrine of might is right. On this point, the argument of Popper seems to me irrefutable.

It is not my aim to propose solutions to philosophic problems: but rather to indicate what the alternative philosophic positions are, and to suggest what the implications of each one are for literary theory and practice. The particular problem posed in this essay I cannot even begin to solve; and I will conclude by setting against Lukacs the (Humean) point of Popper, that even if a particular future is inevitable, this need not make it desirable, or even acceptable.

> 'It is at least conceivable (I do not assert more, at present) that a man who to-day foresees with cartainty that we are heading for a period of slavery, that we are going to return to the cage of the arrested society, or even that we are about to return to the beasts, may nevertheless decide not to adopt the moral standards of this impending period but to contribute as well as he can to the survival of his humanitarian ideals, hoping perhaps for a resurrection of his morality in some dim future.
>
> All that is, at least, conceivable. It may perhaps not be the 'wisest' decision to make. But the fact that such a decision is excluded neither by foreknowledge nor by any sociological or psychological law shows that the first claim of historicist moral theory is untenable. Whether we should accept the morality of the future just because it is the morality of the future, this in itself is just a moral problem.'
>
> (*The Open Society and its Enemies*, Chapter 22)

This is a common enough position in our time; and it has developed its own literary form, the anti-Utopia. It is clear that there is a natural connexion between millenarianism and

Utopia, and when the millenarianism is religious the Utopia is called the Kingdom of God. A Utopia is a description of a society which has solved all our present problems; an anti-Utopia describes a society that has solved the problems by destroying what we most value. It is clearly the appropriate form for those who watch the Saints, the Party, the Fifth Monarchy men, bullying and destroying in order to bring about their New Jerusalem.

If we are unlucky, our descendants will read *Brave New World*, 1984, *The Space Merchants*, *we*, and will remark that the twentieth century imagination registered as evil what they have come to see as progress.

Department of English
University of Sussex

Jack R. Sublette

IMAGERY OF TIME AND CHANGE IN *RICHARD II*

In addition to the dramatization of political ideas, William Shakespeare's *Richard II* considers man's existence in what is a very real universe of time and change. As Alvin Kernan suggests in the passage quoted below, two of the chief ideas of the *Henriad* are time, including the changes resulting from time, and man's identity:

> . . . the action is the passage from the England of Richard II to the England of Henry V. This dynastic shift serves as the supporting framework for a great many cultural and psychological transitions which run parallel to the main action, giving it body and meaning. In historical terms the movement from the world of Richard II to that of Henry V is the passage from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance and the modern world. In political and social terms it is a movement from feudalism and hierarchy to the national state and individualism. In psychological terms it is a passage from a situation in which man knows with certainty who he is to an existential condition in which any identity is only a temporary role. In spatial and temporal terms it is a movement from a closed world to an infinite universe. In mythical terms the passage is from a garden world to a fallen world. In the most summary terms it is a movement from ceremony and ritual to history . . . .[1]

As the time passes, the environment, along with the fates of those who inhabit the English kingdom, changes. Consequently, the identities of the characters undergo a parallel alteration. Even though *Richard II* suggests that a kind of perfect order exists, perhaps in the greater environment of the surrounding universe or macrocosm, much of the action in this play deals with the passage of time and change on earth.

Robert Ornstein claims that the language of *Richard II,* in particular,

> the poetry of *Richard II* does not declare the universality of cosmic harmony; it speaks instead of the universality of contention and change. It suggests that if hierarchy is natural, sovereign place is neither fixed nor immutable . Stars fall and consume themselves; rivers overflow their banks, and clouds dim the radiance of the sun. The sea endlessly challenges the land, the falcon ventures into the eagle's spree, and the elements themselves are protean in their qualities. . . . Such conceits do not project Shakespeare's belief in analogical order; they express in dramatic verse his awareness of man's will to discover pattern and stability in a universe of disorder and flux.[2]

The imagery in *Richard II* dramatically emphasizes the power of time and the existence of change. However, Ornstein's remarks ignore the intrusion of some men into the realm of time which is beyond their control. *Richard II* portrays men who not only try to discover order and pattern but also attempt to create their own order by means of controlling time.

The terms 'image' and 'imagery' are complex ones which need careful and precise definition. For the purposes of this study, I am using Caroline Spurgeon's definition of image : most basically and concisely stated as figurative language.[3] Unlike Spurgeon, however, I consider both parts of the images, the two components which have been called variously the subject-matter and object-matter,[4] the minor term and the major term,[5] and the vehicle and the tenor.[6] According to this definition, then, part of the following speech made by the Bishop of Ely in *Henry V* illustrates what is meant by the term image :

> The strawberry grows underneath the nettle,
> And wholesome berries thrive and ripen best
> Neighbored by fruit of baser quality.
> And so the Prince obscured his contemplation
> Under the veil of wildness, which no doubt
> Grew like the summer grass, fastest by night,
> Unseen, yet crescive in his faculty. (I. i. 60-66)[7]

One of the images in the passage is the comparison which the Bishop makes between the surprising character of Hal after his emergence from his life with Falstaff in the taverns (object-matter, major term, or tenor of the image) and the similarly remarkable quality of the mature strawberry after its development in an apparently hostile or non-productive environment (subject-matter, minor term, or vehicle of the image). The speech contains other images, but only one is being commented on here for purposes of example. According to Spurgeon's system of classification based on the subject-matter, this would be a nature image. However, in my study, the significance of the image, with proper attention paid to both parts, lies in the comment being made about the passage of time and resulting change or apparent change in Hal's character and behaviour.

Writing about the various concepts of time in Shakespeare's works, Ricardo Quinones goes so far as to suggest that 'drama is made from the attempts of characters to deny, control, escape or understand the real, relentless, and unrecalling activities of Time.'[8] Time and the changes resulting from time are the chief forces with which the characters contend in order to find their identities. Therefore, the concept of time, with all its complexities, connotations, and results, is particularly significant in relation to *Richard II*, a play which dramatizes many changes.

Some of the importance of time in *Richard II* is revealed in Richard's opening address to John of Gaunt as 'time-honored Lancaster' (I.i.I.). In this title, Richard suggests that Gaunt commands a certain respect not only because of his having been able to withstand the passage of time but also because of the honour of his lineage and ancestry. Part of the man's identity is related to the number of years that he has been able to survive, to his position in his family line, and to the particular family of which he is a part. Here time itself is personified as an agent which respects the man whom it has not yet conquered and that man who has a royal ancesrty.

This view of time is echoed in the greetings given to Richard by Bolingbroke, 'Many years of happy days befall/My gracious sovereign, my most loving liege!' (I. i. 20-21), and by Mowbray

> Each day still better other's happiness,
> Until the Heavens, envying earth's good hap,
> Add an immortal title to your crown! (I. i. 22-24)

With the synecdoche of 'days' and 'years' for the concept of time, Bolingbroke and Mowbray hint, as the king does in his opening line, that time is a force against which human beings must struggle and that the fortunate ones are those who are able to endure happily or with at least some degree of felicity. However, before the end of the first scene another dimension is added to the already personified time. In protesting his innocence to the charges leveled against him by Bolingbroke, Mowbray declares, 'The purest treasure mortal times afford/Is spotless reputation' (I.i.177-78). Time, then, is not only that which man must endure but that which has the power to supply certain men with good fortune. These images of time are doubly significant when viewed in relation to what is to happen as the drama progresses. Mowbray's remark about the treasure of a spotless reputation applies not only to himself and Bolingbroke but also to the King. In the conversation between John of Gaunt and the Duchess of Gloucester, the audience soon learns that Richard, not Mowbray, is guilty of cutting short Gloucester's time on earth. Therefore, very early the imagery establishes the identity of Richard as murderer and as a man who, in Mowbray's words, is 'but gilded loam or painted clay' (I.i.179). As the previous images suggest, to age well is honourable, and happy times are to be desired. The images, however, prove to be ironic 'since,' as Robert Montgomery notes, 'Gaunt's age soon becomes bitter to him, and Richard's days are short and tormented.'[9] The early images of time, though subtly incorporated into the text of the play, establish much of the significance of time in the first play of the *Henriad*. Time is both an active and passive agent with which the characters must contend.

Immediately following the images in which time is personified are two images which complicate the representation of time in this play. In their conversation about the actions of Richard and the death of the Duke of Gloucester, Gaunt and the Duchess of Gloucester speak of a relationship between human activities and the seasonal cycle of nature as it is related to time. Gaunt rationalizes his lack of action by leaving the punishment of the guilty to God :

> Put we our quarrel to the will of Heaven,
> Who, when they see the hours ripe on earth,
> Will rain hot vengeance on offenders' heads. (I ii. 6-8)

Gaunt's blind trust in non-human forces suggests a naivete similar to Richard's. Nonetheless, his remark definitely marks a similarity between the rhythm of human events and the sequential change which is found in the larger order of nature. Actually the comparison links man with the environment in which he must exist. In relation to a world which is beyond the earthly existence, Gaunt, in his explanation for not initiating an aggressive action to correct the wrong committed by Richard, refers to the King as 'God's substitute,/ His deputy anointed in His sight' (I.ii.37-38 . Gaunt's name for Richard identifies the King as an ideal ruler in contrast to his actual behaviour, which the Duchess of Gloucester has just recounted. The Duchess uses another image which reinforces the link between man and nature. She calls the sons of Edward III 'Seven fair branches springing from one root' (I.ii.13), some of which 'are dried by nature's course' (I.ii.14). The complaint made by the Duchess is that when the Duke of Gloucester 'Is hacked down, and his summer leaves all faded' (I.ii.20), the natural course of time has been unnaturally interrupted. In a less dramatic way, the image in the Duchess' speech makes a comment very similar to that in the Duke of York's later speech and actually anticipates the view of time in the speech of York, in which he warns King Richard:

> Take Hereford's rights away, and take from Time
> His charters and his customary rights,
> Let not tomorrow then ensue today,
> Be not thyself, for how art thou a king
> But by fair sequence and succession? (II. i. 195-99)

York's unheeded advice focuses on the central issues of *Richard II* and of the entire *Henriad*. York warns the King that the illegal and unnatural use of his royal power will destroy the natural rhythm of time, the order of the kingdom, and his own identity. Once Richard breaks the established, natural order, he sets in motion an unnatural sequence of events which will destroy him and bring disorder to his kingdom, a land where power will belong to those 'That know the strong'st and surest way to get' (III.iii.201), where tomorrow will not follow today, where man will not know who he is but live an existence of continually changing roles, and where disorder, dramatized at various levels of society, will become the normal way of life. Because of the King's behaviour and his inability or refusal to maintain his royal life according to the accepted and natural course of time, Richard and his kingdom suffer a horrible consequence, a fate which Richard ponders in his soliloquy in prison and to which Bolingbroke as Henry IV refers ('untimely bier') in the last line of the play. *Richard II* and the other three plays of the *Henriad* dramatize York's words.

The significance of the imagery of time continues to increase as the play proceeds. When Richard pronounces the sentence of banishment upon Bolingbroke, he tries to conceal part of the unpleasant effect of the sentence by means of the language relating to time. Bolingbroke must leave his native England 'Till twice five summers have enriched our fields' (I.iii.141), a figurative euphemism for ten years. The image likewise ironically foreshadows the consequences of Richard's unrightful and unnatural use of time. Bolingbroke will, of course, not be absent ten years, and England will not enjoy only an enriching summer-like existence. The fields will not be enriched but soiled with native English blood. Richard's power over time is limited. He can banish a man; he can reduce the duration of the banishment: 'Four lagging winters and four wanton springs/End in a word. Such is the breath of kings.' (I. iii. 214-15) However, the reality that time continues and takes its natural course in the physical lives of men represents a force over which even a king has no power. The King can, in one sense, play with days and years as if they were trifles in the royal exchequer, but he cannot give even a second or a minute more to a man once the natural course of time is completed. Gaunt so advises Richard :

> But not a minute, King, that thou canst give.
> Shorten my days thou canst with sullen sorrow,
> And pluck nights from me, but not lend a morrow.
> Thou canst help time to furrow me with age,
> But stop no wrinkle in his pilgrimage.
> Thy word is current with him for my death,
> But dead, thy kingdom cannot buy my breath.
> (I. iii. 226-32)

Richard ignores this timely warning. In fact, he does not come to a full realization of his limited power and his identity until he is in prison.

Gaunt understands the link between the natural rhythm of man's life and the rhythm of nature just as he senses Richard's desire to take an active role in the time cycle. Sarcastically, Gaunt tells Richard,

> Join with the present sickness that I have,
> And thy unkindness be like crooked age,
> To crop at once a too-long-withered flower. (II. i. 132-34)

The comment which these lines make about Gaunt implies as much about the change which time and Richard have brought to England. 'This other Eden,' which Richard has farmed out, has no place for its former flowers. Some have withered naturally; some, unnaturally. Those that remain, like Gaunt, are out of place and time. Upon Gaunt's death, Richard derisively refers to the previously mentioned association between the time of nature and that of man: 'The ripest fruit first falls, and so doth he' (II. i. 153). Unfortunately for him and his kingdom, Richard can see no farther than death. One of the paradoxes of human and natural life is that in death there is life. Northumberland proclaims,

> Even through the hollow eyes of death
> I spy life peering, but I dare not say
> How near the tidings of our comfort is. (II. i. 270-72)

The ripest fruit perhaps falls first That same ripe fruit rots to fertilize the soil, and, even more important, that fruit contains a seed which will itself grow in the course of time. Bolingbroke, the son of John of Gaunt, the Duke of Hereford, who should become in the natural sequence of time and events the Duke of Lancaster upon Gaunt's death, is preparing to return. Lancaster is dead, but he lives. Richard's shortsightedness, along with the limitations of his temporal power, will haunt him. However, Northumberland's words prove ironic and show him to be short-sighted. The Percies have the power to make Bolingbroke the King, but their 'comfort' lasts for only a short time. Just as Richard has initially broken the natural order of sequence and succession, the Percies' act of placing Bolingbroke on the throne does not restore o.der but represents a continuation of the disordered kingdom originated by Richard.

In contrast to Richard's defective sight is the Queen's ability to sense that something is wrong. The image used to express her feeling is one of both time and disorder. Even though she has promised Richard that she will remain happy, her disposition is dismally apprehensive because she feels

> Some unborn sorrow, ripe in fortune's womb,
> Is coming toward me, and my inward soul
> With nothing trembles. (II. ii. 10-12)

This image both looks back to Gaunt's remark about time being 'ripe on earth' and foreshadows the unwelcome news which Green is about to deliver. With Green's announcement that Bolingbroke has returned, the Queen feels that the pregnancy which she would like to have aborted terminates naturally:

> So, Green, thou art the midwife to my woe,
> And Bolingbroke my sorrow's dismal heir.
> Now hath my soul brought forth her prodigy,
> And I, a gasping new-delivered mother,
> Have woe to woe, sorrow to sorrow joined. (II. ii. 62-66)

Part of Gaunt's prophecy is fulfilled. Although the Queen is mother of the new-born woe, Richard, who has taken what might be metaphorically called indecent liberties with time, is the father. The new time which has been born after the deaths of Gloucester, Gaunt, and the Duchess of Gloucester is, in York's words, 'the sick hour that his [Richard's] surfeit made' (II ii. 84). At this point in the play, the imagery of time serves to emphasize the sickness of the state and the cause of that sickness. Because of the new time which has come into existence, one representative of the older order, the Duke of York, is impotent to carry out the duties which he feels that he should perform; he is unable because 'time will not permit. All is uneven, /And everything is left at six and seven.' (II. ii. 121-22). York easily senses the dictates of time and responds to them. After Bolingbroke gains his power and control, York's allegiance quickly turns to the new king. Perhaps he, unlike others of his generation in this play, survives because he is able to adapt to time as it changes.

With the return of Bolingbroke after the maturation and death of the people who were part of an earlier natural cycle, a new cycle which moves in a different rhythm begins. In contrast to those like Gaunt whose energy has been extinguished, Hotspur and Bolingbroke now people the stage.

Hotspur describes himself and his service to Bolingbroke as

> being tender, raw, and young—
> Which elder days shall ripen and confirm
> To more approved service and desert. (II. iii. 42-44)

To which, Bolingbroke responds, 'And as my fortune ripens with thy love, It shall be still thy true love's recompense' (II. iii. 48-9). What both Bolingbroke and Hotspur ignore is that time is out of joint. As York has predicted, tomorrow does not now ensue today. In such an unnatural chronological sequence, it is impossible for human activities to move smoothly through the expected course of events. Hotspur's life and service will ripen along with Bolingbroke's fortune, but the results, the fruits of that maturation, are unexpected. The times are not what they should be. Bolingbroke continues the image with his statement to Willoughby that the only reward that he can presently offer is thanks 'till my infant fortune come to years' (II. iii. 66). Bolingbroke finds himself mother to an infant which is seemingly very different from the Queen's. For all of the joyous expectation in Bolingbroke's words, the image, when considered in the context of the entire play and the *Henriad*, has a certain dark and ironic foreshadowing. Bolingbroke's fortune will mature, but it grows in an unnatural time. To this difficulty is added the fact that Bolingbroke, before much more time passes, will, as Richard has done earlier, 'take from Time/His charters and his customary rights.' Richard misuses the time rightfully given to him. In stealing the crown and not allowing the natural sequence of succession to occur, Bolingbroke, even though he has been wrongfully treated, illegally takes advantage of time.

In this connection, one must distinguish between Bolingbroke's stealing a crown and his merely taking advantage of the time as he finds it. Time seems to be as much beyond the power of Bolingbroke as it is out of Richard's control. John Dover Wilson sees both Richard and Bolingbroke as subject to the wheel of fortune. In analyzing the fortunes of Richard and Bolingbroke, Wilson writes:

> The will of the King seems paralysed; he becomes an almost passive agent. Bolingbroke acts, and acts forcibly; yet he too appears to be borne upward by a power beyond his volition.[10]

For Wilson, the significance of this realization is that it makes Bolingbroke less a villain than some critics would have him to be. However, a difference does exist in the positions of the two men. Richard tries desperately to take control of time and to become the force of time itself; Bolingbroke only uses time to his advantage. Consequently, the fates that each man must endure vary. Richard's life ends tragically with the loss of everything which has been dear to him, including his physical life. Bolingbroke as Henry IV has to spend his entire reign struggling to achieve control over what he feels is his own kingdom. He never finds time for his planned trip to the Holy Land and is able only to die in the Jerusalem chamber of his palace. Although Wilson does not mention this idea, the inextricably linked relationships of Bolingbroke and Richard with fortune and with time emphasize the power of time over the lives of men. In fact, as Wilson suggests, Richard is not just the king but a representative of all men:

> Shakespeare's play was a mirror, not only for magistrates, but for every son of woman; and when on Shakespeare's stage the 'dejected' king gazed into the glass—incomparable symbol for that age!—what he saw there was the brittleness both of his own glory and of all earthly happiness.[11]

The transience of the glory and happiness of Henry IV, Hotspur, Falstaff, and Henry V is yet to be revealed.

As Bolingbroke's fortune begins to ripen, Richard receives the first concrete evidence of the limitation of his power over time. He returns to England, only to be informed by Salisbury that his arrival is mistimed :

> One day too late, I fear me, noble lord,
> Hath clouded all thy happy days on earth.

> Oh, call back yesterday, bid time return,
> And thou shalt have twelve thousand fighting men!
> Today, today, unhappy day, too late,
> O'erthrows thy joys, friends, fortune, and thy state.
> For all the Welshmen, hearing thou wert dead,
> Are gone to Bolingbroke, dispersed, and fled. (III. ii. 67-74)

Earlier Richard could seemingly give and take years; now, once the course of time is run, he is powerless. Richard's reaction is typical of his attitude throughout much of the play. Perhaps the King does allot a little more power to time here than he previously has been willing to do, but his attitude is, nevertheless, selfish and arrogant. With a plaintive voice, he cries: 'All souls that will be safe, fly from my side,/ For time hath set a blot upon my pride' (III. ii. 80-81). According to Richard's logic time itself is at fault. Even though Richard first broke the order of time, he will take none of the blame for the situation in which he finds himself and his kingdom. Some of Richard's unreasonable and illogical attitude toward time can be seen not only in the fact that he tries in vain to control that which is beyond his power but also in his view that he is both a part of, and separate from time. In a traditional manner, he identifies himself with the sun and his reign with daylight. Consequently, he asserts,

> That when the searching eye of Heaven is hid
> Behind the globe that lights the lower world,
> Then thieves and robbers range abroad unseen
> In murders and in outrage, boldly here. (III. ii. 37-40)

His faulty view of time is revealed, however, when the sun reappears and those whom he calls thieves and robbers remain in sight. The king's position is analogous to the sun's in the universe, but Richard as king has not kept the prescribed course. Therefore, when he discharges his followers 'From Richard's night to Bolingbrok's fair day' (III. ii. 218), he unknowingly acknowledges the similarity between the sun and the king, a likeness which he has only sentimentally recognized previously. Richard is still the rightful monarch but one who has himself reversed the natural day for the unnatural night. Aumerle expresses the ill-found hope that the situation will improve and, therefore, suggests that they 'fight with gentle words/Till time lend friends and friends their helpful swords' (III. iii. 131-32). His attitude only emphasizes what Richard has done to time and reinforces the fact that the course of time has been altered. Time, whose power Richard has tried to usurp, is not likely to lend the nearly bankrupt Richard anything.

Early in Act IV of *Richard II*, when the characters attempt to establish the positions in what Fitzwater terms 'this new world,' the imagery of time makes clear that the actions of Richard and Bolingbroke have caused and will effect irreparable harm to the English kingdom. Past time is irretrievable. Although Bolingbroke initially thinks that he can recall Mowbray and, thereby, bring an end to the charges and counter-charges being made by Aumerle and Fitzwater, the Bishop of Carlisle declares, 'That honorable day shall ne'er be seen' (IV. i 91). Indeed, the Englishmen are living in a new world but a world which has grown out of former times, not an existence distinct and separate from the past. Similarly, the future will grow out of the way in which Bolingbroke uses the present time. If he takes the crown from Richard, no matter how willingly Richard yields it, the Bishop of Carlisle prophesies that 'The blood of English shall manure the ground/And future ages groan for this foul act.' (IV. i. 137-38). This image delineates the continuous cycle of time, whose course may be changed but not terminated. Within the womb of time, the Bishop of Carlisle predicts, are 'children yet unborn/[who] Shall feel this day as sharp to them as thorn' (IV. i 322-23). These images link the three traditional parts of time—past, present, and future. The time is as it is because of Richard's taking too little care of time; the future will grow worse if Bolingbroke now misuses the present.

The Queen brings the focus back to the present. Not much time has passed since Richard was glad to see Gaunt wither with age. Now the Queen indicates that the same forces of time cause Richard, 'My fair rose [to] wither' (V. i. 8). Just as earlier Richard was not willing to take the proper blame, he now takes a similar unrealistic view of the former time. To his Queen, he counsels:

> Learn, good soul,
> To think our former state a happy dream,
> From which awaked, the truth of what we are
> Shows us but this. I am sworn brother, sweet,
> To grim Necessity, and he and I
> Will keep a league till death. (V. i. 17-22)

In truth, the former times were not a dream but a very real existence in which Richard thought he was awake and knew what he was doing. As the gardeners openly hint, because Richard did not properly tend his garden in the spring, he must accept the unwelcome fruits in the fall. Perhaps King Richard's attitude is admirable in that he now more realistically, but not completely, realized his identity than he did previously. However, his view of life as a cycle of waking and sleeping is not as accurate as the gardeners' image, in which the kingdom is a garden, subject to the passage of time, a garden which is to be tended by the gardener-king. Time is the constant and Richard the variable. Richard, still selfish, looks forward to a future sleep with very little, if any, consideration for those subjects in his kingdom who have remained painfully awake and will continue to do so.

In saying farewell to his Queen, Richard perhaps comes somewhat closer to recognizing the connection between the cyclical character of nature and the lives of men. The Queen, he asserts, must return

> to France, from whence, set forth in pomp,
> She came adorned hither like sweet May,
> Sent back like Hallowmas or short'st of day. (V. i. 78-80)

This view of time is strengthened with the question which the Duchess of York asks her son about the new life in the kingdom: 'Who are the violets now/That strew the green lap of the new-come spring?' (V. ii. 46-47) The image of England in a new spring of its life should connote growth and luxuriant vitality, but both the memory of the fall and winter out of which this spring emerges and the vision of the death of former flowers severely darken the prospects for the future of this spring. The new favourites themselves are somewhat unnatural in that they spring from political opportunism and not from an orderly sequence of events. Their spring will be short-lived. York, who has been able to endure more than one cycle, pragmatically advises his son: 'bear you well in this new spring of time,/Lest you be cropped before you come to prime.' (V. ii. 50-51) The Duchess of York, however, feels that the lesson which her husband has learned from time is incomplete. If he fully understood the link between the cyclical rhythm of nature and human life, he would not submit accusations against Aumerle to the new king, for, the Duchess questions:

> Is not my teeming date drunk up with time?
> And wilt thou pluck my fair son from my age
> And rob me of a happy mother's name? (V. ii. 91-93)

The Duchess realizes the power of time over her and her inability to recall time. The earlier prophecies of York and Carlisle have come true. The natural rhythm of time and familial order has been interrupted; father is set against son.

Toward the end of *Richard II*, the deposed king comes close to an awareness of self-identity. His time of life has been like that of an actor who plays various roles:

> Thus play I in one person many people,
> And none contented. Sometimes am I King,
> Then treasons make me wish myself a beggar,
> And so I am. Then crushing penury
> Persuades me I was better when a king.
> Then am I kinged again. And by and by
> Think that I am unkinged by Bolingbroke,
> And straight am nothing. But whate'er I be,
> Nor I nor any man that but man is

With nothing shall be till he be eased
With being nothing. (V. v. 31-41)

The Duke of York earlier uses much the same dramatic metaphor to describe the pageant in which Bolingbroke draws the attention of the public at the expense of the King whose time is past:

As in a theater the eyes of men
After a well-graced actor leaves the stage
Are idly bent on him that enters next,
Thinking his prattle to be tedious,
Even so, or with much more contempt, men's eyes
Did scowl on gentle Richard. (V. ii. 23-28)

These two images in which the world is seen as a stage do not detract from man's significance and worth and make his life meaningless; they simply suggest the changes which occur in the course of human life.

As *Richard II*—a play which presents the end of time for Gaunt and most of his generation, the end of a reign for Richard, and the beginning of a new cycle for Bolingbroke—comes to an end Richard, upon hearing music, ponders more wisely than ever before over his own use of time:

Music do I hear?
Ha, ha! Keep time. How sour sweet music is
When time is broke and no proportion kept!
So is it in the music of men's lives.
And here have I the daintiness of ear
To check time broke in a disordered string,
But for the concord of my state and time
Had not an ear to hear my true time broke.
I wasted time and now doth time waste me.
For now hath Time made me his numbering clock.
My thoughts are minutes, and with sighs they jar
Their watches on unto mine eyes, the outward watch
Whereto my finger, like a dial's point,
Is pointing still, in cleansing them from tears.
Now, sir, the sound that tells what hour it is
Are clamorous groans, which strike upon my heart,
Which is the bell. So sighs and tears and groans

Show minutes, times, and hours. But my time
Runs posting on in Bolingbroke's proud joy
While I stand fooling here, his Jack-o'-the-clock.
This music mads me, let it sound no more,
For though it have holp madmen to their wits,
In me it seems it will make wise men mad.
Yet blessing on his heart that gives it me!
For 'tis a sign of love, and love to Richard
Is a strange brooch in this all-hating world. (V. v. 41-66)

In prison and isolated from the kingdom and people that he should have ruled, Richard is able to hear the discordant and irregular rhythm which he has caused and which he could have prevented. While Richard was king, all he could hear was an inner craving for his own pleasure. However, the process of acquiring self-knowledge does begin earlier. Upon returning to England from Ireland and finding that some of his favourites have been executed, Richard ponders his own mortality:

For within the hollow crown
That rounds the mortal temples of a king
Keeps Death his court, and there the antic sits,
Scoffing his state and grinning at his pomp,
Allowing him a breath, a little scene,
To monarchize, be feared, and kill with looks,
Infusing him with self and vain conceit,
As if this flesh which walls about our life
Were brass impregnable, and humored thus
Comes at the last and with a little pin
Bores through castle wall, and farewell King!
(III. ii. 160-70)

Here, perhaps fo the first time, the King acknowledges his relationship with the rest of humanity. Even though he is a king, Richard is a mortal man. As he admits, the King shares the same basic needs with other men in his kingdom:

I live with bread like you, feel want,
Taste grief, need friends. Subjected thus,
How can you say to me I am a king? (III. ii. 175-77)

Despite the fact that he has lost some of his power and his followers, Richard is actually more royal here than earlier. He acknowledges his identity as a human being. A similar expression of growth in self-identity occurs in the deposition scene. However, in prison, he is able to make the fullest assessment of his position in life when he discovers his limitation of power over time and time's own strong and steady course.

Raymond O'Dea suggests that time is the real king of men in much of Shakespeare's early work and that 'the poet and dramatist does believe that those who attempt to pull from the womb of time their desires end like Richard II, idly counting the minutes that have brought an end to the abortive discord of attempting to gain what time had not yet granted. . .'[12] A great part of Richard's tragedy is that he comes too late to the realization of time's superior power over him. Richard cannot turn time back but only sit and await his time to die. Robert Montgomery views the imagery of time in this crucial speech as synthesizing the various aspects of time:

> . . . the imagery of time in this soliloquy moves through all the dimensions Shakespeare has established for it: it is expressive of subjective feeling; it invokes the broad theme of natural rhythm; and it provides the terms for Richard's assessment of himself as well as for our assessment of him. And it expresses finally, for Richard and for the audience, a way of distinguishing timeliness as a principle for human action from opportunism, a principle evident in Richard's failure to achieve it.[13]

Although Bolingbroke's awareness of the complexities of time is sharper than Richard's, he, too, must contend with these same dimensions of time. Deprived of the chance to meditate on the difference between timeliness and opportunism, Bolingbroke, who—in contrast to the deposed King isolated in a prison cell—finds himself in a situation where events occur rapidly, makes a mistake quite suggestive of Richard's earlier actions. Just as Richard allowed his favourites to assume greater power than they deserved and just as he illegally seized the inheritance left by John of Gaunt, Bolingbroke affords the opportunity for the Percies to desire power; he refuses to be satisfied with his rightful inheritance; and, therefore, he takes the crown which is not legally one of his possessions. These actions on both men's parts occur, at least partially, because a moment in time is simply conducive to opportunistic behavior. Even though the King and the usurper receive advice about the illegality and unnaturalness of their acts, they choose to ignore it and follow a course which only seems to be the most natural. Both of them break the natural order of time, but both are confronted with situations which are beyond their control. The wheels of time and fortune turn together.

Richard II, even though it ends with the beginning of a new cycle, closes with an act by the new king which is sadly reminiscent of one of Richard's first actions in the play. Rather than command his loyal subjects to initiate a new day, Henry IV exiles Exton who has carried out one of the new king's first wishes: 'With Cain go wander thorough shades of night,/And never show thy head by day nor light.' (V. vi. 43-44).

The newness of the cycle is already tarnished when the King, who should act the role of the sun, commands darkness, not light, for one of his loyal subjects. In fact, Henry seems to find himself in simply a different but not so very new life. At the end of *Richard II*, Henry sets the tempo of the new time: 'March sadly after, grace my mournings here/In weeping after this untimely bier.' (V. vi. 51-52). A funeral procession, an inappropriate way to begin a new reign, forebodes the bleakness of a misbegotten time and anticipates the irregularity of the rhythm of the reign of Henry IV.

The imagery of time and change in *Richard II* illustrates that this play is more than the dramatization of political ideas and philosophies. Perhaps somewhere in the vast reaches of eternity, as Hotspur senses in his dying moments in *I Henry IV*, time ends, but Shakespeare's *Richard II* confirms that life on earth represents man's continual relationship with time. Paradoxically, man's life or earthly time, like the fire in Shakespeare's Sonnet 73, both nourishes him and gives him his existence and finally consumes him. With the continual passage of time comes the inevitability of change. The most obvious sign of this change can be seen in man's physical being. His body grows, changes, and finally dies. Part of man's identity is derived from his individual position on the wheel of time—non-existence, baby, child, adolescent, adult, old man, and non-existence. For example, John of Gaunt, who endures for a long period of time, holds a special, honourable position. More important, however, is the behaviour of men and their use of time during their allotted span of time. More than his number of years, man's moral capacities establish his real identity. Finally, however, the fate of all men is the same; their time ends. The imagery in *Richard II*, then, suggests that time represents both a duration which can be measured in terms of seconds, minutes, hours, days, months, years, and ages and a never-ending force which directly affects all men. A similar kind of duration and force affects other living things on earth, with which the lives of men are often compared. *Richard II* dramatizes the time spans of various men and their reactions to their periods of earthly time and the forces of time.

104 Skylark Drive
Enterprise
Alabama

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] Alvin B. Kernan, '*The Henriad:* Shakespeare's Major History Plays,' in *Modern Shakespearean Criticism*, ed. Alvin B. Kernan (New York: 1970), pp. 246-47. This article appears in a shorter form in *The Yale Review* 59 (1969), 3-32.

[2] Robert Ornstein, *A Kingdom for a Stage: The Achievement of Shakespeare's History Plays* (Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 105.

[3] Caroline F. E. Spurgeon, *Shakespeare's Imagery and What It Tells Us* (1935; rpt, Cambridge: Cambridge University Prass, 1971), p. 5.

[4] R. A. Foakes, 'Suggestions for a New Approach to Shakespeare's Imagery,' *Shakespeare Survey*, 5 (1952),82-86.

[5] Henry W. Wells, *Poetic Imagery, Illustrated from Elizabethan Literature* (1924; rpt. New York; 1961), pp. 24-25.

[6] I. A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (London: 1936), p. 96.

[7] William Shakespeare, *Shakespeare: The Complete Works*, ed. G. B. Harrison (New York, 1948) p. 736. Hereafter all quotations from Shakespeare are taken from Harrison's text.

[8] Ricardo J. Quinones, 'Views of Time in Shakespeare,' *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 26 (1965), 328.

[9] Robert L. Montgomery. Jr., 'The Dimensions of Time in *Richard II*.' *Shakespeare Studies*, 4 (1969), 74.

[10] John Dover Wilson, ed., 'Introduction,' *King Richard II* (1939; rpt. Cambridge: 1966) p. xx.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. xxii.

[12] Raymond O'Dea, 'The King of Men in Shakespeare's Early Works: Time,' *Discourse*, 11 (1968), 141.

[13] Montgomery, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 83-84.

A. A. Ansari

NO CLOCK IN THE FOREST OF ARDEN

The comic action in *As You Like It* is spread over two distinct but nevertheless shifting spatial points: the Court and the Forest of Arden, and the latter seems to cover a more extended area than the former. The shift from one point to the other reflects the dramatist's major and persistent concern and preoccupation with defining the limits of the pastoral, the characters' varying responses to it and the oblique and yet ubiquitous suggestions as to how time operates within this sphere. The supplanting of the Duke Senior by his brother, Frederick, motivated as it appears to be by deep-seated but unidentifiable malice and perfidy, has its dramatic excuse in outlining the change from one mode of living and behaving to the other which is diametrically opposed to it. It amounts in other words to a shift from the public to the more or less private universe, from the world of sophisticated corruption to the simplicities of the contemplative and solitary tenor of life. Duke Frederick, while trying to rationalize his own conduct and in a brazen endeavour to highlight the disadvantages from which Celia comes to suffer because of the deliberately chosen copresence of Rosalind in the court now presided over by him unburdens himself thus:

> She is too subtle for thee; and her smoothness,
> Her very silence and her patience,
> Speak to the people, and they pity her.
> Thou art a fool: she robs thee of thy name! (1, iii, 74-77)

But he nowhere intimates that his own virtues and distinctions were in any danger of falling into neglect and oblivion because of which he had deprived Duke Senior of his legitimate and beneficent rule. The fact of usurpation and dispossession is therefore the accepted datum with which the play starts and which is neither clarified nor elucidated upon. Life at the court, subject to the eccentricity and imperiousness of Frederick, stands provisionally discredited when juxtaposed to existence in Arden which is idyllic in its contours and atmosphere. Not only does the aureole of the classical golden age gather around it but it also implies the life of total commitment to the medieval ideal of contemplative seclusion, set apart as it is from the corruption, baseness and hypocrisies of the public world of the court. Small wonder then that hosts of courtiers, dedicated to Frederick, throng towards Arden in quest of the peace of the ideal realm and to have a shared experience of 'the bliss of solitude'.

Act II opens with one of the many set speeches in the play —the speech delivered by Duke Senior who takes up the cue, in hot haste, from Rosalind's self-assuring utterance: 'Now go we in content/To liberty and not to banishment' (1, iii, 134-5) and expatiates with sweeping rhetoric upon certain basic themes of the pastoral: freedom from restraint, sense of plenitude in Nature, absence of cant and of physical pain and hardship and access to substitute knowledge and wisdom extracted from objects in the phenomenal world. Life in this context, for instance, is not subordinated to 'the penalty of Adam' ('as brother's hand is not against brother');[2] in fact the 'Seasons' difference' or the rigours and inclemency of the weather force upon one the reality of one' finite self: 'This is no flattery: these are counsellors/That feelingly persuade me what I am' (11, i, 10-11). Here the phrase 'what I am' is loaded with an entirely different signification from its near-equivalent, 'unaccommodated man' in *King Lear.* Man in Arden is doubtless exposed to all sorts of hazard, insecurity and precariousness in as much as the laws governing the physical reality are not permanently suspended here. And yet the impact of all this is at variance with that of the pitiless pelting of the storm' so pungently brought out in one of the crucial passages of the same tragedy. But, contrary to the stance of the banished Duke, Touchstone, who is the 'blithe wit', demonstrates, in no small measure, his innate commonsense and sceptical bias the moment he bursts peremptorily upon the forest of Arden thus: 'Ay, now am I in Arden; the more fool I: when I was at home, I was in a better place: but travellers must be content' (11, iv, 13-15). And towards the very end, with reference to Jaques's puckish and biting comment about him: 'he hath been a courtier, he swears', Touchstone is egged on to authenticate his identity thus: 'If any man doubt that, let him put me to my purgation. I have trod a measure; I have flattered a lady; I have been politic with my friend, smooth with mine enemy; I have undone three tailors; I have had four quarrels, and like to have fought one' (V, iv, 42-6). Touchstone is here more or less the dramatic *persona* and no sensitive reader can afford to miss the ironic tone of denigration at the expense of one who is thoroughly acclimatized to the inane and weary routine of life at the court. Simultaneously, he offers us a burlesque of the coventional *debat* about the pastoral, very much in vogue in the sixteenth and seventeenth century England, while skilfully mimicking the balancing, qualifying, self-contradictory idiom in which it used to be couched. In reply to Corin's interrogation: 'And how like you this shepherd's life, Master Touchstone?' he cannot help replying to the following effect:

> 'Truly, shepherd, in respect of itself, it is a good life; but in respect that it is a shepherd's life, it is naught. In respect that it is solitary, I like it very well; but in respect that it is private, it is very vile life. Now, in respect it is in the fields, it pleaseth me well; but in respect it is not in the court, it is tedious. As it is a spare life, look you, it fits my homour well; but as there is no more plenty in it, it goes much against my stomach.' (III, ii, 13-21)

Touchstone's bantering tone underlines the denial of absoluteness to whatever degree of perfection or immaculateness one may be induced to ascribe to the pastoral: it registers an impulse to integrate his non-committal attitude within the framework of the comic vision.

Rosalind's passion for Orlando—the conspicuous example of the rhapsodies of love and reflecting upon the focal romantic episode in the play—though it has had its germination in the court surroundings, matures and stabilizes, acquires depth and colour in Arden where they 'fleet the time carelessly' under the shade of the melancholy boughs. Such love-making does not therefore implicate any urgent and obsessive consciousness of the passage of time but grows spontaneously as a plant grows out of the soil. Generally speaking, Rosalinds' attitude is that of amused detachment as well as of frank and forthright acceptance of the compulsive sway of love. No longer content to remain on tenterhooks, while Celia is cajoling her and purposely withholding the disclosure of Orlando's identity from her she gushes forth with a certain amount of ingenuousness thus: 'Good my complexion: dost thou think, though I am caparison'd like a man, I have a doublet and hose in my disposition? One inch of delay more is a South-sea of discovery' (111, ii, 190-93). This makes one realize that her feminine curiosity could be repressed no longer without doing damage to her equipoise. Even when the cat is out of the bag she persists in her queries in fervid tones of voice which declare the impatient vivacity of a woman who is tingling with excitement all over: 'What did he when thou sawest him? What said he? How looked he? Wherein went he? What makes him here? Did he ask for me? Where remains he? How parted he with thee, and when shalt thou see him again? Answer me in one word.' (111, ii, 215-20). And shrewdly prefacing her remark with: 'It is as easy to count atomies as to resolve the propositions of a lover' Celia's one-sentence answer is: 'I found him under a tree, like a dropped acorn' (III, ii, 229-30). Viola-Caesario duality in *Twelfth Night* is anticipated here in the double person of Rosalind-Ganymede and this facilitates the theatrical device of counterfeiting which is employed so consistently in the play. Trial and error is the normal method of ascertaining truth in the daily commerce of life, and this procedure is symbolized here by the conscious artifice of disguising. This serves the intended purpose of revealing the truth about love which ultimetaly unites the souls of Rosalind and Orlando into an indissoluble bond. At the other end of the pole is Silvius—the only sophisticated one among the 'country copulatives'—who is all impetuosity and who defines love in a graceful litany of balanced cadences which is nonetheless framed in naive and rather simplistic terms thus:

> It is to be all made of fantasy,
> All made of passion, and all made of wishes;
> All adoration, duty and observance;
> All humbleness, all patience and impatience;
> All purity, all trial, all obeisance; (V. ii, 89-93)

The Forest of Arden in *As YouLike It* is a microcosm within the larger design of the play: it is both a literary pastoral and a replica of the universe of orderd harmonies which glows with the halo of pristine purity and lack of self-consciousness. The element of nostalgia which implies a hankering after the ruined Paradise as well as involves the action framed to retrieve it is however shared alike by each. Whereas Silvius and Phebe specifically belong to the former, the rest of them—Rosalind, Celia, Orlando, Touchstone and even Audrey—belong to the latter. Arden has the status of an image of the mind in which the contrary valuations of the diverse characters are reflected without any blurring or distortion. When Duke Senior descants upon this impure archetype thus

> And this our life, exempt from public haunt,
> Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
> Sermons in stones, and good in everything. (II, i, 15-17)

he is obviously insinuating at the compensation for the civilities of the court which the forest of Arden offers to those who have sought refuge within its precincts and also hints at one's making the best of a bad business. But Jaques, with his barely concealed cynicism, is quick to remind us that the banished Duke is as much a tyrant and a usurper as Frederick because the burghers of the forest are the mute, uncomplaining, helpless victims of his gratuitous oppression Similarly, whereas Orlando encroaches upon the unspoiled beauty of the forest by carving verses in the tree-trunks addressed to his lady-love and thus feeding his appetite for sonneteering in the Petrarchan fashion, the foresfers kill the deer—'poor dappled fools'—for their food.

In this rural retreat the drama of love is enacted, principally and *incognito*, by Rosalind, and with the open connivance, support and encouragement of Celia. Most of the love-scenes, especially the one in which Phebe falls in love with the mere image of a man and is thus moved to superciliously persecute and humiliate Silvius for his utter servitude and self-abasement (which is in any way despicable), are engineered and manipulated by Rosalind. The ecstasy of love in most cases seems to resist the untamed fury of time, or time just passes it by. It flows here with a peculiar rhythm of its own—a rhythm of which the reckoning is made not by the clock but only by the awareness of the mind's apperception of the lover. When Touchstone, as reported by Jaques—'the melancholy moralist' – maintains that nobody is really free of its ineluctable bondage:

> 'Thus we may see', quoth he, how the world wags;
> 'Tis but an hour ago since it was nine,
> And after an hour more 'twill be eleven;
> And so, from hour to hour we ripe and ripe,
> And then from hour to hour we rot and rot. (II, vii, 24-27)

he is obviously relating the process of change and growth and the inevitable sense of decay entailed by it to conditions obtaining beyond the Arden world in the urban polity of Frederick's court. Helen Gardner perceptively maintains: 'In Shakespeare's comedies time goes by fits and starts. It is not so much a movement onwards as a space in which to work things out'.[3] But it may be added that what is implied by this immobilization of time is consistent with the very notion of Arcadian perfection; timelessness is indeed one of the postulates on which it rests. Time does flow in Arden but it flows unobtrusively, more specifically, the time-sense is interiorized here, but is in no way to be equated with non-time.

Both Touchstone and Jaques are discordant voices or represent attitudes of realism which are brought to bear upon and evaluate the muddle to which the affairs of men and women seem to have been reduced to their naked vision. Touchstone prides himself upon being the debunker of romantic claptrap as is partly evident from his name as also from the way in which both Rosalind and Orlando are catechised by him. And Jaques makes a blustering claim about his capability of 'cleansing the social Augean stables' when he says:

> give me leave
> To speak my mind, and I will through and through
> Cleanse the foul body of th' infected world,
> If they will patiently receive my medicine. (II, vii, 58-61)

Thus though they propose to themselves almost identical objectives yet while Touchstone is sweet-tempered and tolerant up to a certain extent, Jaques tends to be bitter, uncompromising and wholly negative in his attitudes. He is however prevented eventually from doing any harm to any one except that he insists upon keeping himself outside the charmed circle. He is like a true denizen of the pastoral world, quintessentially single and alone, and also disinclined towards copulation, generation and love. Being a purely comic character Touchstone has available to himself a sort of adaptability and improvisation and he is far from being pertinacious or rigid; he is, on the contrary, pragmatic in his approach to things. Jaques is not only self-analytical but as a variant of the Elizabethan malcontent, is tormented with self-division. He is a form of chaos invading an integrated cosmos—shaggy, alienated and fragmented: 'I had as lief have been myself alone' (III,ii,249). He takes care to emphasize his sense of separateness and distinction from others and underlines the organic wholeness of his peculiar brand of melancholy when he particularizes its components thus:

> 'I have neither the scholar's melancholy, which is emulation; nor the musician's, which is fantastical; nor the coutier's, which is proud; nor the soldier's, which is ambitious; nor the lawyer's, which is politic; nor the lady's, which is nice; nor the lover's, which is all these: but it is a melancholy of mine own, compounded of many simples, extracted from many objects, and indeed the sundry contemplation of my travels, in which my often rumination wraps me in a most humorous sadness'.
> (IV, i, 10-19)

Not unlike Touchstone, Jaques is also an exhibitionist and is moved, primarily, by self-regarding instincts. What distinguishes him from Touchstone is the fact that whereas the latter is all along and essentially a parodist, Jaques is by and large and, temperamentally, a cynic, turned inward upon himself. In this peroration one is at once struck by his swaggering tone about the largeness of his discourse, the freshness of his view-point and the heterogeneity of his conceptions.

Jaques is a bit more complex than Touchstone whom he invectively calls 'deep-contemplative,' for the latter is perhaps capable of uncovering realities which are hidden from the common gaze. While engaged in conversation with the exiled Duke, Jaques declares: 'O that I were a fool:/I am ambitious for a motley coat' (II, vii, 42-3) and is also willing to accept one, as pretty assured by the Duke of having it, with the proviso that he should have liberty 'Withal, as large a charter as the wind/To blow on whom I please; for so fools have (II,vii, 48-9). In this he seems to be hankering after the kind of wisdom or maturity the Shakespearian fools almost always have the privilege of embodying. In a nimble exchange of witticism with the romantic lover in which each is trying to get the better of the other, Orlando remarks: 'I am weary of you'. And quick on its heels follows the dialogue which is quite revelatory and significant in its own way:

Jaques. By my troth, I was looking for a fool when I saw you.

Orlando. He is drowned in the brook: look but in, and you shall see him.
Jaques. There I shall see my own figure.
Orlando. Which I take to be either a fool or a cipher.
(III, ii, 279-82)

Jaques's coming across his own figure, drowned in the brook, is a symbolic way of not only asserting his identification with the fool but also of assimilating the submerged figure into his own self. Jaques seems to combine his inherent streak of cynicism with a kind of cleverness which is masqueradad as folly. Despite Jaques's aversion for Touchstone it is difficult however to go the whole hog with Willard Farnham in his contention:' Jaques does not have the large capacity for acceptance of folly that leads Hamlet to enjoy the performance of even an unknowing fool".[4] Farnham regards both Jaques's melancholy and his 'love of clever folly' equally sentimental, but the fact remains that his satiric thrusts have no grain of malice in them and are in no way lethal.

Apropos of Touchstone the banished Duke draws pointed attention to his being a bundle of contradictions despite the fact that he can control any unsavoury situation he is thrown into and has the grit and self-confidence to impose his own valuations upon others. He can allow himself to be made the butt of ridicule but he also partakes of the Falstaffian capacity for resilience and can rally the powers of the mind to tackle with any imponderables. As shown earlier each of the main characters in the play tends to discover his or her own psychic disposition or type of experience mirrored in Arden, and hence Reality in *As You Like It* appears to be both subjective and relativistic which fact is also borne out by its title. In the midst of tantalizing verbal acrobatics with Orlando, Rosalind impishly characterizes woman's mercurial wit thus: 'make the doors upon a woman's wit, and it will out at the casement; shut that, and 'twill out at the key-hole; stop that, 'twill fly with the smoke out at the chimney.' (IV, i,142-6). What qualifies woman's wit here—its essential attribute of fluidity—

may be predicated equally forcefully and quite justifiably of the presiding complexion of the play as a whole.

The flow of time in the forest of Arden is not mediated through any external media and cannot therefore be measured with any mathematical precision and accuracy but only by keeping an eye on the human pulses. This is brought out in the famous passage in which it is deliciously suggested as to how the various categories of persons react variously and discriminatingly to its movement. This is preceded by Rosalind's rejoinder to Orlando's 'there's no clock in the forest' to this effect: 'Then there is no lover in the forest; else sighing every minute and groaning every hour would detect the lazy foot of Time as well as a clock' (III. ii. 295-7). In other words no extra, mechanical contrivance like the clock is needed to capture, arrest and solidify this flow, for such an act would be nothing but superfluous in view of the interior time-sense which is operative here. This is followed by her very shrewd as well as amusing judgment: 'Time travels in divers paces with divers persons. I'll tell you who Time ambles withal, who Time trots withal, who Time gallops withal, and who he stands still withal.' (III, ii, 300-3). What this playful conceit, based as it is upon the Platonic similitude of the rider and the horse, obliquely suggests is that Time has a sort of interiority about it. Like everything else in the play Time is also a relative category and its flow as a logical consequence may be plumbed adequately only in terms of one's inner sensations. In a slightly different context we are insistently reminded how Time hangs heavy on Macbeth's hands the moment he reaches the nadir of his fortunes. Though it may look a little tangential yet one may as well take into account another intriguing affirmation of the interiority of Time implicated in these lines from one of William Blake's later prophecies, *Milton:*

> But others of the Sons of Los build Moments & Minutes & Hours'
> And Days & Months & Years & Ages & Periods, wondrous
>   buildings;

> And every Moment has a Couch of gold for soft repose,
> (A Moment equals a pulsation of the artery)
> And between every two Moments stands a Daughter or Beulah
> To feed the Sleepers on their Couches with maternal care.
> (Book the first, 44-9)

This may be regarded as an epiphany of Time mediated through the combined verbal and sonic structures, and the moments composing Time are cast into the metaphor of the human heartbeat. It may be added that whereas Blake is engaged with this notion in its mythical or metaphysical dimensions and in terms of his own symbology, Shakespeare through Rosalind illuminates it on the level of earthy and mundane experience and in a dramatic context. Putting it differently one may uphold that whereas Blake is speaking in a weighty tone, Shakespeare, in consonance with the comic convention in which he works, treats the whole thing with a non-serious solemnity. The point of the analogy lies elsewhere too: Beulah, in Blake's mythical geography, is the intermediary between the timeless and the temporal. 'In *Pilgrim's Progress*', as pointed out by S. Foster Damon, 'the land of Beulah is the Earthly Paradise, the happy land where the pilgrims live until it is time for them to cross the River of Death.'[9] The forest of Arden, likewise, is not to be equated with the Golden World but is only a replica of it which lies midway between the imagined Paradise and the urban court with all its allurements, vileness and sophistication. The analogy may be illustrated by the following two parallel diagrams:

Golden World→Arden→Court
EDEN→Beulah→Ulro.

To Blake's Beulah flock the exhausted and terrified Emanations who are in search of solace, sustenance and renovation of their spirits. It is a place of temporary refuge, lighted by the Moon of Love and watered by the rivers of Heaven and to it belong Blake's Muses—the Daughters of Beulah who serve as direct transmitters of poetic inspiration and are therefore juxtaposed to the classical Muses the Daughters of

Mnemosyne or Memory. 'Moments' in Blake's cosmological scheme are the source of all visionary or imaginative activity in the fallen world. The forest of Arden is evocative of the perfection of Eden and is also a symptom of the descent from it and therefore the movement of Time therein, though not entirely suspended as suggested by Helen Gardner, becomes spatialized and langorous Eden is supposed to symbolize the dynamic aspect of Eternity or the process of integration relevant to it and Beulah—the spatialized image—symbolizes its stable or static aspect. Time in Beulah is characterized by discontinuity, in Arden by langour, and these two elements cling to the very bases of these two different localities. What is common to these two concretions of Time is in the last analysis the recognition and acceptance of the element of subjectivity or interiority involved in each.

The notion of the free flow of time cannot be dissociated from the pervasive atmosphere of the idyllic solitude which is projected through and subsists at the very heart of this image of the borrowed pastoral tradition. Such has been the burden of our argument all along. The self-doubting mind of Touchstone and his wry detachment and Jaques's predilection towards inwardness and exclusiveness loom as large and are as integral to the over-all pattern of the play as the scintillating wit of Orlando and the verbal exuberance and fertility of Rosalind who is an adept at punning. In Marvell's *Garden,* whose thematic substratum is provided by the seventeenth century literary tradition of solitude time passes by unobtrusively, and its movement can best be measured through the dial of herbs and plants which is the only authentic instrument for such measurement available to its inhabitants. Human life is also imaged in *As You Like It* as 'this wide and universal theatre' and Jaques's 'successive vignettes of representative states of life'[6] are envisaged in terms of its comic vision :

> All the world's a stage,
> And all the men and women merely players;
> They have their exits and their entrances;

> And one man in his time plays many parts,
> His acts being seven ages. (II, vii, 139-43)

These seven ages are enumerated thus: the 'mewling infant', the 'whining school boy', the lover 'sighing like furnace', the soldier seeking the bubble reputation', the justice 'full of wise saws and modern instances', the old man with 'shrunk shank', and finally, the 'second childishness', sans everything, which confronts us with the despairing prospect of senility, impotence and unavoidably prolonged extinction. Exceptions may be proposed to this neat formulation in the interest of greater inclusiveness and for the sake of making it more universally applicable but the whole diagram has perhaps been more or less adequately conceived. Though this sententious declamation is not marked by any profundity of thought or subtlety of feeling—and it is not intended to be so marked any way—yet it does offer us an epitome of human experience in broad comic terms. Jaques is not commenting here on the tragic waste of human potentialities which are subject to the gnawing envy of Time. But standing both outside and above the action he knows very well, and the reader knows with him, too, that it is time which measures the processes of growth, maturity and decay to which human life is inevitably bound. But this is objective Time, as distinguished from subjective or interior Time which operates in Arden, and it is precisely this bondage to objective Time which prevents Jaques from adjusting himself to the forest of Arden.

If life as a series of interlocking stages, with change and decay as its inalienable attributes, is framed within the emblem of the theatre, subjective Time finds its external manifestation in the obligations grounded in love and is represented as a pageant or make-believe. The long-drawn-out love affair of Rosalind and Orlando seems to presuppose a cleverly improvised mechanism which is sustained by the confusions of identity. And yet when all is said and done Rosalind gives the impression of being deeply in love with Orlando and manages to live out the drama of passion stage by stage.

First, in reply to Orlando's expostulation about the symptoms of a love-sick devotee she catalogues them as a lean cheek, a blue and sunken eye, an unconquestionable spirit, a neglected beard, an ungartered hose, an unbanded bonnet, an unbuttoned sleeve, an untied shoe, and everything about him 'demonstrating a careless desolation'. This kind of windowdressing, done with the specific purpose of projecting the image of an idealized or notorious lover, is dismantled when related to the figure of Orlando. She therefore caps it all by saying: 'But you are no such man: You are rather point-device in your accoutrements; as loving yourself than seeming the lover of any other' (III, ii, 367-9). Secondly, she also does not mind scoffing at the proverbial ecstasy of love by maintaining: 'Love is merely a madness, and, I tell you, deserves as well a dark house and a whip as madmen do; and the reason why they are not so punished and cured is, that the lunacy is so ordinary that the whippers are in love too' (III, ii, 383-7). One cannot help admiring the double-edged sharpness of this verdict: deflating the lover's frenzy, bordering on almost lunacy, and yet conceding the universal hold of this lunacy over every mortal, whatever his status in the social scale. And lastly, skilfully and successfully coaxing Orlando into regarding Ganymede as his own Rosalind and thus enabling herself to rehearse the ritual of courtship by proxy she also specifies how she achieved the task of curing a hypothetical lover of his tyrranous passion: 'would now like him, now loathe him; then entertain him, then forswear him; now weep for him, then spit at him; that I drave my suitor from his mad humour of love to a living humour of madness, which was, to forswear the full stream of the world, and to live in a nook merely monastic' (III, ii, 397-402). She assures him that by the application of the same technique she could wash his liver as 'clean as a sound lamb's heart'. In a further effort to probe Orlando more fully she avers later: 'The poor world is almost six thousand years old, and in all this time there was not any man died in his own person, *Videlicet*, in a love-cause'. (IV, i, 86-9). She continues in the same destructive mood, and demolishing the myths about the classical heroes—'the patterns of love'—like Troilus and Hero and Leander, she upholds that these myths are no more than embroidered and fanciful exaggerations, hyperbolical assertions which sound patently silly, puerile and therefore downright incredible. 'But these are all lies: men have died from time to time, and worms have eaten them, but not for love (IV, i, 97-99). This raillery on even the uncommon tribe of lovers sounds devastatingly cruel and heartless but its implicit ironic intention—registering a shock of surprise and disillusionment to Orlando—cannot be missed by any perceptive reader and does not therefore require an extended comment. It is nonetheless delightful to note how feigning in love is enacted in a later context when Oliver appears with the bloody napkin to explain Orlando's inordinate delay in returning to her within the stipulated hour. It has been pointed out with great discernment by Rowdon Wilson that 'the time which Orlando has not kept is scarcely the objective time of the polity, of course, but rather the interior time of the lover's awareness'.[7]

The spectacle of this napkin and the fact of her being the weaker vessel make Rosalind swoon on the spot. On regaining consciousness, however, she pretends as if she had been merely striking a posture. And hence in reply to Oliver's observation: 'This was not counterfeit: there is too great testimony in your complexion that it was a passion of earnest' (IV, iii, 168-9) she continues to hold her own ground,: 'Counterfeit, I assure You' (IV, iii, 170). And then she ends up by entreating Oliver to this effect: 'I shall devise something, But, I pray you, commend my counterfeiting to him.' (IV, iii, 179-80). This reflects the tenacity and firmness of her devotion to Orlando beyond any shadow of doubt as well as her unusual capacity to wriggle out of any emba:rassing situation. And thus what has been declared by Amiens in one of his songs: 'Most friendship is feigning, most loving mere folly' cannot be predicated of her. This particular kind of feigning therefore helps in the discovery of the truth which is only half-glimpsed by the two of them from time to time but which explodes, in her wit-combat with Celia and in a rare moment of her self-confession, like a bomb-shell towards the very end thus: 'No, that same wicked bastard of Venus, that was begot of thought, conceived of spleen, and born of madness, that blind rascally boy that abuses every one's eyes because his own are out, let him be judge how deep I am in love' (IV. i, 189-93). This make-believe may also be treated as a dramatic device for prolongation of the business of love and does not involve any irritating consciousness of 'Time's winged chariot' on the part of the lovers. To it is juxtaposed the love-affair of Oliver and Celia which is subjected to a process of acceleration as if the former were to say to the latter, imagining her to be impersonating Marvell's Coy Mistress: 'Had we but World enough, and Time/ This coyness Lady were no crime.' The note of hurriedness here, in striking contrast to the snail-paced and leisurely love of Rosalind and Orlando, invites attention to itself. It involves a shift in the rhythm of time—from interior or langorous time of Arden (or Blake's pulsational moments) to objective Time operative in the court polity to which these lovers are now taking a flight.

The return to the court proposed towards the end does not necessarily imply the complete negation or rejection of the pastoral. Jaques, for instance, remains unconverted in the sense of not accepting the refinements of the social or civilizing order to which every one else in the play is to be restored with such eager precipitancy. Frederick too is willing to surrender the 'painted pomp' of the 'envious' court in favour of the grace and serenity of the spiritual and contemplative hierarchy. It looks as if the conflicting claims of the social and solitary modes are being equally weighed and the various value-judgments exercised are being modified the one by the other. The relativistic stance, referred to earlier, is brought out in the naive but tentatively cogent observation of Corin—'the natural philosopher'—thus: 'those that are good manners at the court, are as ridiculous in the country as the behaviour of the country is most mockable at the court' (III, ii, 44-7). The qualifications made to the validity of the two alternative modes of being are admitted frankly, but inspite of insufficiencies and inadequacies, both are allowed elbow-room in the broadest spectrum. To these also correspond the two coordinates: the objective and the interior time-sense; the former relates to motion in space, the latter to the knowing mind. Further, whereas the former is measurable and numberable the latter is entwined with the fabric of experience and reflects the shifting kaleidoscope of human consciousness.

Department of English
Aligarh Muslim University
Aligarh

REFERENCES

[1] All quotations are from *As You Like It* edited by Isabel J. Bisson, New Clarerdon Shakespeare (Oxford, 1951).

[2] Philip Edwards: *Shakespeare and the Confines of Art*, London, 1968, p. 58.

[3] Helen Gardner: *As You Like It* in *More Talking of Shakespeare* edited by John Garret, Longmans, London, 1959, p. 22.

[4] Willard Farnham: *The Shakespearian Grotesque*, Oxford, 1971, p. 122.

[5] S. Foster Damon: *A Blake Dictionary*, Brown University Press, 1965, p. 43.

[6] Derek Traversi: *An Approach to Shakespeare*, Vol. I, London, 1968, p. 299.

[7] Rowdon Wilson:'The Way to Arden: Attitudes Toward Time in *As You Like It*,' *Shakespeare Quarterly*, Vol. XXVI, Number 1, 1975, p. 22.

J. J. M. Tobin

MACBETH AND CHRISTS TEARES OVER JERUSALEM

Macbeth like so many of Shakespeare's plays was influenced by the themes and diction of several of the pamphlets of Thomas Nashe. It is well known that both *Pierce Penilesse* (1952)[1] and *The Terrors of the Night* (1594)[2] contributed to the texture of the tragedy; I suggest that at least as influential in the composition of the play was *Christs Teares over Jerusalem* (1593), a work earlier mined by Shakespeare in I *Henry IV*.[3] An examination of the parallels between *Christs Teares* and *Macbeth* reveals not only the considerable reliance upon Nashe by Shakespeare, but also the great likelihood that one of the most celebrated of emendations in the canon, Theobald's 'shoal' for the Folio's 'Schoole' at I. vii. 6,[4] is indeed correct.

Christs Teares over Jerusalem is the longest and most sober of Nashe's works. It is chiefly a sermon-like warning to London to reform lest it be punished by God in the manner of the equally sinful first centuary A. D. Jerusalem. The work is marked by a singular oration delivered by Christ himself, a vignette-filled narrative of the seige, famine and destruction of Jerusalem, and the anatomizing of the moral turpitude of modern London with its pride, ambition, luxury, etc. Its most striking vignette is that of the Jewish matron, Miriam, who in the midst of famine chose to kill and eat her only son rather than have both mother and son die of starvation. Although there is no doubt whatsoever that Lady Macbeth derives much of her power from the image of Medea in Studley's translation of Seneca's *Medea*,[5] some of the imagery in *Christs*

Teares and the idea of a woman who is not only both mother and murderess, but also a female who taunts the weakness of men, lies behind Lady Macbeth's interview with her hesitant spouse.

Miriam is the most dramatic of several mothers suffering during the famine, one of whom 'lurcht from ... her young weaned children (famisht for want of nourishment) fastned theyr sharpe edged *gums* on her fingers, and would not let them goe till she *Pluckt* the morsell out of her owne mawe to put into theyrs' (70).[6] On the following page Miriam ('discoursing with herselfe') laments, 'O my deare *Babe, had I* in every limbe of mee a several life, *so* many lyves *as* I have lymbes to Death wold I resigne one life ... I will unswathe thy breast with my sharpe *knyfe* and break ope the *bone*-walled pryson where thy poore hart is lockt up' (71-2). One notes that 'gums' appears first in the canon here (and not in Studley's version of Seneca) in Lady Macbeth's

> I have given suck, and know
> How tender 'tis to love the *babe* that milks me;
> I would, while it was smiling in my face,
> Have *pluck'd* my nipple from his *boneless gums*,
> And dash'd the brains out, *had I so* sworn *as* you
> *Have* done to this. (I. vii. 54-8)

Earlier Lady Macbeth had referred to her keen knife (I. v. 52) in her soliloquy which begins 'The *raven* himself is *hoarse*/ That *croaks* the fatal *entrance* of Duncan'. (I. v. 38-9), lines which seem to have been affected, along with Banquo's reference to the *Temple*-haunting martlet and Macbeth's description of Duncan's virtues by some words of Nashe afew pages earlier in *Christs Teares* as he denies being 'so Luciferous passionative-ambitious' (compare Macbeth, 'not without ambition'). Nashe's words are, 'Let no man *enter* into the History ... the full *blast* of this desolative-*Trumpet* ... with a *hoarse* sound ... lifting up into *Heaven*, when the *Temple*-boasting Jewes ... whole flockes of *Ravens* (with a fearfull *croking* cry) ... a hideous dismal Owle ... in the *Temple*-porche built her nest' (60-61).[7] Banquo's' temple-haunting martlet' mistakenly builds its nest in Macbeth's castle because, ironically 'the *heaven's* breath/Smells wooingly here' (I. vi. 4-6). The bird, the nest building, the inversion of the expected, and the hyphenated compound 'Temple-', all in conjunction with Macbeth's anxiety over the heinousness of the murder of Duncan whose virtues are '*trumpet*-tongued' and for whom 'pity' is 'Striding the *blast*' (I. vii. 19, 21, 22) suggest that Shakespeare had these particular pages firmly in mind to the point where the diction could be parcelled out among three characters as they variously approach the murder scene.

Not diction alone, but Nashe's theme of a masculine woman's taunting weak men (a topic absent from both Holinshed and Seneca) has affected Lady Macbeth in her confrontation with her vacillating husband. Miriam feeds her only off-spring to the hungry soldiers who suddenly become aware of the nature of their dinner (recall Lady Macbeth's dinner-time reference, 'He has almost *supp'd,*' (I. vii. 28) and Macbeth's yet more explicit 'I have *supp'd full with horrors*' (V. v. 13). She then taunts the men, 'Cravens, *cowards* sitte you mute and amaz'd .... My womanish stomack hath served me to that which your man-like stomacks are dastarded with. What I have done, you have driven me to do, now beeing done you are *daunted* with ... Most *valiant Captaines* why for-beare you' (76).[8] One notes that Lady Macbeth, explicitly indicting his manhood, calls her husband 'coward' (I. vii. 43), that he cites her '*undaunted* mettle' (I. vii. 73), and that earlier we hear of his being described as '*valiant*' (I. ii. 24) and as one of 'our *captains*' (I. ii. 34). Further, Macbeth himself has been given some of the diction used by the hesitant Miriam as she steels herself to murder her son.

Miriam at the moment of the murder is unable to speak the name of her son, 'so *I could not* distinctly *pronounce* this sweet name of my sonne: it is too sweet a name to come in slaughters mouth' (72). Macbeth, too, has difficulty in speaking a single word at a murder scene, 'But wherefore *could not I prononnce* "Amen" '? (II. ii. 29). Miriam continues to encourage herself as best she can,

> The tongue is the encouraging Captaine, that (with daunger-glorifying perswasion) animates al the other *corporeall* parts to be venturous. He is the Judge that doomes and determines; the rest of our faculties and powers are but secular executioners of his sentence. Be prest, myne hands, (as Jayle-garding *officers*) to see executed whatsoever your superior tong-slaying Judge shall decree. Embrawne your soft-skind enclosure with Adamantine dust, that it (72) may draw *nothing but steele* unto it. Arme yourselves against my sonne. . . (73)

Here we have Duncan's 'spungy *officers*' (I. vii. 71) as well as Lady Macbeth's tongue encouraging of her captain in the midst of his infirmity of purpose, the imperative mood, the phrase *'nothing but'*, the word 'steele' which has prompted the 'mettle' of Macbeth, and a male child.[9] Macbeth's lines are

> Bring forth men-children only
> For thy un*daunt*ed mettle should compose
> *Nothing but* males. (I. vii. 72-4)

and after Lady Macbeth speaks of the *'clamor'* (I. vii. 78) Macbeth announces that 'I am settled, and bend up/Each *corporal* agent to this terrible feat' (I. vii.79-80). One recalls that the desolation of Jerusalem 'shall be *clamored'* (73) and that the tongue has indeed animated 'al the other *corporeall* parts' (72). In this single scene Shakespeare has given aspects of Miriam, first hesitant and then aggressively and tauntingly murderous, to the hesitant Macbeth and to the decisive and taunting Lady Macbeth, an intriguing use of his sources which gives unexpected support to Freud's celebrated opinion that Macbeth and Lady Macbeth are the two halves of one personality.

Finally, one observes that in the opening of this same scene (I. vii) Macbeth's 'But here upon this *bank* and *shoal* of time,/We'ld jump the life *to come*' (I. vii. 6-7), with 'shoal' the emendation of Theobald followed by most modern editors for the Folio's 'Schoole', has a source in Nashe's description of the carnage attendant upon the siege of Jerusalem,

> The channell of Jordan was so over-burdened and charged wyth dead carkasses, that the waters contended to wash theyr hands of them, and lightly leapt over theyr *bankes* as shunning to mixe themselves with so many millions of murders; but after many dayes abstinence from theyr propper entercourse, . . . they recollected theyr liquid forces and putting all theyr wavy shoulders together, bare the whole *shole* of them before them, as farre as the Sea of Sodom (68)

a description which follows the reference to other victims described in the previous paragraph as 'exclayming for some melting-harted man *to come* and rydde them out of theyr lingring-lyving death' (68).

Macbeth is by general agreement Shakespeare's most Senecan play, and while Nashe with affected modesty had demurred at writing 'like tragiche Seneca' (60), Shakespeare in the composition of his play about ambition, crime, guilt, and punishment was impressed by the presentation of those very themes in the pamphlet. Evidence of the dramatist's absorption of still other elements from *Christs Teares* include unique or rare terms in the canon suh as *'hurly-burlie'* (59), *'dudgeon'* (64),[10] *Hangmans hands'* (168), 'the *Temple . . . most sacriligiously'* (66), *'hie-towring* sinne/O *Pryde'* (80), *'birdes doe . . . the Pyt-fal, the nette, the Ginne'* (169), *'Matrons . . . Cesterne'* (59). Compare *'hurly-burly's'* (I. i. 3), *'dudgeon'* (II. i. 46), *hangman's hands'* (II. ii. 25), *'Most sarciligious . . . temple'* (II. iii. 67, 68), *'tow' ring* in her *pride'* (II. iv 12), *'birds do . . . the nest . . . The pitfall:* nor *the gin'* (IV.i i. 32, 34, 35), 'Your *matrons . . . cestern'* (IV. iii. 62, 63). Even the sequence of common terms reveals Shakespeare's close study of Nashe's work in that the news brought by Rosse of the slaughter of Macduff's family and its reception (IV. iii) derives from the terms used by Christ in his description of the wrath of God which falls upon both the guilty and the innocent of Jerusalem. Compare Nashe's terms *'My tongue'* (56), *'soul', 'enrag'd', anger', 'Heaven', 'howles', 'hart', 'myne eyes', 'give grief', 'chickins', Kites', 'must I', 'I cannot'* (57), *'hart', howling'* (58), *'Wife" 'slaughtred', 'Chil-*

dren', 'Babes', hearing' (59) with those of Shakespeare in *Macbeth* IV. iii : *'howl'd'* (194), *'my tongue'* (201, 231), *'wife'* (204,211,212), *'babes'* (205), *'slaughter'd'* (205), *'grief'* (209, 215), *'heart'* (210, 229), *children'* (211, 216), *'hell-kite'* (217), *'chickens'* (218), *'I must'* (221), *'I cannot'* (222), *'heaven'* (223, 227), *'souls'* (227), 'let *grief'* (228), *'anger'* (229), *enrage'* (229), *'mine eyes'* (230). Scotland is punished as was Jerusalem, and Macduff like Nashe's Christ is left desolate.[11]

Christs Teares in its themes and diction seems to have become so much a part of *Macbeth* that part of Jerusalem has become Scotland, some of Miriam Lady Macbeth, and both have contributed to the character and words of the hesitant murderer who wished that Duncan's surcease would bring about his own success 'upon this bank and shoal'-not school-'of time'.

Boston State College
USA

NOTES & REFERENCES

[1] See Arnold Davenport, 'Shakespeare and Nashe's *Pierce Penilesse'*, *N & Q*, cxcviii (1953), pp. 371-4.

[2] Ann Pasternak Slater, *'Macbeth* and *The Terrors of the Night'*, *Essays in Criticism*, xxviii (1978), pp. 112-28.

[3] John Dover Wilson, 'The Origins and Development of Shakespeare's *Henry IV'*, *The Library*, xxxi (1945), pp. 2-16.

[4] All line references are to *The Riverside Shakespeare*, ed. G. B. Evans *et al*. (Boston, 1974).

[5] Inga-Stina Ewbank, 'The Fiend-like Queen : A Note on *Macbeth* and Seneca's *Medea'*, *Shakespeare Survey*, XIX (1966), pp. 82-94.

[6] Nashe references are to *The Works of Thomas Nashe*, edited by R.B. McKerrow (1904-10. repr., 1958), ii.

[7] The following paragraph of Nashe's page sixty-one contains 'sacrificing knyves that . . . wold afterwards by no means be clensed but tooke unto them an unremoveable rust' a hint for the hands that hold the knives in *Macbeth* and will not be cleansed.

[8] Some added evidence that Shakespeare had been particularly interested in Nashe's narrative of the effects of famine during the siege of Jerusalem comes from Macbeth's comment in V. v. that his 'castle's strength/Will laugh a *siege* to scorn; here let them lie/ Till *famine* and the ague eat them up' (2-4); there is no siege or reference to the possibility of siege in Holinshed, and while Shakespeare has given the famine and ague to the besiegers, he had read of 'the siege harde played' and the '*Famine* and the Pestilence' in the attack on Jerusalem (69).

[9] As well as 'the opposition between the hand and the other organs and senses which recurs again and again', Kenneth Muir, ed., *Macbeth* (new Arden edition, London, 1951), xxvii.

[10] Muir notes a number of instances of 'hurlyburly' and 'dudgeon' in works known to Shakespeare, including Seneca's *Agamemnon* (Studley trans.) for 'hurlyburly' and Gerard's *Herbal* for 'dudgeon' but none is cited as containing both terms.

[11] One recalls Malcolm's 'Let us seek out some *desolate* shade, and there/Weep our sad bosoms *empty*' at the opening of IV. iii. and Christ's reference to the infant '*empty*-famished' and to the prophecy that He 'should thus bee left *desolate*' (59). The infant is one of those babes who want to return to the womb rather 'then viewe the Worlde in such *hurly-burlie*' (59).

BOOK REVIEWS

Selected Essays in Criticism by L. C. KNIGHTS, Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. VIII + 232.

The book is a selection of essays by L. C. Knights who is, as we know, one of the most significant literary critics of our time. The essays drawn (all except the last but one) from his earlier collections, *Explorations* (1946), *Further Explorations* (1965) and *Explorations 3* (1976)—all of which are no longer available--form a companion volume to his selection of Shakespearean essays published earlier. The present volume spans a wide range of critical thinking, with essays on authors as diverse as Marlowe, George Herbert, Ben Jonson, Clarendon, Restoration Comedy writers, Blake and Henry James. It also contains essays, like the two on Coleridge as a literary critic, which deal explicitly with general questions regarding literature and literary studies. The various essays are self-sufficient units, and yet they are linked by 'a pervasive interest in the conditions, social or personal, out of which particular works emerged, and in the way in which major works of the imagination are renewed as they are re-interpreted in successive generations'. This does not mean taking recourse to any reductive generalizations, any moralistic, political or pedagogical simplifications. On the other hand, Professor Knights is always making us realize that it is only through our knowledge of the 'irreplaceable uniqueness' of a literary work that our consciousness is energized into a continual apprehension and assimilation of other kinds of knowledge, literary and non-literary. It seems that without refuting the autonomy of a work of art he sees it as an open energy-system—a windowed monad, so to say—embodying and mediating energy as an ever-fresh focused awareness of life-affirming values. With such an approach our critic has the advantage of freely moving in and out of the literary work to elicit the essential value-concern that brings the author and his society and the reader and the reader's society into a meaningful relatianship.

The focused awareness of life-affirming values which is a matter of total certainty of attitudes on the part of the artist operates as the shaping spirit of his imagination. It is the creative personal concern that makes for an impersonalization and clarifying organization of his feelings. Without it he fails to create a coherent symbolic form. Such is the 'Strange Case of Christopher Marlowe', and Professor Knights goes to the heart of the matter as he points it out. The uncertainty of Marlowe's attitudes, which is betrayed by the fantastic self-indulgence and the exaggerated, exhibitionistic gestures that we find in his verse, is owing to an unresolved conflict between his unconscious drives which make him identify himself with the ruthless power-cult of his times and his intelligence which condemns it. Since he is at the mercy of his unconscious drives there is an uncontrolled impetuousness that fails to be transformed into energies of art. His plays do not affirm any values, which affirmation would have made them coherent wholes, too. And this is true even of his greatest work, *Dr. Faustus*.

The essay on George Herbert begins with a consideration of the poet's style. It is demonstrated that Herbert's homely manner of expression is one with his honest attempt to work out his own conflicts—especially the conflict in himself between the ambitious man of the world and the priest—and to accept the validity of his experience. His honest recognition of the disturbing elements in his experience and his painful struggle to achieve maturity make his religion a humane one. Thus his poetry is life-affirming and of universal significance.

Donne's obsession with a feeling of 'nothingness' is the subject of the next essay. On the evidence of the poet's letters and verse epistles it is inferred that the obsession is too deeply rooted in his personality to be successfully handled in poetry. It finds free expression in the 'Anniversaries' just because he did not know Elizabeth Drury. One wishes Professor Knights had examined the 'energy-construct' of these poems to elicit a value-judgment. But he rightly points out that it is Donne's confrontation with nothingness that results in one of his greatest poems, 'A Nocturnal upon S. Lucies Day'. It is so, paradoxically, because of the energy of the account of 'how it feels to reach absolute Zero'.

The essay on Ben Jonson is a defence of his 'public' poems. In cautioning us against approaching these preconceptualized poems with Eliot's distinction between 'poetic thought' and 'the thought of the poet' in mind Professor Knights makes an apt use of the biographical fact that Jonson wrote them first in prose. He shows that these poems, which are firmly attached to a particular time and place, have 'an inherent perennial vitality' which 'calls out a corresponding energy of apprehension in the responsive reader'. With their tone and rhythm they convey a sense of 'actively engaging with life'.

Significantly enough, the essay on the 'Social Background of Metaphysical Poetry' begins with the recognition that without *taste*, without a developed feeling for literature, one cannot usefully pursue one's researches outside literature. The sociological criticism that emanates from, and in its turn enriches, literary criticism can 'deepen our insight into the intimate dependence of individual growth on factors outside the individual'. In the case of the Metaphysical Poets one finds these factors in the fact of a unified active culture—which can be understood by studying the life of Sir Henry Wotton. It is because of emerging from such a culture that Metaphysical Poetry brings 'the whole soul of man into activity'.

The sixth essay is : 'Reflections on Clarendon's *History of the Rebellion*'. In an illuminating contrast with Trotsky who in his *History of the Russian Revolution* asserts a schematized and imposed pattern by seeing bloodless categories of masses and social forces Clarendon's approach of seeing persons, their motives, attitudes and habits of mind, with an awareness of moral issues, is shown to reflect, notwithstanding his bias, the qualities 'that were to contribute to the more lasting achievement of civilization long after the political cause that he supported was lost'. We must foster these qualities in our political thinking, which is the only alternative to the progressive deterioration of public life in our time. The essay shows how perceptive a great literary critic can be when he turns his 'energized consciousness' to considering works of political history.

As regards Restoration Comedy it has not been recognized that it is as decadent and 'artificial' as the Heroic Tragedy. By pointing to the limited, convention-based set of attitudes of Restoration Comedy writers, Congreve not excluded, to their nerveless style, non-functional verbal pattern, mechanical antitheses and un-illuminating, convention-based 'wit' Professor Knights clarifies the issues once and for all. 'The criticism that defenders of Restoration Comedy need to answer is not that the comedies are "immoral", but that they are trivial, gross and dull'.

The next essay, 'Early Blake', calls attention to a group of eight Songs from the *Poetical Sketches* to show that they are a positive achievement by the young Blake. Their criss-cross of contrasting, mutually enlightening insights into psychic states and their mastery of a subtle music make them an intrinsic part of the great poet's work. Professor Knights is most admirably sensitized to the music, the very 'sound of sense', of poetry, which can take him very far afield. For example, he shows how 'the plangent tone that comes with the shift of rhythm' in a particular line ('Brings me yew to deck my grave') of a song ('My silks and fine array') 'has just that shade of self-conscious self-awareness that warns us against identifying with the speaker': how in one song ('Love and harmony combine') 'the rhyme sustained through each stanza suggests the desired concentration on the one relationship', and in the other ('I love the jocund dance') 'the shorter lines, the predominantly iambic rhythm and the alternate rhymes, help towards the impression of a shared jollity' : which testifies to 'two constant preoccupations of Blake—with "private" experience in its intenser moments, and with the "social" world that supports (or frustrates) that experience, and can in turn be transformed by it. Similarly, in the light of the word-music of 'Memory, hither come' an important philosophy of Blake, the one regarding the negative value of memory, is seen taking shape, 'not as thought but as a sensitive feeling into a mood and its implications'.

In 'Two Notes on Coleridge' the first section deals with criticism. It is pointed out that Coleridge's criticism is informed with his feeling for life as a whole, his conception of imagination as an integrating, directed and precision-oriented energy being the one criterion. Besides Coleridge's particular perceptions, what Professor Knights finds valuable is his 'organizing insights', especially his view of poetry as a form of energy—which he himself subscribes to.

The second section which is a 'note' on Coleridge's periodical *The Friend* recommends it as 'essential reading'. Some tips, regarding the two senses of 'reason', are given for the non-professionals who are likely to be baffled by this hodge-podge'. It is shown that the various essays of the periodical are essentially concerned with education, in its real sense of awakening 'the principle and method of self-development'. With Coleridge's power of engaging the reader's mind *The Friend* is not only a tract of the times but, it seems, of all times.

This is followed by 'Idea and Symbol : Some Hints from Coleridge.' A symbol takes its meaning from a context and fosters a life-direction through imaginative involvement. Professor Knights speaks of the overlapping contexts within which meaning takes place, that of the created work, for which the artist's genius draws on tradition, and that of the developing life-experience of the reader who, like the artist, is imaginatively involved with the work with his 'whole soul.' Which results in the addition to Coleridge's list of another feature in which opposites are united in the symbol : 'the active involvement of the self—the whole self—in the self-forgetful act of contemplation.' It is because of the principle of involvement that the symbol contains what Coleridge calls 'an endless power of semination.' In the end, we are reminded that the symbol, which brings to focus the transforming energy of the imagination, is directed towards precision.

There are two essays on Henry James. Both deal with the theme of victimization, which is one of James's chief preoccupations. The first essay deals with the later works in which the victim, trapped by 'Fate', appears as the central character—'the trapped spectator of life.' In refutation of the opinions of certain critics, of Cleanth Brooks in particular, it is convincingly demonstrated, with reference to the stories *In the Cage* and *The Beast in the Jungle,* that James neither lacks vitality nor relieves his personal feelings but turns the story of frustration into art. That the central character is not merely 'detached', that an operative irony is always projecting 'the possible other case, the case rich and edifying,' and that two points of of view, the subjective and the objectively critical, not only alternatingly but often simultaneously, to evoke sympathy as well as detachment in order to bring about an extension and refinement of consciosness—all these factors contribute to 'the highest form of vitality' that art mediates.

The other essay on James considers his preoccupation with egotistic domination in small social groups, which is the root cause of the distortion of the texture of collective life and, therefore, of the menace to civilization by war. Jemes's approach is not 'moralistic' in any didactic sense; it is not a matter of applying ready-made categories but of releasing 'moral vibrations' through the perceptive energy of the imagination. This means the artistic handling of language. Which is demonstrated with reference to the story *Washington Square* by drawing attention to the significance of elements like tone, manner of experession, metaphor, setting, and descriptions of apparantly slight, almost unnoticed, actions. James brings out the full pressure of circumstances that mould the trapped consciousness. This is one reason why he also indicates the qualities in victim that make him or her a victim. Witness the case of Isabel Archer which comes out through quotations from *The Portrait of a Lady*. Professor Knights has a way of sensitizing his reader to the language of the literary text.

With the last two essays we return to general questions regarding literature and literary studies. Of these the first—originally an Ernest Jones Lecture (1977)—considers how poetry brings to light in a precise form 'things hard for thought,' to grasp. To demonstrate it Professor Knights selects three poems, Emily Dickinson's 'There's a certain Slant of Light', Blake's 'A Poison Tree' and a passage from Eliot's *Waste Land* (lines 377-84), which is an adaptation of a fragmenr (see the facsimile edition, pp. 113, 115). Through their unique word-music—even through intervals of silence (pauses), as the Emily Dickinson poem shows—poems create meanings which are non-paraphrasable, multiple, endlessly growable, and yet precise. Such meanings are a function of the controlled energies of the imagination that the poems embody and evoke. The Eliot fragment was an expression of uncontrolled personal feelings of disgust and therefore of no signficance. But as the poet assimilates it into *The Waste Land* he transforms it into something impersonal and of universal significance. A poet can tolerate the undefined till he is able to find the 'right' symbolic form that defines it.

In the last essay, 'Literature and the Teaching of Literature,' Professor Knights first considers what literature is for. It is a 'form of Knowledge, an irreplaceable way of arriving at truths that are of highest importance to us if we are to remain, or try to become, adequately human.' In the face of not only the 'veil of familiarity' between us and the actuality of the world but our own defences it is only through the experience of literature that we live our way into these truths, perceive hitherto unperceived relations and get organizing and clarifying insights into other works and into our experience as a whole—into its moral, educational, and even political aspects. The teaching of literature should be varied and flexible, involving a variety of approaches directed towards 'awakening the mind and suggesting to it the possibilities of self-direction and self-discipline.' Scholarship, not of the Ph. D. type, but of the actively assimilative kind, should be encouraged. Practical criticism, which is the basis of all literary study, has its dangers if it is not conducted with tact. Cross-fertilization is necessary.

The aim of teaching literature is what L. C. Knights himself, being the great teacher and critic that he is, achieves, in a different way, through his 'essays in criticism.' He enriches, enlightens, sensitizes and awakens our mind, 'suggesting to it possibilities of self-direction and self-discipline;' prompts us to perceive, to respond, to test his imaginative insights in our own experience, and to acquire our own imaginative insights and make a creative use of them. He helps us in discovering for ourselves the way 'to set free and foster the energies of the imagination.'

Department of English
Aligarh Muslim University
Aligarh

Z. A. Usmani

Lost Angels of a Ruined Paradise: Themes of Cosmic Strife in Romantic Tragedy by ERIKA GOTTLIEB, Sono Nis Press, Victoria, British Columbia, 1981, pp. 183

As the title itself indicates, the author is mainly concerned with making a thematic study of some representative tragic plays of the Romantic period. For this purpose she has chosen one drama each by Wordsworth, Coleridge, Keats, Byron and Shelley. She concedes that none of these works can be regarded as an example of really successful drama, nevertheless she thinks it worthwhile to discuss in considerable detail some of the abstract issues which the five plays raise though not always dramatically. There is nothing wrong in taking a sympathetic view of a piece of literature which may, by many, be dismissed as an artistic failure, provided the critic's effort leads to some valuable insight into the author's total creative endeavour and the perspective in which it should be seen. There is ample justification for paying more than usual attention to the unsuccessful dramatic works of the five major Romantic poets because of their significant achievements outside the purview of theatre and drama.

Erika Gottlieb is not primarily interested in the causes of the Romantic poets' failure to write convincing and plausible drama, though she has hinted at some of these causes particularly in the opening and closing chapters of the book. She, for instance, points out that Wordsworth, Coleridge, Keats, Byron and Shelley were not gifted with that human or dramatic imagination which we associate with Shakespeare. They were more inclined to cosmic allegory than the historical drama and mostly projected their own mental and emotional conflicts through their weak dramatic characters. In this respect the English Romantic drama stands in sharp contrast to its continental counterpart, for there the allegorical design is harmonized with the concrete human interaction of the characters who appear to be real men and women. She rightly observes: 'having watched the revolutionary upheaval from across the Channel, the English Romantics have translated Revolution and Counter-Revolution into an almost exclusively cosmic, metaphysical drama.' She also notes that the French Revolution, which she does not consider to be the sole factor responsible for creating the mental climate generally associated with it, gave the Romantic poets 'limitless faith in human and social possibility' and the disillusionment that followed brought them to the other extreme of black despair. One seldom finds any tragic catharsis in the Romantic tragedies and with afew exceptions these plays confront the audience with a sense of total moral collapse. This, according to the author, is due to the Romantic poets' initial denial of the existence of evil. Though the above reasons may generally account for the Romantic poets' inability to write genuine tragedy, there are a number of specific artistic even technical problems in the case of each Romantic playwright which deserve to be studied. However it would be unfair to expect a full length discussion of these problems in a book which does not so much propose to evaluate the five Romantic poets as dramatists as it tries to discern a certain thematic unity in their dramatic works and to arrive at a lucid understanding of the nature of these poets' philosophical dilemmas. Thus Erika Gottlieb's approach to the subject is basically exclusive, reductive and perhaps inevitably a little monotonous; though, within the limits set by herself, she has given an exhaustive interpretation of each play in an extremely clear and logical manner and drawn her conclusions with a touch of assurance becoming a confident scholar.

The author starts with the hypothesis that each of the chosen plays is 'essentially the ritual enactment of a basic myth, that of man's fall from innocence, and his loss of Paradise.' A good deal of overlapping in their roles notwithstanding, the four stock characters of Gothic melodrama: hero, heroine, villain and a father figure, as they appear in these tragedies, respectively correspond to Adam, Eve, Satan and Father. All these plays *(The Borderers, Remorse, Otho The Great, Manfred* and *The Cenci)* are concerned with 'a nearly saintly heroine's loss of innocence' and 'the major crime is an offence committed against a father or father figure.' The whole study moves within the framework of this assumption and attempts to trace the working of the basic myth in its variety through the plots of the tragedies. Taking the plays as essentially allegorical, Erika Gottlieb does not rule out the possibility of a political or [more mundane interpretation, but her emphasis is] clearly on the metaphysical aspects of the dramatic conflict particularly concerning the problem of evil. She has also applied Northrop Frye's concept of the Romantics' 'revolutionary reversal' of the traditional cosmology to the closing situation in the five tragedies to discover that none of these 'end merely with a revolutionary reversal which simply substitutes an old with a new moral principle.' No new cosmic centre clearly emerges from the enveloping darkness at the end of these tragedies, particularly in the ones by Keats, Byron and Shelley. Coleridge's play has an incongruous happy ending and in Wordsworth's *The Borderers,* as the author notes, the new cosmic centre remains 'unrealized.''

One full chapter has been devoted to the consideration of each of the five tragedies. In view of the nature of the problems that they raise, the plays of Byron and Shelley fall in a category slightly different from the one comprising the rest. Taking up *The Borderers* first, the author admits that with its tangled plot and unmotivated characters the play is dramatically confused and can yield its meaning best if taken as 'a symbolic journey in search of a resolution of his [Wordsworth's] cosmic dilemma.' It is suggested that the allegorical structure of the play bears some influence of Milton and Spenser. Neither the saintly Herbert nor the demonic Oswald can be regarded as dramatically realized characters. Herbert represents man's divinity and his blindness is an indication of man's loss of direction. Noticing a certain ambiguity in the playwright's attitude towards Oswald the author observes that the hero Marmaduke, who personifies the poet's weak and perplexed philosophy, does not appear to be in any real dramatic conflict with the villain. Though he suffers a great deal Marmaduke is not totally defeated or destroyed—a fact that brings in an element of hope in the dark universe of the play. A convnicing interpretation of some of the striking images as they occur in the drama is a valuable feature not only of the study of *The Bcrderers* but also of the subsequent studies of the other plays. The author admits that 'Wordsworth's transfer of the numinous to the worldly sphere' is very important for the allegorical framework, but at the same time maintains that this transfer is 'difficult to achieve dramatically'. The question is: can there be any drama worth the name without this achievement?

Comparing Coleridge's *Remorse* with its earlier version *Osorio,* the author feels that *Osorio* had a charm and the energy of conviction which *Remorse* lacks. She speculates that some of the striking inconsistencies in the latter play are probably due to certain ideological and possibly theological changes that took place in Coleridge's mind between writing the first and the second version. According to her there in no cathartic effect at the close of *Remorse* which has a forced happy ending; instead we have a neatly worked out scheme of poetic justice. One cannot, however, be fully convinced by the view that Coleridge's failure is not so much artistic, for he was well versed in dramatic skills: he failed because he had an 'extremely bad conscience about the two major themes of romantic tragedian : the hero's claim for Paradise and his rebellion against the father who may stand in the way of consummation'. Here the author seems to be moving in the realm of speculation. Perceiving a degree of ambivalence in the characterization of the innocent ones : Alvar and Teresa, she points out that Ordonio, the Satanic figure in the play, is 'vague, weak and cowardly'. He has been seen as an archetype of Judas as he betrays his saintly brother Alvar. At another level the relationship of the two brothers resembles that of Cain and Abel. The author thinks that there is no unified feeling about Nature in the drama. Besides remarking about the light images, she has discussed at length the symbolic meaning of the cavern and the dungeon.

Keats's *Otho The Great,* which Erika Gottlieb views as a 'dramatization of a spiritual biography', is different from the plays of Wordsworth and Coleridge, particularly the latter's, because in it the hero's search for Paradise ends on a note of 'alienation, madness and death'. The motives and actions of the hero Ludolph, no less entangled than the plot, can best be understood within the allegorical framework of the story. Having discovered Auranthe's offence which to him 'signifies the fall of the whole world of Nature', the hero has to suffer all alone the consequences of his wrong choice. His lot is irredeemable. As in *The Borderers* and *Remorse*, the hero's offence against the heroine in *Otho The Great* parallels his offence against the father. Dealing with the imagery of the play the author has drawn attention to the ironic use of the gold images.

Byron's *Manfred,* which reminds the author of *Dr. Faustus,* has certain striking features which set it apart from the previous three plays, for instance, Manfred is not deceived like the heroes of Wordsworth, Coleridge and Keats. There is a certain inevitability about his fall as though it were 'a pre-ordained cosmic catastrophe'. The heroine too seems to be a part of Manfred's being rather than an individual character. There is a rejection of both Devil and Heaven in the play. Byron seems to attribute sin and villainy to the creating power. About the images the author remarks that they 'serve a primarily intellectual and illustrative function'.

Erika Gottlieb's fondness for Shelley's *The Cenci* is quite obvious. She finds the play less melodramatic and better harmonized in its allegorical and dramatic design than the other four dramas. As in *Manfred,* the loss of the heroine's innocence is there, but the offence against the father is a 'consummated parricide' which we do not find in the plays of Wordswosth, Coleridge, Keats and Byron. The author considers Shelley's interpretation of the myth of Fall and Creation, which is common to all the five plays, to be the most radical. He seems to question the very fact of being. In the character of Count Cenci he has introduced a 'diabolical divinity who uncreates the world through hate'. Cenci represents not only man's mistaken notion of the Creator but the Creator himself—a figure like Jupiter or Jehovah the angry Father. The author asserts that the real question in the play is not concerned with the character of Beatrice but the motivation of the evil Father. Erika Gottlieb disagrees with Wasserman's assessment of Beatrice's 'pernicious error'. Viewing Beatrice as 'an allegorical personification of an abstract quality', she observes that this character shows how Shelley could not reconcile some Utopian aspects of his ideology with what he called 'our sad reality'. One, however, wonders why the author is unwilling to accept Beatrice as anything other than 'a personification of an abstract quality', especially when she has herself noticed 'a tension between the ideology of the play and the real world depicted in it'. She draws attention to some of the contradictions in Beatrice's character as they are revealed in her defence of herself before the judge. Seen from another point of view these very contradictions give her the potential of becoming a convincing human character even as she has been cast in an overwhelmingly allegorical setting. Beatrice's position at the end of the play 'seems to foreshadow the emergence of the existential hero of modern tragedy', but the author is careful enough to add that a world devoid of the ideal would be unreal for Beatrice—an attitude which can hardly be reconciled with existentialism.

The well-organized, neatly presented and extremely readable study of Romantic Tragedy is quite likely to revive academic interest in the almost forgotten plays of Wordsworth, Coleridge, Keats, Byron and Shelley.

Department of English
Aligarh Muslim University
Aligarh

S. Wiqar Husain

Visionary Physics: Blake's response to Newton, By DONALD AULT, The University of Chicago Press, 195 pp.

In a provocative article, 'Negative Sources in Blake' (Cf. *Essays for S. Foster Damon*, ed. Alvin H. Rosenfeld, Brown University Press, 1969) Martin K. Nurmi had suggested that Blake's attitude towards the head of the philosophical Cerberus—Newton—was not that of total and outright rejection but of giving his own particular stance to those Newtonian and Cartesian axioms which were common knowledge in the eighteenth Century. These include, primarily, the theory of Limits (implying the increazing polygons extending upto the periphery and vanishing into nonexistence) States and Vortices. Donald Ault, in his superbly original book, *Visionary Physics*, carries forward Nurmi's thesis very much further afield. His main contention is that, apart from the mechanistic world model provided by the Newtonian physics and the Lockean epistemology, fundamental doctrines like those ot fluxions, law of inverse squares, void space, solids, absolute time, continuous motion and vanishing ratios, as propounded by Newton, usurped the lure for the imagination. Blake, according to Ault, had a firm grasp over the far-reaching implications of contemporary Science and Mathematics, and was aware of their seductive and sinister appeal for varying mental constructs. Blake conceives of Urizen's functioning—and Urizen is very much the emblem of a Newtonian character—in terms of the processes of freezing and solidification and is engaged in measuring and splitting the void. *The Book of Urizen* and *The Book of Los* are subtle and intricate poems in as much as the former maps out both cosmology and cosmogony more or less according to Newton's methodology, and in the latter the counter system is provided by Los—the divine architect of the Blakean Universe. The famous vortex passage in *Milton* offers the refinement and complication of a pretty well-known doctrine: it may be regarded as a synthesis of the Newtonian void, the conical angle of the eye notion (as elucidated by Northrop Frye in *Fearful Symmetry)*, and the Cartesian vortex which sucks existence into itself. Similarly, Urizen's quest for 'a solid without fluctuation' reflects the desire for a sort of stasis (or destruction of all activity) which is wholly exempt from change and is equivalent to the Newtonian continuous motion or rest; the desire for a 'monolithic world' from which, as Ault points out, 'pain, fluctuation, death and unquenched burnings have been excluded' (p. 166). It may be added that here 'solid' is the fallen analogue of permanence, and 'fluctuation' the fallen analogue of contrariety. Motion of a single mass-point, acceleration, and the forces of attraction and repulsion responsible for indicating the instantaneous rate of change in velocity are cardinal points of Newtonian physics. These engendered belief in an order of things which is causal and determinate, quantitative and measurable and whose functioning could be qualified or altered to some extent by human ingenuity and manipulation. The basic nature of ultimate Reality was knowable in terms of causality and the human power of prediction, and thus God, the efficient watch-maker, was brought down his pedestal and even treated as an unnecessary encumbrance. But post-Newtonian physics has tilted the balance slightly in the opposite direction by focusing on the limitations of the human potential because neither causality nor predictability continue to be an unchallenged datum. Blake's unorthodox view-point in this connection is that physical effects may not and necessarily have physical causes but spiritual ones alone : for, 'a Natural cause only seems; it is a Delusion/Of Ulro, & a ratio of the perishing Vegetable Memory'. He also condemned vehemently the tenuous interconnections between the Ratio and the Moral Law and the feminine tabernacle provided to them by the Mystery of Natural Religion or Deism in the contemporary context of things.

Ault begins his critique by drawing upon the paradigmatic framework proposed by Leonard Krieger whose main components are coherence, identity and the process of integration which signify, respectively, mathematical forces, the basic unit of computation or atoms and void space, and the synthesis of the mathematical law and physical reality. In terms of the structure of Blake's Eternity, the first corresponds to the 'Divine Body' (another name for the apocalyptic Imagination), the second to the principle of contrariety, opposition and tension and the last one to the concept of Emanation. If the marriage of the emanation with its male counterpart does not materialize or is intercepted, the inevitable, logical consequence is the emergence of hermaphroditic bodies, or divisions, separations and internecine struggles. In the context of both Newton's Corpuscular theory of light and the alternative Huygens's Undulatory wave-lengths theory, Ault considers the Blakean notion of the 'Minute Particulars' (which constitute the 'divine body' and are equivalent to Eternal Forms) as something quite distinct from Plato's Ideas, Aristotle's Substantial Forms and Locke's abstractions. These last ones, it is intriguing to note, both continue the Medieval tradition of Nominalism and of Universals and look forward to modern conceptualism and Imagism. He also considers Blake's notion of contraction and expansion of the senses with reference to Newton's *Opticks*, and the idea of discontinuous time as against Newton's spatialization of it, and continuous and rectilinear motion. 'Absolute, True and Mathematical Time' or 'flowing quantity' Newton defines in *Principia Mathematica* as something which 'of itself and from its own nature flows equably and without regard to anything external'. The Newtonian Mathematical idea of Limits which implies reducing of quantities to infinitesimals so much so that they reach either Zero point or infinity has been transformed by Blake into the limits of contraction and opaqueness relevant to the condition of *verfallenheit* and apply, respectively, to Adam and Satan. These limits are formed by 'Los's Mathematic Power': contraction is connected with solidity and opaqueness with void and discontinuity, and both these connections are central to much of Blake's imagery in his poetry. But the upward limit of translucence cannot be fixed. The senses of the fallen man contract but the Eternals not only contract and expand them at will but this expansion is also not subject to any circumscription. Further, whereas Newton's States of rectilinear motion and rest confirm his postulated physical laws, Blake's notion of the States involves a degree of determinism—it absolves the individual of moral responsibility. Any ethical denunciation to which we may subject the individuals is without any validity because the blame attaches not to the individuals as such but to the States they pass through. Similarly, Blake exploits the mathematical terms like centre and circumference in very fascinating contexts for mediating his own mythical speculations as was also done by Emily Dickinson who uses them as metaphors of divine glory or ectasy and by Spender *(Dark and Light)* in a quasi-mystical sense. Man in the spectral, Newtonian or Urizenic universe offers a parody of the permanence, definiteness and completeness or coherence which characterize life in the undifferentiated phase of Existence. To definiteness is juxtaposed indefiniteness or chaos or a sort of continuous, perpetual motion in which Newtonian characters like Urizen and his satellites,—Valah, Rahab and Tirzah—are involved, but this dynamism partakes, paradoxically, of a kind of inertia.

As pointed out earlier, 'vortex' which signifies the circular motion of a whole *plenum* of particles as in a whirlpool offers an amalgam of Cartesian motion and Newtonian void. For the sublunary traveller, as brought out in the *Milton* passage, existence is globular whereas for the traveller through Eternity the earth becomes an 'infinite plane'. For the latter, when the vortexes have ceased to operate, 'up' and 'down' become indistinguishable as well as irrelevant; he loses the sense of direction because the conglomerated atoms have ceased whirling round a nucleus. It is worth noticing that whereas the idea of vortices has been used by Descartes for accounting for the creation of the cosmos, Blake's visualization of them is a functional feature of the fallen world. It is also used by Blake for giving a form to chaos and thus subjugating it. Similarly, the Newtonian and Cartesian view that man's perception undergoes alteration with the shift in the physical landscape is countered by Blake's thesis that the apprehension of the nature of space depends unequivocally upon the kind of vision which is brought to bear upon it. Thus the earth becomes the 'infinite plane' and the upward and downward movement of the 'vegetable' or purified eye determines the nature of the globule which is exposed to either. Blake's 'pulsational' Moments seem to be the reconstituted form of Newton's 'fluxions' (computation of velocity at a particular instant of time). These 'fleeting' instants' fuse, according to Ault, 'the indefiniteness of temporal process with static definiteness, of spatial coordinates' (p. 115).

Newton's 'evanescent limits' or variable ratios in *Calculus* —'the method of rectifying curvilinear figures'—find, according to Nurmi, a faint, unconscious echo in Blake's 'evanescent shadow' which is another name both for Vala's identity—Luvah's Emanative Form—, and the delusive veil conglobing the phenomenal world. Just as the fact of the particles whirling into a centre, called 'vortex', is a crucial component of Blake's cosmology and ontology, the notion of the Mundane Shell, derived from Newton and Thomas Burnet, is an equivalent to the 'Mighty Incrustation' of the material world and refers simultaneously to the 'smooth, ovoid form' of the prelapsarian state of the world as well as to the ruined, cavernous shape of it in the post-diluvian period of its survival. The Mundane Shell is shown in Blake's mythical geography as located in the 'vegetable' universe and hypostatizes the Newtonian model of inert and lifeless Nature: it is associated with the 'Voids between the Stars' of Newtonían astronomy. The isotropic nature of the Newtonian absolute space, which is 'everywhere uniform and immobile', as pointed out earlier, is replaced by the relativistic notion about it. The construction of absolute space by Newton is regarded by Einstein as an epoch-making achievement though Blake would consider it as a gigantic protuberance of delusion. And time, instead of being continuous and pushed to the Zero-dimensional point, is for

Blake essentially Cartesian in the sense of being discontinuous.

The main thrust of the book lies in suggesting that Blake used specific Newtonian categories in the *Prophetic Books* for constructing his own 'concept-image' or 'concept-myth' for purposes of not only exposing them as a consolidation of error but also as a mode of redemption, that is, by assimilating them as false accretions, and then casting them out, and that is what is implied by the Last Judgment in Blake's symbolic schema. When Los declares that he wishes to create his own comprehensive system and destroy and thus get rid of those of others, the word' system' connotes not something which is self-enclosed, constricting and petrifyiny but it is a near-eqivalent for his substitute symbology. Blake's intention is focused not on a merely ironic or critical procedure but primarily on the redemptive one. 'Such an attempt to turn his enemies' systems against them in order to reveal their satanic aspects, while at the same time rendering them either positively or ironically redemptive is.....perfectly typical of Blake's poetic method' (p. 106). Ault has demonstrated with clarity and irrefragable logic how both Newton and Descartes usurped the drives of the imagination towards 'universality' or permanence, and 'action' or dynamic contrariety within the Eternal Structure by subverting the implications of boundary, definiteness and order, and corollaries of concepts like States, Limits, Solids, Void and Fluctuation led ultimately to the emergence of a monolithic but mechanistic universe. Blake's creation of Los or the Spectre of Urthona as a counter symbol or antithetical mythic figure to Urizen—who later on assumes the compacted form of Satan in *Milton* and *Jerusalem*—registers a sort of radicalism which is very much characteristic of Blake. Whereas Urizen is a manipulator of measurement, static qualities of things and of contractive vision – the last one embedded in the *Opticks*, Blake is all for flexibility or fluidity, qualitative rather than quantitative entities and multiple and expansive vision. It may be interesting to note that Descartes, assimilating the Boylean idea of the gases, also formulated the notion of the flexibility of the atoms. Further, Blake's 'pulsational' Moments, as pointed out already, are opposed to 'Newton's indefinite, infinitely divisible flowing moments of the fluxional Calculas'. Hence 'Single Vision & Newton's Sleep' is for Blake not just the fact of seeing two images with one eye—the contemporary notion of the functioning of the 'vegetable' eye—but is also a very succinct way of hinting at the closed world of repressive necessity associated with the eighteenth century milieu of highly mechanized living. Blake did indeed develop the idea of the four levels of perception, conveyed in the letter to Thomas Butts, 22 November, 1802 as the result of a reaction against Newton's theory of vision. All this exposure of the Newtonian complex of errors in the perspective of Blake's structure of Eternity has a direct bearing on his aesthetics and poetic vocabulary through which is mediated that sublime allegory (poetry) which is addressed to the powers of the mind. It is not reductive in the sense of dispensing with Memory (abstraction from Bowlahoola and Cathedron) and Ratio (Reasoning power) but is archetypal by way of making room for these and yet ultimately transcending them in the interest of the highest imaginative truth or the body of Christ. 'Blake's poetic technique', says Ault perceptively, 'requires a perspective ontology......for Blake constructs the very fabric of his poetic universe out of perspectivistic tools. He replaces entities with relations and hopes thereby to restore relational rather than normal entitative thinking to the reader' (p. 195).

Newton and Descartes represent diametrically opposite positions; whereas Descartes proceeds on an *apriori* basis and is deductive in build ng up his mathematical edifice, Newton is Baconian in his mode of making inferences. Both regard matter and motion or extension as basic constituents of physical reality; yet for Descartes, matter is quantitatively constant in the universe as a whole but constantlly changing qualitaively in shape, size and direction. For Newton atoms are immutable in themselves but motion is undergoing quantitaitive change. Descartes's theory of vortices, as indicated earlier, was an attempt 'to unite celestial motion with terrestrial gravitation'. To Newtonian void is opposed the idea of Cartesian plenitude and both Newton and Descartes believe in the existence of ether, for different reasons, as a necessary prop to their cosmological framework. Inspite of differences they, however, embody, from the Blakean point of view, two seminal manifestations of a single error: their systems are logistic, or as Ault puts it, are 'logically articulated metaphors for the formal operations of the physical world', and are thus antagonistic to Blake's visionary stance. Blake may be credited with setting the human mind free of the incubus of the Newtonian and Cartesian hypotheses because inspite of their inner and inherent opposition to each other, both Newton and Descartes are looked upon by Blake as identical philosophical enemies.

The distinction of this book lies in the tact, finesse and scholarly acumen with which correlations between Newtonian and Cartesian hypotheses on the one hand and crucial poetic statements in Blake's major *Prophecies* on the other have been worked out, and this most persuasively.

Department of English
Aligarh Muslim University
Aligarh

A. A. Ansari

THE ALIGARH JOURNAL OF ENGLISH STUDIES

(BI-ANNUAL)

(DECLARATION FORM IV, RULE 8)

1. Place of Publication	Aligarh
2. Periodicity of Publication	Bi-annual
3. Printer's Name	K. C. Mital
Nationality	Indian
Address	Printwell Printers Shiv Bhawan Lekh Raj Nagar, Aligarh
4. Publisher's Name	A. A. Ansari
Nationality	Indian
Address	Chairman, Department of English Aligarh Muslim University Aligarh
5. Editor's Name	A. A. Ansari
Nationality	Indian
Address	Chairman, Department of English Aligarh Muslim University Aligarh
6. Owner's Name	Aligarh Muslim University Aligarh

I, A. A. Ansari, hereby declare that the particulars given above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

A. A. ANSARI