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PSYCHODRAMA IN MARLOWE'S DOCTOR FAUSTUS

In a recent book, *The Subject of Tragedy: Identity and Difference in Renaissance Drama*, Catherine Belsey makes an interesting comment on Marlowe's *Doctor Faustus*. According to Belsey, Marlowe's play, like many other Elizabethan tragedies, reveals an unresolved conflict between the 'subject of enunciation' (the character who is the obvious source of speeches and soliloquies on the stage) and the 'subject of utterance' (the 'I' that his speeches and soliloquies suggest).¹ To illustrate her point Belsey cites, among several others, two soliloquies from *Doctor Faustus* : II.i. 389-402 and V.ii. 1926-82.² While the speaker in both the cases is Doctor Faustus, a 'free-standing, literal figure in a geographically-and-chronologically specific world' (p. 43), the 'I' in either case, says Belsey, is a 'discontinuous, fragmented' being (p. 46). In the first, it is the conflicting voices of the two angels, Good and Bad (p. 44); in the second, the equally discordant voices of repentance and despair (p. 44).

Up to this point there can be little disagreement with Belsey's argument and her method of analysis since soliloquy in Elizabethan drama is an important device to portray the conflict within the mind of a character. But Belsey does not stop here; instead, she uses this evidence to make two generalizations about Renaissance drama. First, the fragmentation of the subject of utterance calls in question the unified identity that humanistic criticism supposedly seeks to confer on characters such as Faustus, Hamlet and Macbeth (p. 52). Second,

this fragmentation is often the result of the dramatists' failure to synthesize two different techniques: the technique of the conventional morality plays in which internal human characteristics appeared as allegorical characters on the stage, and the technique of a relatively secular drama which emphasized the individuality of characters (p. 44). Now whatever the validity of Belsey's assertions about Renaissance drama in general, their relevance to *Doctor Faustus* is manifestly questionable. For, in the first place, the 'unified identity' of *Doctor Faustus* is not a fiction invented by humanistic criticism; it is rather a creation of Faustus himself, who not only refers to his own name as if it had a special charm about it but, like Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, considers himself a living legend. Secondly, *Doctor Faustus* is essentially a Renaissance psychodrama in which the conflicting pulls and pressures on the mind of the protagonist are not only the cause of his tragedy but also the centre of dramatic interest. Neither the adaptation of the morality technique, which is too obvious to be accidental and unconscious, nor the fragmentation of the subject of utterance leads to any confusion of artistic aims. On the contrary, both of them, as the following analysis shows, are central to the overall framework of this play which is primarily a tragedy of the mind.

Doctor Faustus, to begin with a necessary banality, is the tragical history of a man who finds himself deeply rooted in a period of cultural transition, namely, the transition from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance. Subconsciously loyal to and consciously sceptical about the revealed and widely accepted truths of his religion and culture, and fascinated by a new humanistic and materialistic ideology but unsure of its validity, Faustus is baffled, as many of his historical contemporaries were indeed baffled, by some basic questions about human existence. What is the end of human knowledge—is knowledge a means to attain salvation in an afterlife or is it an

important tool to fashion a 'world of profite and delight/Of power, of honour, and omnipotence?' (80-81) during 'this-worldly existence? Is there an afterlife, or is it foolish to 'imagine,/That after this life there is any pain' (522-23)? To put it differently, are heaven and hell real or 'meere old wives Tales' (524)? Again, is hell, if real, a geographical place 'within the bowels of these Elements' (508), a state of mind (304ff.), or simply a Christian name for 'Elizium', where the souls of 'old Phylosophers' (288) dwell? And finally, is God's mercy available to a human sinner even after he has signed a bond with the devil and considers himself a reprobate,³ or is this mercy available only to the Elect?

These questions, it is to be noted, do not pose any problem to a man who possesses a certain singleness of will. A sincere believer such as the Old Man in this play is easily satisfied by the answers that his orthodox religious faith provides. Conversely, a man who possesses a different kind of singleness of will, the hero of Marlowe's *Tamburlaine* plays, for example, can do anything evil without being troubled by his conscience. But Doctor Faustus, who is simultaneously aware of his orthodox and Calvinistic heritage, his intellectual scepticism, and his strong worldly ambitions and carnal appetites, cannot be so single-minded in his loyalties. This is why he fails to forget God and heaven even after signing a bond with the devil and lives in a hell of alienation, anxiety and meaninglessness. Throughout the play Marlowe's emphasis, as I hope to show, is on this aspect of Faustus's tragedy. The morality structure, the psychomachia theme and the supernatural machinery of angels, devils, and seven deadly sins are employed to externalize the living hell within Faustus's mind.

The opening soliloquy, in which Faustus rejects the legitimate disciplines of study and opts for necromancy, is, on the surface, fairly single-minded. Faustus is all alone on the stage, unattended by the two angels and Mephistophilis. As

he examines the means and ends of logic, philosophy, medicine, law, and divinity, he feels that he is not only '*Faustus*, and a man' (51) but, worse still, a sinner condemned to die 'an everlasting death' (72). Necromancy, on the other hand, seems to promise a new world where Faustus will be a 'mighty god.'⁴ But the confusion of commands, questions and assertions and the shifts in the personal pronouns that Faustus uses for himself make this soliloquy sound like an internalized dialogue between conflicting voices from within his consciousness. If this soliloquy were rewritten as a dialogue between two voices, the first voice using the second and the third person pronouns and the second voice using the first person, it would reveal the nature of the conflict within Faustus's mind.⁵ Consider, for example, the following dialogue based on the first forty-six-lines, which constitute three-fourths of the opening soliloquy :

Voice 1. Settle thy studies *Faustus*, and begin
 To sound the depth of that thou wilt professe,
 Having commenc'd, be a Divine in shew,
 Yet levell at the end of every Art,
 And live and die in *Aristotles* workes.

Voice 2. Sweet *Analitikes*, tis thou hast ravish't me,
Bene disserere est finis logices.

Voice 1. Is to dispute well Logickes chiefest end ?
 Affords this Art no greater miracle ?
 Then read no more, thou hast attain'd that end;
 A greater subject fitteth Faustus wit.
Bid on kai me on farewell.

Voice 2. *Galen* come :
 Seeing *ubi desinit philosophus, ibi incipit medicus.*

Voice 1. Be a phisitian *Faustus*, heape up gold,
 And be eterniz'd for some wondrous cure.

Voice 2. *Summum bonum medicinae sanitas:*
 The end of physicke is our bodies health:

Voice 1. Why *Faustus*, hast thou not attain'd that end?
 Is not thy common talke sound Aphorismes?

Are not thy bills hung up as monuments,
 Wherby whole Cities have escap't the plague,
 And thousand desperate maladies beene cur'd?
 Yet art thou still but *Faustus*, and a man.
 Couldst thou make man to live eternally,
 Or being dead, raise them to life againe,
 Then this profession were to be esteem'd.

Voice 2. Physicke farewell: where is *Justinian*?

*Si una eademque res legatur duobus, alter rem, alter valorem
 rei, &c.*

Voice 1. A petty case of paltry Legacies.

*Exhereditare filium non potest pater nisi
 Such is the subject of the *Institute*,
 And universall body of the law.*

Voice 2. This study fits a Mercenarie drudge,
 Who aims at nothing but externall trash,
 Too servile and illiberall for mee.
 When all is done, *Divinitie* is best

Voice 1. *Jeromes* Bible *Faustus*, view it well.

Stipendium peccati mors est.

Voice 2. Ha, *stipendium* &c.

The reward of sin is death? that's hard.

Voice 1. *Si peccasse negamus, fallimur, et nulla est in
 nobis veritas:*

If we say that we have no sinne we deceive ourselves, and there
 is no truth in us

Voice 2. Why then belike

We must sinne, and so consequently die.

Voice 1. I, we must die, an everlasting death.

Voice 2. What doctrine call you this?

Voice 1. Che sera, sera:

What will be, shall be.

(20-75)

In this rewritten form of the soliloquy, the first voice acts as the tempter from within Faustus's mind, while the second appears to be a willing object of temptation. But the division within Faustus's mind is much deeper than these two voices demonstrate. His Christian heritage and his training as a theologian inform the whole soliloquy. Faustus rejects the

metaphysics of '*on kai me on*' (40) only to replace it with the Metaphisicks of Magitians' (76) meant to resolve the same problem of being and non-being that haunts him here as well as in the rest of the play. He rejects Christ and Christianity, but then would usurp their attributes. Like Christ, he would 'raise' men 'to life againe' (53). Not only this, he thinks of the necromantic books as 'heavenly' and feels that magic will 'cheer' his soul. To put it differently, Faustus's subconscious love for Christianity is like a man's love for his mother tongue. He can think in the words of only that language; *think*, that is to say, of magic in terms of divinity. For although he chooses necromancy, Faustus cannot change his whole inheritance simply by bidding divinity 'adeiw.'⁶

The opening soliloquy sets the tone for the rest of the tragedy and many of Faustus's subsequent speeches and soliloquies demonstrate a similar dualism. At the beginning of II.i, for example, Faustus's mind is divided between an orthodox hope of return to God and an agonizing despair which has obvious Calvinistic overtones:⁷

Now *Faustus*, must thou needs be damn'd,
And canst not now be sav'd.
What bootes it then to thinke on God or Heaven?
Away with such vaine fancies, and despaire,
Despair in GOD; and trust in *Belzebub*:
Now go not backward: no, *Faustus*, be resolute.
Why waverest thou? O some thing soundeth in mine eares,
Abjure this Magicke, turne to God againe.
I, and *Faustus* will turne to God againe.
To God? he loves thee not:
The god thou serv'st is thine owne appetite,
Wherein is fixt the love of *Belzebub*,
To him, I'le build an Altar and a Church,
And offer luke-warme bloud, of new borne babes. (389-402)

During the drafting of the infernal compact Faustus's Christian inheritance reasserts itself and his blood congeals :

What might the staying of my bloud portend?
 Is it unwilling I should write this byll?
 Why streames it not, that I may write a fresh?
Faustus gives to thee his soule: ah, there it staid.
 Why shouldst thou not? Is not thy soule thine owne?
 Then write againe: *Faustus* gives to thee his soule. (453-58)

Faustus hardens himself and, ironically enough, concludes the bond with Christ's last words in the Gospel according to Saint John: '*Consummatum est*' (463). This is supreme blasphemy, as many critics have pointed out, but it also reveals a subconscious remorse. The inscription '*Homo fuge*' (470) that appears on Faustus's stabbed arm also expresses a warning which comes from his outraged Christian conscience.

This revolt by Faustus's subconsciously cherished religious and spiritual heritage against his conscious decisions and actions continues throughout the play and reaches its ironical culmination in the last soliloquy. Having signed the bond in time and now finding himself standing on the verge of an eternity of damnation, Faustus appeals desperately to the spheres to stop their movement so that the midnight hour never comes. The metaphysics of '*on kai me on*' returns to haunt him; for having failed to be a 'mighty god,' Faustus would now like to be a 'brutish beast' (1968) wanting both soul and the faculty of reason which distinguish man from animals. Not only this, he would like his soul to be dissolved into elements. This is a complete reversal for the man who was once over-confident of his intellectual powers. His soul does not dissolve, but the dissolution of his mind is complete. Hallucinatory visions of Christ's blood streaming in the firmament, of God's ireful brows and of Lucifer's threatening looks appear before him in rapid succession. His language becomes so confused that it is difficult to say whether his prayers are addressed to Christ or Lucifer⁸.

O I'le leape up to my God, who puls me downe?

See see where Christ's blood streames in the firmament,
One drop would save my soule, halfe a drop; ah my Christ,
Rend not my heart, for naming of my Christ,
Yet will I call on him: O spare me, *Lucifer*. (1938-42)

This is the picture of a mind in its final stage of disintegration. In the last scene the Scholars speak of Faustus's limbs 'All torn asunder by the hand of death' (1989). This may or may not be true since the scene is not found in the A-text, but there is no doubt that during the last soliloquy Faustus's mind, is clearly a mind in pieces.

In other parts of the stage-action too, there is a similar emphasis on the hero's inner state. As James Smith has succinctly remarked, the scenes in *Doctor Faustus* are 'like tableaux, illustrating the possibly simultaneous aspects of man's state of soul, rather than events in his history'⁹. This is as much true of the serious scenes as it is of the comic scenes throughout the play; for whereas the serious scenes reveal the dualism of Faustus's mind, the comic scenes comment ironically on his inner state. There is a marked decline in his intellectual aspirations when he plays practical jokes on the Pope of Rome and entertains royal spectators in the courts of Germany and Vanholt. The man who aspired to be a 'mighty god' is now content to be an itinerant magician and to earn thanks and rewards from his royal patrons. In the early scenes of slapstick comedy (I. ii, I. iv, and II. iii) Faustus is not present on the stage but the clowns parody his actions and speeches and thereby explode the heroic dimension of his desires.

This psychological and symbolic pattern underlying the stage-action is also evident in the delineation of characters. The two angels are, to a large extent, the theatrical equivalents of the double source of Faustus's will, the Good Angel embodying the subconscious impulses of his religious inheritance, and the Bad Angel, the impulses of his carnal appetites.

irrational desires and acquired intellectual scepticism. Of course Elizabethan theology admitted the power of such angels actually to influence human behaviour¹⁰, but it is difficult to accept the angels in *Doctor Faustus* as representatives of external, metaphysical forces of good and evil. For these angels appear only when Faustus is deeply perturbed, and the victory of one angel over the other depends on Faustus's predominant feeling at that particular moment. In the first two acts they appear four times because Faustus's heart is not so much hardened. But they do not appear even once during the middle part of the play for the simple reason that Faustus is never significantly shaken in his conscience. When they finally reappear in V.ii.¹¹, both of them say virtually the same thing : the Good Angel shows Faustus a vision of heaven which, he says, Faustus has lost for ever; the Bad Angel, on the other hand, shows a vision of hell which, according to this evil spirit, is now Faustus's perpetual home. If the Good Angel is taken as a representative of absolute good, his speech is theologically unsound because Faustus still has time to repent and save himself should he choose to do so. But there is no theological inconsistency if he represents Faustus's inner good which has by now accepted defeat. This also explains why the Good Angel appears to be so ineffectual in the whole of the play.

The Seven Deadly Sins, like the Bad Angel, are an externalization of Faustus's gross appetites and impulses. When they first visit Faustus in II. iii as allegorical embodiments of evil in its quintessential form, he dismisses them one after the other, but when they are suitably disguised, he indulges in almost all of them without recognizing their true nature.¹² For example, he dismisses Lechery when it appears before him in its picture-book shape, but later, when it visits him as the simulacrum of Helen, he sings a passionate rhapsody in its praise and takes it to bed. The pageant of the Seven Deadly Sins also reveals one important aspect of Faustus's

mind : he is not pleased with evil for its own sake but must confuse it with good.

The devils, taken simply as dramatic characters, are far more complex than the two angels or the Seven Sins. Their external, independent existence is nowhere in doubt, though Mephistophilis' later claim that it was he who turned the pages of the holy book during Faustus's opening soliloquy also makes him subjective¹³. Elsewhere in the play Mephistophilis accompanies Faustus as his spectral conscience keeper. As for Lucifer and Belzebub, they confront Faustus only once; otherwise, they either invisibly preside over his action or appear before him as hallucinatory visions created by his own frightened and agonized mind.

Functionally, however, the devils mirror, more than they exploit, the dualism which Faustus has inherited from his cultural and religious tradition. In I. iii, for example, Faustus has reason to believe that his conjuring has raised Mephistophilis; but Mephistophilis is equally right in saying that this was only accidentally so,

For when we heare one rache the name of God,
Abjure the Scriptures, and his Saviour Christ,
We flye in hope to get his gloirous soule. (275-77)

Again, in his description of hell as both a geographical place and a state of mind, Mephistophilis echoes the dualism that Faustus could find in both Augustine and Calvin¹⁴ :

Faustus. First, I will question with thee about hell:

Tell me, whete is the place that men call hell?

Mephis. Under the heavens.

Faustus. I, so are all things else; but whereaboute?

Mephis. Within the bowels of these Elements,

Where we are tortur'd and remaine for ever,

Hell hath no limits, nor is circumscrib'd,

In one selfe place, but where we are is hell,

And where hell is there must we ever be.

And to be short, when all the world dissolves,
And every creature shall be purifi'd,
All places shall be hell that is not heaven. (604-15)

If Faustus's response to this double view of hell is sceptical, it is largely because he cannot believe in hell as a geographical place where the damned souls are tortured for ever. And if hell is only a state of mind, he is confident that he has enough of a manly fortitude to 'scorne those joyes' he never can possess (313-14). Of course Mephistophilis is an 'instance to prove the contrary' (525), but then what Faustus sees in this devil is not the suffering but the power and freedom that devils enjoy :

Nay, and this be hell, I'll willingly be damn'd.
What, sleeping, eating, walking and disputing? (527-28)

Faustus's tragic blindness during these debates about hell lies chiefly in his insistence on a strict empirical verification of all experience, something which his new learning has taught him. As a result of this tendency, Faustus refuses to accept anything on authority (whether it is on the authority of the scriptures or of the devil) and cuts himself off from those categories of experience which defy sensory verification. It is no wonder, then, that even when the devils speak the truth, Faustus refuses to accept it and inadvertently becomes his own worst tempter. The devils at worst exploit what is already deep-seated in his own mind.

Other characters are by and large dramatic analogues for different aspects of Faustus's inner state. The Old Man may be a 'symbol of the patronymic heritage of Wittenberg that Faustus has tried to abolish in signing the fatal pact',¹⁵ though his single-minded faith in God and traditional religion makes him a suitable foil to Faustus. The two magicians, who appear in the opening scene only are not necessarily the 'devil's decoys' that Sir Walter Greg thought they were,¹⁶ they are rather the miniature versions of Faustus himself, sharing his

propensity for the forbidden but lacking his heroic and, of course, fatal courage to go as far as he does. In any case, they are little more than dramatic means to accelerate the pace of action; for they appear only after Faustus has made his tragic choice. Once they have instructed him in the 'rudiments' of the black art they disappear from the play and are never heard of again. The two prelates who figure in Act III are, ironically enough, rather close to Faustus in their hunger for and misuse of power. Pope Adrian, appropriately described by his rival as 'proud *Lucifer*' (871), uses his fallen adversaries as footstools and appears as a variation on the heathen Tamburlaine. The rival Pope Bruno fares hardly better. He first revolts against the papal authority, as Faustus does against God's, and then accepts assistance from the devil to secure his release from the custody of his enemy. Similarly, the royal audiences that Faustus entertains at Vanholt and in Germany share his desire for the forbidden (the Duchess of Vanholt literally asks for out-of-season and therefore forbidden fruit), though they try to fulfil their desires at the Doctor's rather than at their own expense. The clowns, on the other hand, clearly represent the shadow side of Doctor Faustus. While Wagner, Robin and the unnamed Clown unconsciously parody Faustus's actions and speeches in the first two acts, the Horse-Courser, Carter and others in the middle part of the play (acts III and IV) reduce Faustus's desires to their lowest common denominators. Functionally, they all mock Faustus's titanic aspirations and his revolt against God.

Thus from start to finish, the real centre of interest in *Doctor Faustus* is the mind of the protagonist, a mind which is torn between the claims of a strong Christian inheritance and those of an equally strong Renaissance aspiration for sensuous pleasure, material gain, knowledge and power. As he finds these two sets of claims irreconcilable and must choose only

one, Faustus opts for what fascinates him more. But he can never forget what he has deprived himself of. Consequently, from the moment he makes his tragic choice Faustus lives in a state of psychological damnation until his mind finally disintegrates under the burden of his divided loyalties.

Notes and References

1. Catherine Belsey, *The Subject of Tragedy: Identity and Difference in Renaissance Drama* (London, 1985), p. 46. All subsequent references to this book have been given parenthetically.
2. All quotations from *Doctor Faustus* are from Fredson Bowers' edition of the *The Complete Works of Christopher Marlowe*, Vol. 2. (Cambridge, 1973). Because line enumeration in this edition is continuous, I have in general omitted references to act and scene divisions and mentioned only the line numbering in parenthesis.
3. In 'Time and the Timeless in *Everyman* and *Dr. Faustus*', *College English*, 22 (1960), 11, David Kaula puts the issue of the availability of God's mercy to Faustus in proper perspective: 'Dr. Faustus is a distinctly post-Reformation play because the hero's destiny hinges entirely on the question of faith, a question which does not enter into *Everyman* at all. This is not to say that the play is Calvinistic in its implied theology: the opportunity to renounce his bond and [repent] is genuinely available to Faustus to the very end, as the Old Man indicates. Nevertheless, a heavy element of spiritual pre-determinism does appear in Faustus' conviction that even God's mercy is not capacious enough to embrace such a sinner as himself. Although the conviction may be illusory, it is still one of the most powerfully felt ingredients in the play.'
4. 'Mighy god' is the A-text reading; the B-text substitutes 'Demigod.' See Bowers, 'Historical Collation,' in his *Complete Works*, p. 257.
5. 'My method of analysis, it will be noted, is close to Belsey's but, as my comments on this and other soliloquies show, the nature of the conflict within Faustus's mind is much more complex than Belsey's analysis of' the two soliloquies of this play recognizes.
6. I have adapted part of this paragraph from my *Christopher Marlowe: A Study in the Structure of the Major Plays* (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University Press, 1983), p. 138.

7. For a study of Marlowe's use of the Calvinistic Doctrine of Pre-Destination in *Doctor Faustus*, see Lily B. Campbell, *Doctor Faustus: A Case of Conscience*, *PMLA*, 76 (1952), 219-39; Ariesh Sachs, 'The Religious Despair of Doctor Faustus,' *JEGP*, 63 (1964), 625-47; and Pauline Honderich, 'John Calvin and Doctor Faustus,' *Modern Language Review*, 68 (1973), 1-13.
8. See Max Bluestone, 'Libido Speculandi: Doctrine and Dramaturgy in Contemporary Interpretations of Marlowe's *Doctor Faustus*,' in Norman Rabkin, ed., *Reinterpretations of Elizabethan Drama* (New York and London, 1969), pp. 76-78.
9. James Smith, 'Marlowe's *Doctor Faustus*' Scrutiny, 8 (1939); rpt. in John Jump, ed., *Marlowe: Doctor Faustus, A Casebook* (London 1975), p. 62.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.
11. The authenticity of this portion of V. ii has been questioned on two grounds: first, it is found only in the B-text and not in the A-text; second, it rules out the possibility of repentance and salvation for Faustus. Like most Marlowe critics, I consider this portion to be Marlowe's own, though my interpretation of it as an hallucinatory vision rules out the possibility of any theological inconsistency.
12. For a detailed discussion of the emblematic function of the Seven Deadly Sins, see Sherman Hawkins, 'The Education of Faustus,' *Studies in English Literature*, 6 (1966), 195.
13. This portion (185-91), like the visions of heaven and hell, is not found in the A-text.
14. This point concerning Marlowe's use of the double view of hell in *Doctor Faustus* is discussed in some detail by William Dinsmore Briggs in his 'Marlowe's *Faustus*, 305-18; 548-70,' *Modern Language Notes*, 38 (1923), 385-93.
15. Charles G. Masinton, *Christopher Marlowe's Tragic Vision: A Study in Damnation* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1972), p. 135.
16. W. W. Greg, 'The Damnation of Faustus,' *Modern Language Review*, 46 (1946); rpt. in John Jump, ed., *Marlowe: Doctor Faustus, A Casebook*, p. 74.

P. Ramamoorthi

RITUAL OF ATONEMENT IN SHAKESPEARE'S LATE PLAYS

Despite obvious dissimilarities, Shakespeare's four late romances are variations on a single theme. In *Cymbeline*, *The Winter's Tale*, *Pericles* and *The Tempest*, the Shakespearean concept of spiritual regeneration assumes local habitation and name in a dramatic formula exploited sequentially. Within a tragicomic structure, these late plays explore the stages of a process of sin, guilt, penance and regeneration or reconciliation, and objectify it in a plot formula to imply its universality.¹ Behind their spiritual 'progress' is a familiar Shakespearean notion. Human action makes for good or evil, the results of which have significance not only for those creating the actions but for others as well. Further actions may attempt to negate evil, but only through penance, suffering, and the integrative influence of children and love may atonement and spiritual rebirth be achieved. This elemental pattern, early evolved in the histories and tragedies, is formalized with ritual overtones in the late plays. As is abundantly clear in *The Winter's Tale* and *The Tempest*, the imagery of regeneration enriches the development of this theme as formula, and the ritual dimensions of all four are too pervasive to be ignored.

Shakespeare probably thought of the late plays as a group. E M. W. Tillyard argues forcefully for the notion that Shakespeare conceived of the history plays as units or cycles in a national epic.² Some of the same patriotic, religious, historical, or pseudo-historical conceptions may also be found in the

late romances,³ as well as the implications of a series or group. Various commentators have noticed the similarities of their plots, citing that they span the generations,⁴ possess the same general scheme of prosperity, destruction, and recreation,⁵ and seem to take their origin from 'old festival plays'⁶ or religious drama.⁷ Still others have recognized their similarity of theme.⁸

These shared characteristics stem from a common plot and symbol pattern too intrinsic to be coincidental.

Each of the late plays concentrates on a phase or several phases of a ritual pattern. Each insists on the communality of the spiritual journey. And each locates the experience within the spirit of a protagonist who, by the end of the play, not only is a member of the older generation but has reached archetypal proportions. Shakespeare also examines the relationship of the generations, transferring the goodness of the young to the aging protagonist to cure his spiritual half-life. This scapegoat action is especially clear in *Pericles* and *The Winter's Tale*, where the young lovers figure symbolically as the old reborn.⁹

Pericles and *The Winter's Tale* dramatize both the youth and the maturity of the central character. Although *The Tempest* does not, the long expository second scene of the first act accomplishes the same result, by suggesting Prospero has already undergone the experience of spiritual recovery. *Cymbeline* also presents the earlier life of the protagonist through simple exposition but shifts attention away from the king to the scapegoat sufferings of his daughter and sons.

Because of these differences, the latter two plays offer a useful comment on the dramaturgical processes of the group. In returning to a classical mode of structuring action in *The Tempest*, Shakespeare clarifies his intention, which may be seen as exemplifying the general purpose of the late plays.

In reintroducing the 'banished duke motif', Shakespeare indicates that the focus of the play is on Prospero but not as

a suffering Lear or Othello, as in *The Winter's Tale* or *Pericles*. The centre of interest instead is the mechanics of the reconciliation the protagonist makes with his community through the media of magic and young lovers. In other words, a ritual of renewal is in process. Presumably, the resolution of Prospero's desire for revenge has taken place before the play commences. As in Marston's *The Malcontent*, Shakespeare's protagonist is more interested in reform and regeneration than revenge.

Accepting the restrictions of the unities, Shakespeare begins the play apparently after Prospero has overcome his wrath; as a result *The Tempest* records the reconciliation rather than the penance of the formula. The emphasis, therefore, is not on the original rift, as it is in *The Winter's Tale*; nor is it on the internal struggle of the protagonist, as in *Pericles*. Because the play rests solidly on the mechanics of reconciliation, a compressed time scheme is more significant in *The Tempest* than in the looser romantic structure of the other late plays.

In *The Tempest*, the young lovers are counters in a spiritual chess game manipulated by the magician-priest. Prospero in fact combines the symbolic roles of Cerimon and Paulina, in *Pericles* and *The Winter's Tale*, who act as priestly physicians to the spiritual health of the king. Forced to present his exposition in the controversial second scene of Act One, Shakespeare introduces the Sebastian-Antonio complication, the unholy trinity of Caliban-Stephano-Trinculo, and finally the love of Miranda and Ferdinand. If he had not imported dynamic, present evil into the action, through two attempts to usurp power (one in the burlesque comedy subplot), *The Tempest* would have been serene indeed, dealing exclusively with past evil. As it is, the evil in the play is not worked out of Prospero himself. It is seen instead as an active principle in the universe, and the character who experiences rebirth during the action is Alonso, a stand-in for Prospero, whose function is similar to the symbolic role of little Mamillius in

The Winter's Tale

The love of Ferdinand and Miranda is both thematic necessity and unifying symbolic force in the overall pattern, as is the love of the young lovers in the other plays. In *The Tempest*, however, the flight to the woods characteristic of the early comedies is transformed into the ritual experience of the entire play: the mysterious shipwreck, the charmed adventures on the Enchanted Isle, and the ultimate return to reality, Milan, and thoughts of death. The 'green world'¹⁰ of a magic island removed countless leagues from physical reality provides the setting, and the basic opposition is between the forces of spiritual good, controlled by Prospero, and the forces of evil, personified in Antonio, Sebastian, Caliban, Stephano, and Trinculo.

Ritual suffering appears in all the four plays. In *Pericles*, it occupies the bulk of the play. In *The Winter's Tale*, Leontes' penitential sterility, the curse of the Waste Land in the tragic sequence, necessitates the healing romantic misrule of the last two acts. In *Cymbeline*, Posthumus in penance does good works by battle to act as a regenerating force. And in *The Tempest*, the entire island experience, for both Prospero during his exile and the shipwrecked court of his evil brother, may be seen as penitential in character and outcome.

Whereas *Pericles* follows the process of penance itself, *The Winter's Tale* avoids it by the choric device of Time and the sixteen year hiatus before the summer action of the last two acts concludes the play. As a consequence, *The Winter's Tale* explores the cause of the Waste Land period of Leontes' life and then leaps forward in time to record the sequence of reconciliations dominating the last act. In these two plays, the young grow older, and their own children effect the regeneration of the conclusion.

In *Cymbeline* and *The Tempest*, however, the father figures are already older. In *Cymbeline*, the lovers are even already

married, and the father's banishment of Posthumus initiates the conflict, so that the play focusses on the scapegoat mission of Imogen and her husband, which generates the final reconciliation. In *The Tempest*, Prospero, too, is already old. But as the magical choreographer of reconciliation, he effects the regeneration of Alonso, who experiences the sea baptism of sin and grief during the play.

It seems evident from this analysis that the four late plays employ the formula of sin-penance-regeneration with varying emphasis, each stressing different phases of the spiritual experience.

The structure of these late plays is still based on the polarity system of the middle comedies¹¹, though sophisticated through a series of interlocking complications. *The Winter's Tale*, for example, is so thoroughly founded on the symbolic implications of a 'winter-summer' progression that many scholars suggest it falls into complementary halves, a tragic movement and a comic movement which may or may not be artistically fused. With its masque-like combination of tragedy and comedy, and its obvious relationship to earlier plays *The Winter's Tale* presents the most complete example of the themes of rebirth and reconciliation. Leontes' irrational passion creates disharmony in his family and kingdom, as well as in his personality. Reminiscent of the great tragic figures of Shakespeare's middle period, he brings upon his head the curse of the gods, which, like Lear's to Goneril, is to remain childless. Through voluntary penance and spiritual rebirth, he must work out of his soul the evil he has engendered through false vision of his world.

Though Shakespeare is no longer interested in exploring the psychopathology of jealousy, Leontes and Othello are brothers under the skin. In *The Winter's Tale*, however, the interest of the play lies in the effects of jealousy not only on the protagonist but, more importantly, on his kingdom. Evil,

however created, is not to be presented within the closed circuit of a tragic protagonist's soul. Its influence inevitably broadens to include those associated with the king and, ultimately, his kingdom itself. The Fisher King myth lurks beneath the surface of this action. Having attained knowledge of evil, Leontes sinks into spiritual infirmity. Increasingly, he becomes a ritual personification of Mankind laboring under the curse of sin and evil.

The last two acts seem designed as a unit, an antidote to the tragic action of the first three. They introduce the atmosphere and devices of romantic comedy so as to suggest Shakespere has created what might be called an 'open-ended tragedy'. In *The Winter's Tale*, unlike the tragedies, the influence of tragedy is not confined to the life of the protagonist, nor does the play end with his physical death. Instead Shakespeare has dramatized a symbolic death and rebirth, through the use of scapegoats, and shifted attention to the spiritual and communal life cycle, rather than the individual tragic redemption, through suffering and death, of a single, noble human being. Leontes' son Mamillius dies in his stead so that the suffering king may go on the spiritual regeneration effected through the mock death of his wife and the fertility mission of his daughter.

Pericles articulates a similar mode of development and thematic concern. But the scapegoat action is sketched more overtly in the construction of this episodic play. Tainted with the sexual evil of Antiochus' incest, Pericles draws vengeance away from his people by doing works of charity and following the penitential route traversed by the Biblical Paul. Like a figure from Eliot's *The Waste Land*, he lives a kind of half-life, figuratively dead, until restored to spiritual health by the healing agency of his daughter Marina and her purgative music.¹² In this play as well is to be found the mock death used so majestically in *The Winter's Tale* and *The Tempest*. Thaisa,

Marina and Pericles himself undergo forms of mock death. Marina's eventual release from the brothel is regenerating, as is her effect on the grieving king, who awakens like Lear to her celestial music. Thaisa is to Pericles what Hermione is to Leontes, and it is the men not the women who are spiritually reborn, for the women function as scapegoats within the tragicomic implications of the formula.

Pericles' suit for the hand of Antiochus' daughter brings him abruptly into knowledge of sin and death. Because of his willingness to risk death to win an empty prize, atonement is exacted of him. His actions after this experience of evil recall the comic principle of misrule, which assumes that going beyond the limits of normality into moral chaos and disorder eventually produces a new and more precious 'order'. Out of the knowledge of sin and death come spiritual reawakening and renewed social order.

As with *The Winter's Tale*, *Pericles* begins with a tragic action and moves toward a comic one, through a dramatic confrontation between life and death, youth and age, summer and winter, and grace and sin. Its plot division, in fact, echoes that of *The Winter's Tale*, a three part, two part structure, which remains essentially episodic. In not only the dramatic formula of the action but also the life history of the major figures, the main theme of the late plays is resident: out of death comes life, out of suffering comes happiness, and out of evil comes good.

In *Cymbeline* elements from *King Lear* take on fresh expression. In the beginning of the play, Cymbeline's wrath and tyranny remind us of Leontes and his irrational treatment of wife and child. Symbolically, in the first section of the play, Winter blights Spring unnaturally, banishing Spring from the community, until it can finally be returned, in the second movement, through the 'medicinal' agency of the young.

Unlike *The Winter's Tale* and *Pericles*, *Cymbeline* does not

focus upon the life of the suffering king. Significantly, it shifts emphasis to his children, especially to Imogen's scapegoat function and the symbolism of the two 'lopp'd branches.' Already in his sterile period, when the play opens, Cymbeline receives his regeneration through the journey of his daughter, a clear parallel to the relationships of Perdita and Leontes, Marina and Pericles, and to some extent Miranda and Prospero.¹³ Cymbeline's function is in fact close to Prospero's. As he is the symbolic centre of the tensions of the kingdom, the final reconciliations are focused in him: 'Oh, what am I? A mother to the birth of three?' (V. v. 368-69).

Clearly, the 'incest theme' in *Pericles* and the 'adultery theme' in *The Winter's Tale* and *Cymbeline* carry similar weight. Cymbeline's unhealthy relationship with his spiritually barren wife is reminiscent of Antiochus's incestuous relationship with his daughter and Leontes' paranoiac sexual jealousy. Sexual evil is only hinted at in *The Tempest*, however, through Caliban's attempted rape of Miranda and Ferdinand's labours. Though fabricated by Iachimo, the adultery in *Cymbeline*, stains Posthumus with a taint which, as in *Pericles*, must be removed by penance. The concern in *Cymbeline*, therefore, is not the cause of the present action. Rather it is the reconciliation with his family and the restoration of the community to health through the scapegoat journey and mock death of his child. Ritual mock death is closely associated in these plays with time and the conception of spiritual recovery. In *The Winter's Tale*, the mock death of Thaisa is required so that Leontes may grow in spiritual understanding and the prophesy of the Oracle be fulfilled. In *Cymbeline*, Imogen's supposed death has comparable effect, as is the case with the long lost brothers. In *Pericles*, the formula is clear in the mock death of daughter and wife, as well as the 'death-in-life experience of the protagonist. In *The Tempest*, finally, the experience of the entire play, including

Prospero's island sojourn and the transforming 'death by water', suggests the mock death before rebirth of ritual drama. The resurrection motif inherent in the traditional mock death is equally clear in *Cymbeline*, where Cornelius comments, 'but there is/No danger in what show of death it makes,/More than the locking up the spirits a time,/To be more fresh, reviving' (I. v. 39-42). And Lucius exclaims, 'Some falls are means the happier to rise' (IV. ii. 403).

The themes of individual regeneration and children as 'sacred physic' to the nation insure that the spiritual continuity of life is central to the late plays. Not only the audience but the characters themselves are struck by similarities between parents and children. In *The Winter's Tale*, for example, Leontes remarks wonderingly on the likeness of son to father, daughter to mother. The result is that the main characters also function as ritual personifications of the stages of life. As the young re-enact the history and experiences of the old, the late romances imitate ritual drama, and the final impression of each is of the human life story. In a sense, Perdita and Florizel re-enact the marriages of their parents. Leontes exclaims to Florizel, 'Your father's image is so hit in you,/His very air, that I should call you brother...' (v.i. 127-28). In *Pericles*, Marina, who 'beget'st him that did thee beget' (V.i. 197) not only brings about the spiritual transformation of her father, she is the image of her mother.

It is worth restating that the late plays are not unorthodox experiments at the end of Shakespeare's career. Rather they are sophisticated extensions of the methods and themes of the festive comedies, with the emphasis shifted from the young and their spring-like love to the medicinal influence they exert on the older generation. The plot focus of these plays is not the joyous rebellion of young lovers and their flight to the woods. Rather it is the ritual character of the kingly protagonist who represents the spiritual state of a 'sickly weal'.

The protagonists of the late plays function, therefore, like those of the Waste Land myth. They undergo spiritual separation from their loved ones, normal happiness and activity, and their communities. The transition, therefore, is from social orientation in the middle comedies to spiritual accommodation in the late tragicomedies. In the archetypal struggle between the forces of winter and spring in human experience, the kingly protagonist, too, performs a scapegoat function, like that of the dying god archetype. His springlike rebirth of the spirit accompanies the agency of young lovers and his own children, so that he may exclaim joyfully with Leontes: 'Welcome hither as is the spring to the earth'. And his personal spiritual *renouveau* returns health and vitality to a barren land.

The evolution from comedy to tragicomedy is a structural accommodation demanded by the nature of the developing theme. An 'open-ended' tragedy, including death but not that of the protagonist, is the logical culmination of a shift from the group emancipation of the comedies to the scapegoat implications of the fate of the protagonist in the tragedies. Essentially, the dramatic formula of sin-penance-regeneration renders the symbolism and situations of the middle comedies more compatible with themes of reconciliation and rebirth in the late plays. In some ways, then, the late plays lie midway between the festive romantic comedies and the tragedies. Structurally similar to the problem comedies, they lack their encompassing tone, which A.P. Rossiter defines as tragicomic in nature.¹⁴ The dramatic formula opens up the pattern of a typical Shakespearean tragedy to include aspects of the formal conclusion of a comedy: the ceremony of a feast or marriage. In this respect, these plays diminish the character focus of the tragedies in favour of the group emphasis of the comedies. Accordingly, the late plays deal with lifetimes and generations, treating their participants as both individuals and pageant personifications of the human pilgrimage.

The relationship between seasons in nature and seasons in the life of man remains in the forefront of the plays. Youth is presented as a power; a renewer of life and antagonist to death. As in the middle comedies, the young are associated in symbolism and imagery with nature so as to fulfill a thematic function in the system orchestrating the fall and restoration of both king and realm. Again reminiscent of the comedies, extremes of excess and defect destroy the natural harmony of life so as to create an unhealthy imbalance. The result is a kind of spiritual chaos, expressed sexually in terms of the family and the community and leading to a view of the protagonist as figuratively dead. His ritual isolation, asceticism and mock death are 'cured' by the sacred fertility of his daughter. And king and country are purged of time, error, and sin, as the generations merge in significance.

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Notes and References

1. See G. Wilson Knight's discussion of *The Winter's Tale* in *The Crown of Life* (London, 1965), pp. 76-128.
2. *Shakespeare's History Plays* (Harmondsworth, 1969).
3. See also W. B. Thorne, 'Cymbeline: Lopp'd Branches and the Concept of Regeneration,' *Shakespeare Quarterly*, xx (1969), 143-59.
4. Janet Spens, *An Essay on Shakespeare's Relation to Tradition* (Oxford, 1916), p. 101.
5. E. M. W. Tillyard, *Shakespeare's Last Plays* (London, 1951), p. 26.
6. Richard Wincor, 'Shakespeare's Festival Plays', *Shakespeare Quarterly*, I (1950), p. 219.
7. Knight, *Crown*, p. 37.
8. D.A. Traversi, *Shakespeare: The Last Phase* (Stanford, 1953) p. 138. See also his *An Approach to Shakespeare* (New York, 1956), pp. 215-16.
9. See also W. B. Thorne, 'Pericles and the "Incest-Fertility" Opposition' *Shakespeare Quarterly*, xxii (Winter, 1971), 43-56.

10. See Northrop Frye, 'The Argument of Comedy' in Leonard F. Dean, *Shakespeare: Modern Essays in Criticism* (New York, 1967), pp. 79-89.
11. For analysis of this structural system in the comedies see C. L. Barber, *Shakespeare's Festive Comedy: A Study of Dramatic Form and Its Relation to Social Custom* (Princeton, 1959), and Marion B. Smith, *Dualities in Shakespeare* (Toronto, 1966).
12. That 'Child-changed fathers' become increasingly significant in Shakespearean dramaturgy is evidenced in plays as different as *Romeo and Juliet* and *King Lear*.
13. Prospero says to Miranda, 'O, a cherubin/Thou wast that did preserve me' (I. ii. 54-55).
14. See *Angel with Horns* (London, 1970), pp. 108-28.

SAMUEL BECKETT AND THE AESTHETICS OF BEING

In Samuel Beckett's plays it is difficult to pin down the text to a definite interpretation; perhaps a sense of nothingness and a mood of sinister apprehension are part of the plan. Characters and situations develop paradoxically and inconsistently, at least on the surface level. One may observe that the predictability of style and the development of action are extremely low and the works, as David Lodge has remarked, 'resist reading by refusing to settle into a simple identifiable mode of rhythm.'¹ And yet there is no denying the fact that Beckett's works grip our mind with a strange appeal and power.

In this paper I intend to show that the fundamental problems of Beckett's plays can be resolved by placing them in the perspective of phenomenological and existential aesthetics. The only possible way to study the concepts of Being and Time is to study them at work in language as used by Beckett. In his case the quality of style and form are a revelation of the philosophy more than the philosophy itself. The first section will focus attention on Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and some other existential thinkers and try to establish the aesthetics of existential-phenomenological tradition which, as will become apparent in the second section, is basic to Samuel Beckett as exemplified in *Waiting For Godot*, *Happy Days*, *Krapp's Last Tape* and *All That Fall*. In the final section we shall try to conclude the argument and offer generalizations that the study warrants.

I

According to Croce, 'The science of art and that of language, Aesthetic and Linguistic conceived as true sciences, are

not two distinct things, but one thing only. Philosophy of language and philosophy of art are the same thing.² In a Beckett play as in any successful work of art, materials are completely assimilated into the form. 'What was "world" has become "language"'.³ Welleck and Warren reinforce this point: 'The materials of a literary work of art are on one level, words; on another level, human ideas and attitudes. All of these, including language, exist outside the work of art; in other words, in a successful poem or novel they are pulled into polyphonic relation by the dynamics of aesthetic purpose'.⁴ The plays *Waiting for Godot*, *Endgame*, *Happy Days*, *Krapp's Last Tape*, *Embers*, *All That Fall*, *Words Without Music*, *Play* are Beckett's meditations on the human existential problems and seek to reveal the characteristic Heideggerian conviction that 'our being in the world is "thrownness", there is nothing metaphysical or mystical about the proposition. It is a primordial banality which metaphysical speculation has long overlooked. The world into which we are thrown, without personal choice, with no previous knowledge, was before us and will be after us. Our *Dasein* is inseparable from it and . . . there is a sense in which the world derives meaning from our *Dasein*'.⁵

What strikes one in these plays is the range of complex and varied ways through which Beckett endeavours to translate *Dasein*; sense of void, *angst*, nothing, time, and self in forms which appear amazing for their expressiveness as well as their simulated failure to achieve complete success of expression.

Beckett, as he claims, has no particular interest in philosophical ideas, but his choice of a certain mode of thought to be his truth is an existential commitment that any perceptive reader will find of genuine philosophical interest. Beckett shares with Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Kafka, Heidegger, Sartre Merleau-Ponty and Camus, the fundamental concern to communicate the sense of being, and the preoccupation with the shrinking uses and powers of language as a tool for the

expression of thought and feelings. Kierkegaard wrote: 'How ironical that by speech man can degrade himself below dumb creation—he becomes a chatterbox.'⁶ One could observe in Beckett's works the manifestation of this problem of language. They startle us as the works of a new order. Unlike the old mode, striving after expression, they are in fact aiming to be inexpressive. Hence one is inclined to place him in the company of the above-mentioned thinkers whose works continuously pose the question of how to be read. Like Heidegger he may be considered anti-rhetorical. *Waiting for Godot* in this regard is a representative play which overtly rejects a philosophy which abstracts, which seeks to elevate itself above the matter of factness in arid intetellectualism which can tell us nothing of the meaning of being, of where and what *Dasein* is. Such an insight enlarges upon our naive supposition that man is a spiritual thing, and the subsequent recreation is the stage that is emblematic of the deprivation of our time. Beckett is interested in unfolding Being—what it means to say : I feel, I live, I suffer, and what it means to be human, rooted in the earth. One may find the mockery of the institution and 'system of a society which overvalues rationality, will power, acquisitiveness, productivity and technical skill, forcing out of consciousness, an ontological dimension (Being)'.⁷

Heidegger criticizes the mistake of the Western metaphysical tradition that sees 'Being' as a kind of objective entity which has been sharply separated from the subject; he would rather seek to return to pre-Socratic thought before the dualism between subject and object opened up, and to regard Being as containing both. Thus human institutions insulated from the generative source become abstractions, projections and essences. Merleau-Ponty condemns this state as 'operation-alism' and remarks: 'For all its fluency, science must nevertheless understand itself as a construction based on a brute existent world... a thinking which looks on from above, and

thinks of the object in general, must return to "there is" which underlies it. Being is thus the basic dimension which alone constitutes the substantial unity between man and man, thing and thing, subject and object, past and present and future.⁸ Heidegger argued that human existence is a dialogue with the world and the more reverent activity is to listen rather than speak. Yet language which expresses human thought, articulates being, has been reduced to a complex of cerebral structure which covers up and distorts rather than communicates. Language detached from human subject becomes unreal, infused with essence—the result is, strictly speaking, that it is impossible to express through language the concrete and unique experience of an individual.

Heidegger asserts that language as the house of being is the supreme event of human existence. Human existence has acquired its meaning and foundation through language: "'We are a single conversation'. But the unity of a conversation consists in the fact that in essential world there is always manifest that one and the same thing on which we agree, on the basis of which we are united and so are essentially ourselves. Conversation and its unity support our existence'.⁹ Language speaks Being (*Sein*) to man as thinking (*Denken*). In their mere unfolding, language and thinking produce and create Being which appears as ungraspable yet mysteriously present. Language is not a picture of reality, but it lets what is talked about, stand out and be seen for what it is. This could be interpreted as the view that the right style is one that lets us see things as they are. It is only language that opens up some clearing, some open space in which we can lay hold of things that matter. The relation of truth, freedom, and the overtessness of existence clarify this issue further as explored in Heidegger's essay 'On the Essence of Truth': 'One is in the truth so far one is free; one is free so far one is open to things as they are; one is open to things so far one lets them be what they are, not manipulating them but participat-

ing in their overtness.¹⁰ Heidegger insists on the Greek concept of truth as *aletheia*, meaning unhiddenness. Truth happens as it were, when concealments are stripped away and when things emerge into openness. This means that truth is rooted in *Dasein*.¹¹ Indeed this image of truth could be attributed as the motivation of existentialist's concern with language as a human or existential phenomenon than with its internal structure or its relation to a referent. The existentialist fastens his attention primarily on the spoken word, on talk, or discourse, as the full human phenomenon. The tone of voice, the gesture, the facial expression—they are the characteristics that are irrelevant to logic, but they belong to the full reality of language, are lost when the written or printed word is substituted for talk.¹² The concern to express through language the complete human phenomenon and the realization of the failure to achieve this has been a common concern.

For Heidegger, the moment of being in the world is facticity. Being is an extended temporal activity. It dwells in, with, and through time. *Sorge* translated as 'concern' by Mary Warnock connotes human being's essential relation to Time¹³. It implies the awareness of temporality connoting finitude, nothingness, and the awareness of the passage of time determining human concern with others. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger emphasises two different attitudes : fear and anxiety, constituting *Angst*—a specific threat constituted for us by our situation. This means in the face of nothing we want to save ourselves and in our anxiety, we drown ourselves in the trivial, the social, in all the ingredients of inauthentic existence. The conversation of such a man being inauthentic, is said to be *Gerede*, as opposed to *Rede* (discourse). This state is the state of *Versfallensein*, a lapse. The experience of authenticity is realizing aloneness, realizing the world's reality, orientation toward nothingness, the future non-existence. It is only through the experience of

'Nothing' that human being can experience 'Being', and this central principle links Nothing and Time.

Philosophically, Beckett and Camus both have deep affinity with Heidegger. For the three of them finitude and mortality remain at the very centre of human condition and within the horizon of these limitations the struggle to live goes on. We could agree with the recent critical opinion that there is hardly a sphere of intellectual argument and language consciousness in which the presence of Heidegger is not manifest.

With Heideggerian consistency Beckett wants us to transcend rhetorical forms so that we could look at life with a sense of revelation. He is striving to get language and his readers, listeners, inside the actual world, and if not deliberate, yet in diffused form, the cardinal concerns of Kierkegaard, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger could be encountered in Beckett's aesthetics.

II

Beckett's themes are the variations on Time and Self as aspects of *Dasein*. At the centre of this unreality of time, the contingency of human existence, there is a dimension of the absurd, which annuls, negates, the preceding moment of time. Pozzo's last speech in *Waiting for Godot*: 'Have you not done tormenting me with your accursed time? It's abominable! When! When! One day he went dumb, one day, I went blind. One day we'll go deaf, One day we were born, one day we shall die, the same day, the same second, is that not enough for you? [Calmer] They give birth astride of a grave, the light gleams an instant, then it's night once more.' (*Waiting for Godot*, p. 89).¹⁴ Pozzo's fastidious precision in handling his watch, his pipe, his vaporizer, and the abject Lucky, talking nothing but nonsense about 'a personal God... outside time without extension who from the heights of divine apathia,

divine athambia, divine aphasia, loves us dearly with some exception' (p. 42-43). Pozzo's lecture on Time : The lost colours of morning, the horrors of night to come 'That is how it is on this bitch of an earth,' (p. 38) are reflections on the absurdity of human illusions. Time is a great transformer. The agony of the changing identity and mutability of the self are evoked in *Krapp's Last Tape*. It can never be determined which one it is, or if there is something as real self. In this context, Barret raises a question about speech : 'If one seeks to speak to oneself, to whom, to which of manyselves, is one talking? And one seeks to speak sincerely as oneself, out of the depth of oneself, from where does the voice come? If we cannot be sure that we can speak to our ownself, how can we ever be confident that we can communicate with another self'¹⁵ There is prevalent, deliberate interplay of Time and Self in Beckett plays, where Vladimir, Estragon, Pozzo, Krapp, Winnie, Willie, Hamm, Nagg and Nell, are lonely individuals in this net-work where the act of human communication is reduced to being 'absurd'. As an inexorable consequence on the one hand, language is evocative, expressive of being; on the other, it fails to express. The paradox recalls Heidegger's view of the ambivalence of language. Richard Coe suggests analogy between Heidegger and Beckett : 'Beckett's own art likewise is an art of failure : It is by definition trying to do something that it cannot conceivably do—to create and define which, created and defined, ceases to be what it must be, if it is to reveal the truth of human situation: Man as Nothing in relation to all things which themselves are Nothing'.¹⁶ Hence we may find that Beckett's relation to idiom is problematic. He strives to represent the Being who lives, speaks, feels, suffers in a world where nothing is being, meaninglessness is meaning and self is non-self. They are identical because they are revealed in experience as uniquely and inextricably meshed with each other. Language is naturally a corollary to the paradox inherent in Time, Self and Nothing.

All that Fall is a telling representative of authentic expression against an otherwise failing language which verges on 'idle talk'. The play is essentially an exercise of the human psychosomatic organism whose expressive element tends away from the centre yet wants to return to it, which exactly is the 'house of being'. As a radio play the sound effects from nature—the murmurs, subtle transformation of interior monologue into seeming dialogue, rhythm of voices and the inevitable return to the monologue—successfully form a composite lyrical structure. The ingenuousness of the playwright lies in the way human consciousness as a verbal flow has been transcribed. There is a tacit awareness that the consciousness of the self not only consists of a constant stream of language, but of wordless consciousness of being made up of body-sensation, inner tension, the awareness of the body-temperature, aches, pains, the throbbing of blood—the multiple facets of non-verbal consciousness, summed up in the overall concept of emotion. Thus man is conceived as a psychosomatic unity.

Existentialists have spoken of the 'lived body' in order to suggest the degree to which one's own body is internal to oneself. But even such a phrase cannot do justice to the intimate sense in which the body is an inseparable phase of our total being. Barret aptly puts it: 'We live by the tides of the blood, the rhythm of breathing, the vast and intricate process of unconscious mind without which we could not carry out the most elementary sequence of rational thought. The body is not a physical container but a region of Being—a network of living processes that sustains us but also binds us to the whole chain of life upon this earth'.¹⁷

The awareness of the characters even though maimed, bleeding, lacerated, paralytic, nearly blind, tottering, can never have a stop. Mrs. Rooney in *All that Fall*, in her seventies, on her way to the station to receive her blind husband is one such character. Dragging feet, quivering, groping, she

gets into a series of frustrating dialogues in Anglo-Irish voices. Her dialogues reveal the primary expressive urge, tending to abstraction, to compression, and to the rhythm of primordial babble countering rational language. She laments for her only child who died as a young girl, and the major part of the play evokes the pain and suffering of the soul and body through varying patterns. An attempt at a possible paraphrase of the play should bring out how Beckett in his inimitable ways, apart from injecting the elements of drama by arousing the interest of the reader, offers a sustained intellectual criticism of language.

The theme of loss and death is initiated in the sad music, the recalling of dead, the reference to the rotting leaves. The agony of childlessness off and on spills over her. Yet she is vitally 'alive to all that is going on' (*All that Fall*, p. 23).¹⁸

The dialogical monologue evokes the ebb and flow of being dwelling from the past to the present. The self-lamenting apostrophe, comic-pathetic self-pity, curses, obsession with death and diseases are revealed with Mrs Rooney's clumsy stagger and exaggerated flowery speeches. The invocation of Minnie, who died when she was a child: 'Oh I am just a hysterical old hag, I know, destroyed with sorrow and pining and gentility and churchgoing and fat and rheumatism, and childlessness [*Pause-Brokenly*], Minnie Little Minnie? [*Pause*] here that is all I asked, a little love... like a Paris horse butcher's regular, what normal woman wants affection?' (p.9). Her dialogues with Mr. Tyler strike the same chord: 'What news of your poor daughter?' Mr. Tyler: 'Fair, fair, "they removed everything" You know, (p.10) the whole... er... bag of tricks'. 'Now I am Grandchildless'. (p. 10). The 'bag of tricks' is referring obviously to hestereectomy.

What animates Mrs. Rooney are the matters relating to death, sickness and loss. Her comic-pathetic lamentation and self-pity evoke the same note: 'If you see my poor blind Dan tell him. I was on my way to meet him, when it all came

over me again, like a flood... say to him, your poor wife she told me to tell you it all came flooding over her again and [*the voice breaks*]...’ (p. 12). Flooding connotes the hemorrhage of the uterus. The turbulence, trauma of her being seems to have overwhelmed the surface.

In Mr. Slocum’s car to the station, [*screams of brakes, squash of hen*] ‘Oh mother, you have squashed her, one minute picking happy at the dung, on the road, in the sun, now and then a dust bath and then-bang!—all her troubles over [*pause*]. All the laying and hatching [*pause*] just one great squawk and then... [*pause*] they would have slit her weasand in any case [*pause*]’ (pp 15-16).

The ambience of suspense is evoked in the late coming of the train, a female voice warning her little girl ‘One can be sucked under’ (p. 23). The very special method of dialogue altering into monologues reinforces the truth that most of Mrs. Rooney’s attempts at conversation turn futile. The monologue and dialogue clash in comic-pathetic incongruity. The counterpointing provide humour as well as flashes of pathos. The bizarre way of talking of Mrs. Rooney from the very beginning is interspersed with nonsense and garrulity: Her questioning the carter about her way of speaking (p. 8) and her rejection of Christy’s offer of a small load of dung with vehemence strike us as bizarre. The soliloquy against the sound of dragging feet—‘Oh let me just flop down on the road like a big fat jelly out of a bowl and never move again!’ (p. 9). Mr. Slocum’s appearance opens up another dialogue but is doomed again to monologue. This method not only establishes a pleasant counterpoint of speech, but intensifies our awareness of Maddy Rooney’s loneliness. The pauses suggest that most of her questions remain unanswered. The craving to communicate fails. The situation is a characteristic existential one. The way people are normally together does not deserve the name of community. What we find is a distorting and distorted relationship where communication is

mostly meaningless chatter. This tendency anticipates the next pattern in the play when Mrs. Rooney clamours for inclusion in the chorus of voices at the station : 'Do not imagine, because I am silent, that I am not present...' (p. 23). And then insists on soliloquizing with her husband 'Do not mind me dear I am just talking to myself'. (p. 54). Silence here puts in the question of continued existence since consciousness is an incessant verbal flow, human beings are 'conversation'.¹⁹ Silence makes speech possible. As Merleau-Ponty observes : 'What makes us believe is a thought which could exist by itself before being expressed, which we recall in silent moment and which gives us an illusion of an internal life. But in reality this pretense of silence bristles with words, and an internal life is an internal language'.²⁰

The complex range of the play weaves in its texture a subtle parody of 'literary language' and 'weather talk'. Heidegger says: '*Gerde* as talk has a corrosive ubiquity. It embraces not only the flood tide of trivia and gossip, of novelty and cliche, of jargon and spurious grandiloquence, but spreads to what we write, where it takes the form of scribbling'. Overwhelmingly 'talk' has lost its primacy of being towards the entity talked about, or else has never achieved such a relationship'. Mrs. Rooney's attempts at 'small talk' and flowery language become self-defeating, funny and absurd: 'we all know you station is the best kept of the entire net work, but there were times when that is not enough [pause]. Now, Mr. Barrel, leave off chewing you whiskers, we are waiting to hear from you—we the unfortunate ticket-holders nearest if not the dearest [pause] (p. 25). The pattern thus is in the words of Kenner: 'what is left is a garrulity, vestigially logical'. The stream of consciousness provides more scope for the display of Mrs. Rooney's sense of loss in all its spendour: 'Have you no respect for misery? . . . Minnie. In her forties now she would be . . . girding up her lovely little lions, getting ready for the change, (p. 12). Mrs Rooney's

'blowing nose' in order to be included in the conversation : Mr Tyler : (to Miss Fitt) 'when did you say the last train, [Mrs. Rooney blows her nose violently and long]—'When you say the last train, Miss Fitt...' (p. 24). The comic-pathetic situation is further enhanced in Miss Fitt's speech: 'What else could I conceivably mean?' 'The cruel fact remains,' (p. 24) pointedly underscores that Maddy Rooney unlike others is conscious of her 'struggle with a dead language' (p. 34). She is trapped by formula but does not live by formula. The plight is poignantly manifest in Winnie's speech in *Happy Days* : 'Words fail, there are times, when even words fail, at times? [Pause, Back front] What is one to do then, until they come again? Brush and Comb the hair. . . trim the nail... That is all I mean [Pause]. That is what I find so wonderful, that not a day goes by—[smile]—to speak in the old style... (*Happy Days*).²³ Steiner seeks to explore this aspect in his commentary on Heidegger: 'All that talk does is to "pass the word along" a phrase of forceful contempt as in German *Nachreden* also means to asperse, to gossip pejoratively and emptily. The 'One talking to, or, rather, with "they" is at once the symptom and realization of rootlessness and restlessness which gives a culture of inauthenticity.²⁴ *Krapp's Last Tape* represents the intensification, the youthful literary style in a manner which is over-literary:... Sneers at what he calls his youth and thanks to God that it is over [pause]... false ring there [pause]. Shadows of the Opus... magnum. Closing with-[brief laugh]-Yelp to Providence' (pp. 12-13).²⁵

Solitude in *All that Fall* is pushed to the furthest limits resulting in a sense of the strangeness of one's own being effecting images of the grotesque. Mrs. Rooney: 'Oh let me just flop down flat on a road like a big fat jelly out of a bowl and never move again; A great big slop thick with grit and dust and flies, that would have to scoop me with a shovel' (p. 9). 'To Miss Fitt a religious bigot, Mrs. Rooney is a 'big pale blur' (p. 9). To Dan Rooney Mrs. Rooney is 'quivering

like a blancmange'.

These images jolt us out of the accustomed ways of perceiving the world and confront us with a blatantly disturbing perspective. Philip Thomson suggests: 'Grotesque does serve to bring the horrifying and disgusting aspects of existence to the surface, there to be rendered less harmful by the introduction of a comic perspective. Dan Rooney is waiting to die, having a chronic congenital ailment, a hypochondriac, he will amuse himself by creating stories. He is obsessed with a wish to kill a child 'Did you ever wish to kill a child [Pause] Many a times at night in winter I nearly attacked the boy [Pause]' (p. 31). The fantasy could be diagnosed as displaced frustration at not having been able to procreate. Fragments of stories lacking logic are embedded here and there; there is, for example, a story about a girl who was dying and a neurologist (p. 36): 'When he had done with the little girl he stood there motionless for sometime. Quite two minutes... then he suddenly raised his head and explained as if he had a revelation, the trouble with her was she had never really been born' (p. 37) The seemingly grotesque, pointless and macabre stories and the cool, quiet, and factual tone of the narrative effect a sense of disquiet—a pervasive feature in Kafka and Camus. The same tone occurs at the end of the play, when we are given the shocking news of the fall of a child from the train. An apprehension lurks that Mr. Rooney might have killed the child. The title *All that Fall* under the situation is cruel and ironic.

'Life had never offered any compelling alternative' (p. 34) to Mr. and Mrs. Rooney but they have to exist. The fact of their existence matters and has precedence over any other abstract concepts. The poignance of human situation comes through the juxtaposition of absurd and rational, banal and serious, bizarre and real amidst abundance of cliches, platitudes, silence and speech and an insistent urge to formulate an authentic Being.

III

Kierkegaard's awareness of psychological inwardness offers a deeper clue to the understanding of the aesthetics of Beckett:

That the subjective, existing thinker is as much positive as he is negative can be expressed by saying that he has as much of the comic as he has of the pathetic... Pathos that is not reinforced by the comic is illusion, the comic that is not reinforced by pathos is immaturity... Existence itself; the act of existing is a striving as pathetic as it is comic, pathetic, because the striving is infinite, ie. directed towards infinity, which is the summit of pathetic; comic because such striving is self-contradictory. Seen pathetically, a second has infinite value, seen comically, ten thousand years are a mere flash of foolery like yesterday; and yet time in which the existing individual finds himself is made up of such parts

Indeed what Beckett presents to us are the moments of reality however cruel and humorous. Writing on Proust, Beckett sounds close to Heidegger: 'Habit is the series of compromises we make with the world, what precisely is the function of the artwork is to break our habit of living; to unfold the horror and strangeness at the heart of life. In Heideggerian sense it is 'being-in-the world; a 'to-be-in-the-world'.

The foregoing study also inclines to the assumption that Beckett's deliberate distortion, dissipation and energising of language could be seen as a revolt against the permanence of time and simultaneously, as the utter helplessness of the medium to get outside of time-space limits. The instinct to transcend language and the inevitability of some medium expresses as well as restricts the theme of the transcendence of language by itself and on its own terms and conditions. By having recourse to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty's views on self, time, *Dasein*, the paper attempts to delineate the tradition which is basic to the aesthetics of Beckett and in the light of which Beckett's plays seem to become more meaningful.

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WORDSWORTH AND COLIN CLOUT: SOME WORDSWORTHIAN PASTORAL SEASCAPES

Some of Wordsworth's descriptions of and references to the sea can be called 'pastoral seascapes' in that they are maritime prospects viewed from a promontory or hill by shepherds, or by the poet in the company of shepherds or some other pastoral indication. It is a type of prospect that has distinct associations with Spenserianism, and in the more striking cases, in which the sea is imagined as a pastoral landscape or the land as a sea, there seems to be a specific indebtedness to a passage in Spenser's *Colin Clout's Come Home Again*. These scenes raise questions of great importance for Wordsworth about the inherent artificiality of poetic language and about his own poetic methods of approaching nature. How was the poet to take possession of the natural world? As an 'outsider', a literary tourist whose enthusiasms are for the picturesque rather than the natural, and who speaks an evolved language of artistic convention and fancy? Or as an 'insider', a rustic and child of nature speaking plainly and simply in the manner of a countryman? Although by origin an insider, Wordsworth's education, social status and occupation, and perhaps even his age, combined to exclude him from the rustic world of his childhood. Literature itself was probably the greatest barrier of all. In the passages I will discuss there are undertones, and often self-conscious overtones, of literary pastoralism, an ambiguous presence that suggests both the falsification of nature by artificial literary

convention and also the possibilities of a literary kind in which the poet could legitimately represent himself as being at one with the shepherds who are his subject. Wordsworth was acutely aware of his own complex relationship with the pastoral tradition¹ not only because of the shared subject-matter, but also because it dramatizes the central dilemma of his art. This dilemma is given its sharpest focus in the Spenserianism that touches some of these seascapes in various ways : as the artificial manner of the eighteenth century Spenserians, of allegory, personification and charming fiction; or an identity as shepherd-poet, the Colin Clout who can simultaneously inhabit the world of literature and that of nature.

The touristic side of Wordsworth's enthusiasm for nature is most obviously represented in *A Guide Through the District of the Lakes*, but he reveals a consciousness of its inadequacy in an anecdote included in the account of an expedition to Scawfell Pike. Although Wordsworth is representing as his own an experience that was actually Dorothy's the literary tourist's use of a language that is rather foolishly exclamatory, adjectival and tending to elaboration, while the shepherd guide is laconic and factual, enacts a central Wordsworthian theme.

While we were gazing around, 'Look,' I exclaimed, at yon ship upon the glittering sea! 'Is it a ship?' replied our shepherd-guide. 'It can be nothing else,' interposed my companion, 'I cannot be mistaken, I am so accustomed to the appearance of ships at sea.' The Guide dropped the argument; but before a minute was gone, he quietly said, 'Now look at your ship; it is changed into a horse'. So indeed it was,—a horse with a gallant neck and head. We laughed heartily; and, I hope, when again inclined to be positive, I may remember the ship and the horse upon the glittering sea; and the calm confidence, yet submissiveness, of our Wise Man of the Mountains, who certainly had more knowledge of clouds than we, whatever might be our knowledge of ships.²

Prosaically lighthearted though the incident is, the taciturn and practical countryman's reminder about what is actually

seen and what merely fancied takes on the character of an admonishment to the poet.

It is, perhaps, only in the land seascapes of Wordsworth's childhood that this embarrassing division between the poet's and the shepherd's way of seeing could be entirely absent. A seascape is offered in Book I of *The Prelude* as evidence of how,

A child. I held unconscious intercourse
With the eternal beauty, drinking in
A pure organic pleasure from the lines
Of curling mist, or from the level plain
Of waters coloured by the steady clouds. (1805, I. 589-93).

Wordsworth insists that the scene is unadorned by memory or imagination :

The sands of Westmoreland, the creeks and bays
Of Cumbria's rocky limits, they can tell
How when the sea threw off his evening shade
And to the shepherd's huts beneath the crags
Did send sweet notice of the rising moon,
How I have stood, to fancies such as these,
Engrafted in the tenderness of thought,
A stranger, linking with the spectacle
No conscious memory of a kindred sight,
And bringing with me no peculiar sense
Of quietness or peace—yet I have stood
Even while mine eye has moved o'er three long leagues
Of shining water gathering, as it seemed,
Through every hair-breadth of that field of light
New pleasure, like a bee among the flowers. (1805, I, 594-608).

Shepherds are naturally present in the child's rustic world, but the description of the scene eschews any connection with literary pastoralism because uncontaminated by any tendency to poeticism in the deracinated adult Wordsworth.

By contrast, the full complexity of the stylistic and epistemological problem is realised and triumphantly overcome in the Snowdon episode in Book XIII of the *Prelude*

where, guided by a shepherd, Wordsworth, in the company of his friend Robert Jones, once again climbs a peak and looks at the sea. But the seascape is this time an illusion worked by moonlight, mist, and the poet's imagination :

The moon stood naked in the heavens at height
 Immense above my head, and on the shore
 I found myself of a huge sea of mist,
 Which meek and silent rested at my feet.
 A hundred hills their dusky backs upheaved.
 All over this still ocean, and beyond,
 Far, far beyond, the vapours shot themselves
 In headlands, tongues, and promontory shapes,
 Into the sea, the real sea, that seemed
 To dwindle and give up its majesty,
 Usurped upon as far as sight could reach.
 Meanwhile, the moon looked down upon this shew
 In single glory, and we stood, the mist
 Touching our very feet; and from the shore
 At distance not the third part of a mile
 Was a blue chasm, a fracture in the vapour,
 A deep and gloomy breathing-place, through which
 Mounted the roar of waters, torrents, streams
 Innumerable, roaring with one voice.
 The universal spectacle throughout
 Was shaped for admiration and delight,
 Grand in itself alone, but in that breach
 Through which the homeless voice of waters rose,
 That dark deep thoroughfare, had Nature lodged
 The soul, the imagination of the whole. (1805, XIII. 41-65)

The implied and subsequently elaborated (II. 74-90) assertion that Nature and Imagination are the same thing effectively neutralises any suspicion that the scene is not 'real'. The prospect is in Wordsworth's mind, but at the same time nature is forming what Wordsworth is looking at into the very image of a mighty mind. The scene is both natural and imaginary : it both is and is not 'literary'. This is the greatest example of that peculiarly Wordsworthian device of transference by which the poet's anxieties about the artifice

of literature are sublimated by ascribing it to nature herself.³ In this sense, the scene cannot avoid retaining some of the lineaments of the picturesque : Nature composes herself into a *spectacle* that seems designed, as if by an artist, to fill the spectator with *admiration* and *delight*.⁴ However, in addition to the spectacle itself, Nature supplies her own spectator, for while the tourists and their guide passively 'stood', the moon actively 'looked down upon the shew'. Both the essential activities here, those of seeing and creating (they are ultimately the same activity) are performed by nature as well as the poet, with the poet anxious to exculpate himself from any suspicion of deception or fabrication. Thus the first-person pronouns so numerous in the account of the ascent (II. 10-40) vanish with

on the shore

I found myself of a huge sea of mist. (1805, XIII, 42-43)

and nature becomes the powerful presence suggested by the 'was' placed with massive emphasis at the beginning of lines 56 and 61, and the subject of strong, personifying verbs. Wordsworth himself remains a passive instrument ('a meditation rose in me') until the episode is concluded.

The stylistic strategy of this passage may be the better appreciated by examining its origins. We find an earlier version in *Descriptive Sketches*, where the 'pastoral Swiss' at sunrise sees from a clifftop 'a mighty waste of mist the valley fill/A solemn sea'. The illusory sea itself is riven by a 'gulf of gloomy blue' through which rises the 'hollow roar profound' of 'unnumber'd streams' to shatter the 'awful silence' of the scene (II. 492-505). The shepherd's eye is not 'undelighted' by this picturesque prospect, as one would expect in the context of this work of literary tourism. In its turn, this description is based upon a stanza from James Beattie's Spenserian poem, *The Minstrel*, in which the shepherd-poet has a similar vision :

And oft the craggy cliff he loved to climb,
When all in mist the world below was lost.
What dreadful pleasure! there to stand sublime,
Like shipwreck'd mariner on desert coast,
And view th'enormous waste of vapour, tost
In billows, lengthening to th' horizon round,
Now scoop'd in gulfs, with mountains now emboss'd!
And hear the voice of mirth and song rebound,
Flocks, herds, and waterfalls, along the hoar profound!¹⁵

The values of the picturesque and the romantic posturing of fashionable eighteenth century Spenserian pastoralism seen here have undergone a radical transformation by the time of the 1805 *Prelude*, but both are in some sense present, their artifice suppressed in favour of their assertion that the artist can take possession of nature without shame.

But the anxieties attendant upon the pastoral seascape figure and its Spenserian associations reassert themselves elsewhere, as for instance in this simile from Book III of the *Prelude*:

Hitherto I had stood
In my own mind remote from human life,
At least from what we commonly so name,
Even as a shepherd on a promontory,
Who lacking occupation, looks far forth
Into the endless sea, and rather makes
Than finds what he beholds. (1805, III, 543-49).

The shepherd's idleness falsifies his relationship to nature and abandons his mind to fancy. The resultant distinction between 'making' and 'finding' contrasts with the great creative act of perception on Snowdon and points to the danger of delusion that lurks in the epistemology of that vision; the mind becoming disconnected from external reality, becoming absorbed in its own creations, and imposing them upon it. And once again, the ghost of Spenserianism flickers behind Wordsworth's treatment of this pastoral seascape, for these lines appear to be based on a stanza from James Thomson's Spenserian poem, *The Castle of Indolence*:

As when a shepherd of the Hebrid isles,
 Placed far amid the melancholy main,
 (Whether it be lone fancy him beguiles,
 Or that aerial beings sometimes deign
 To stand embodied to our senses plain)
 Sees on the naked hill, or valley low,
 The whilst in ocean Phoebus dips his wain,
 A vast assembly moving to and fro;
 Then all at once in air dissolves the wondrous show.

Beguilement by lone fancy was a danger that Wordsworth often considered as he pondered his own ambiguous relationship with the pastoral tradition and with Spenserianism.

This ambiguity makes itself felt in the pastorals printed in the *Lyrical Ballads* of 1802. If their very designation as pastorals and the use of certain formal elements such as dialogue seem to invite the reader to connect these poems with the literary pastoral tradition, the poems themselves often deliberately undercut such associations. Thus 'The Oak and the Broom', for example, teasingly suggests the fable of oak and briar in 'Februarie' of *The Shepheardes Calendar*, and yet the moral import of Spenser's fable is absent and any tendency to allegory rigorously suppressed. Though personified for dramatic effect, the oak and the broom remain exactly what they are, a powerful tree exposed to powerful dangers, and a pleasant plant flourishing in shelter. An attempt at an allegorical exegesis could yield little more than an endorsement of such values as humility, innocence, and domesticity, values appropriate to the circumstances in which the narrative is set, the cottage of a shepherd's family on a stormy night. The minimizing of expected allegorical content implies the repossession of the pastoral world in the name of nature rather than of art.

A more striking example occurs in 'The Brothers'. The old priest's opening sally against tourists and their leisured and superficial aesthetic concerns with picturesque nature establishes for the poem a claim to a realistic set of rustic values

and a genuine relationship with nature. However, Leonard, the loiterer mistaken for a tourist, turns out to be a shepherd returned from exile, anxiously seeking his roots. He both is and is not a part of the pastoral world of Ennerdale, just as the poem itself both is and is not a conventional literary pastoral. The ambiguity may express something of Wordsworth's own complex feelings about being himself a deracinated rustic, removed by his education from the humble, taciturn world of his childhood to the status of gentleman and poet. Language being in a sense what separates Wordsworth from his origins and also the principal means whereby he seeks to regain them, it is small wonder that linguistic and poetic artifice should figure so prominently as themes in his pastorals.

In 'The Brothers' as in 'The Oak and the Broom', Colin Clout is conspicuous, as it were, by his absence. Leonard

had been rear'd
Among the mountains, and he in his heart
Was half a shepherd on the stormy seas.
Oft in the piping shrouds had Leonard heard
The tones of waterfalls, and inland sounds
Of caves and trees:—and, when the regular wind
Between the tropics filled the steady sail,
And blew with the same breath through days and weeks,
Lengthening invisibly its weary line
Along the cloudless Main, he, in those hours
Of tiresome indolence, would often hang
Over the vessel's side, and gaze and gaze;
And, while the broad blue wave and sparkling foam
Flashed round him images and hues that wrought
In union with the employment of his heart,
He, thus by feverish passion overcome,
Even with the organs of his bodily eye,
Below bim, in the bosom of the deep,
Saw mountains; saw the forms of sheep that grazed
On verdant hills—with dwellings among trees,
And shepherds clad in the same country grey
Which he himself had worn. (ll. 41-62)

In a note, Wordsworth identified the 'feverish passion' with the Calenture, defined in the OED as 'a disease incident to sailors both in the tropics, characterised by delirium in which the patient... fancies the sea to be green fields, and desires to leap into it'. The calenture provides a psychological pretext for Leonard's vision that allows Wordsworth to pass off as fact an extended poetic conceit strongly reminiscent of a passage in Spenser's *Colin Clout's Come Home Again* in which 'the Shepherd of the Ocean' (Sir Walter Ralegh) describes the sea as a pasture

On which faire *Cynthia* her heards doth feed:
Her heards be thousand fishes with their frie,
Which in the bosome of the billowes breed

and of which Triton and Proteus are the Shepherds,

More direct reference to this same passage is made in the sonnet 'The world is too much with us', where Wordsworth borrows from Spenser such details as Triton with his wreathed horn, Proteus, the 'pleasant lea,' the moon, and the bosom of the sea. Spenser makes the whole 'Shepherdess of the Ocean' passage (II, 196-289) a matter of humorous and self-conscious artifice, repeatedly seeking to emphasise the distance between the sea as it appears to the comically apprehensive landsman, Colin, and the controlled, assured contrivance of Ralegh's description of the maritime pasture. Colin cannot conceal his relief on regaining the shore, the fruitfulness and pleasance of which is contrasted at length with 'the sea's encroaching cruelty' (II, 265-89). Yet it is upon what Spenser calls this 'pleasant lea' that Wordsworth stands to make his observations of the sea in his sonnet, deliberately locating himself, so it seems, in that part of Spenser's poem in which we are most acutely conscious of the disparity between a hostile and threatening seascape and the imaginative but artificial description of it.

The theme of the sonnet is man's alienation from nature ('Little we see in Nature that is ours'), which is countered by

an attempt to see in nature a *human* truth. Poetically this is achieved by means of personification :

This sea that bares her bosom to the moon;
The winds that will be howling at all hours,
And are up-gathered now like sleeping flowers;
For this, for everything, we are out of tune.

The personifications that animate these lines, the intimate human gesture of the sea, and the participles *howling* and *sleeping*, foreshadow the desire to be 'a Pagan suckled in a creed outworn', for the pagan's direct experience of natural phenomena is expressed in such anthropomorphic gods as Triton and Proteus, both personifications of the sea. The sonnet treats these personifications, and Spenser's whole rendering up of wild nature to Cynthia's glory in an elaborate poetic conceit, as demonstrations of the power of the poetic imagination to illuminate, transform, and repossess nature and restore contact with lost values. But it also treats both Spenser and personification as potentially dangerous subjects from which the poet has to be distanced and protected even as he attempts to manipulate them for his own purposes.

The 'creed outworn', therefore, is at least as likely to be poetic as religious, and the tone and rhetorical manner of its invocation (the 'I'd rather be' made doubly conditional by the 'so might I') are indirect and equivocal. While it is clear what is happening to the 'us' of the poem (the monitory comparison with the pagan's uninterrupted humanised view of nature condemns our worldliness and 'savage torpor'), the attitudes of the 'I', the poet himself, to a crucial question about language and style remain complex and uncertain. The recent⁷ exponent of a new, plain poetic is obliquely toying with the possibilities of an old poetic manner from which he has publicly excluded himself.

Wordsworth's critical writings, because they are polemical rather than analytical, provide at best an uncertain gloss upon the issues raised by this sonnet and the other passages

mentioned here, but this very uncertainty is perhaps the most important quality that they underline. As is well known, the preface to *Lyrical Ballads* of 1800 declares personification to be irrelevant to the 'very language of men' and is abandoned as part of the price paid for his new sober practices, which have 'necessarily cut me off from a large portion of phrases and figures of speech which from father to son have been regarded as the common inheritance of poets'.⁸ This note of regret becomes in the revisions made in 1802 an attempt to extricate himself from over-rigorous commitments made in 1800 and re-establish some claim on figurative and elevated language. Personifications are now 'a figure of speech occasionally prompted by passion, and I have made use of them as such; but have endeavoured utterly to reject them as a mechanical device of style...' or as devices of elevation to 'raise poetry above prose'.⁹ A long additional passage, arguing that the necessary differences in diction between poetry and prose rest entirely upon the poet's 'selection of the language really spoken by men', opens the way to further justification of figurative language: '...if the Poet's subject be judiciously chosen, it will naturally, and upon fit occasion, lead him to passions the language of which, if selected truly and judiciously, must necessarily be dignified and variegated, and alive with metaphors and figures.' Wordsworth's over-insistence here, to the point of tautology, upon judiciousness and decorum indicates a man treading warily upon dangerous ground, and perhaps not surprisingly the anxiety it is designed to suppress surfaces in the next sentence: 'I forbear to speak of an incongruity which would shock the intelligent Reader, should the poet interweave any foreign splendour of his own with that which the passion naturally suggests...'¹⁰ The poet, we are told, 'considers man and nature as essentially adapted to each other, and the mind of man as naturally the mirror of the fairest and most interesting qualities of nature', but the critical discourse of the Preface is not equal to dealing with

the critical question of the linguistic and stylistic means to be employed in achieving and expressing this. That, in any case, is a major theme of the poetry.

These anxieties reach a climax with the distress felt by Wordsworth at his brother's death by drowning in February 1805. In 'Elegiac Stanzas .. Peele Castle', he describes how the blow of his brother's death altered his whole understanding of his task as a poet and of the working of the poetic imagination. It is also, incidentally, a poem based upon a comparison of seascapes. In contemplating a seascape by Sir George Beaumont, Wordsworth recalls a former inclination in himself to have painted such a scene with the addition, 'in the fond illusion of his heart', of

the gleam,
The light that never was on sea or land,
The consecration, and the Poet's dream. (II. 14-16).

But such imaginative exuberance is no longer possible :

I have submitted to a new control:
A power is gone, which nothing can restore;
A deep distress hath humanised my soul. (II. 34-36).

The final stanzas bid farewell to 'the heart that lives alone,/ Housed in a dream, at distance from kind' and welcome fortitude and a clear view 'of what is to be borne'. It is a blank vision of his artistic guilt.¹¹

The preface to 'The White Doe of Rylstone', written for the edition of 1815, recounts the same crisis but specifically as it affected his love of the poet Spenser. For Wordsworth and his wife, the charm of Spenser's romantic narrative has been disrupted by the 'lamentable change' of John's death:

Notes could we hear as of a faery shell
Attuned to words with sacred wisdom fraught;
Free Fancy prized each specious miracle,
And all its finer inspiration caught;
Till in the bosom of our rustic Cell,

We by a lamentable change were taught
That 'bliss with mortal Man may not abide':
How nearly joy and sorrow are allied!

For us the stream of fiction ceased to flow,
For us the voice of melody was mute. (II. 17-26)

The exile from Spenser is short-lived, however, and they emerge to find consolation in the story of Una's patient suffering. But the engagement with Spenser now seems to be of a different kind, and is linked with Wordsworth's own aims in writing 'The White Doe': a poetry in keeping with a mind humanised by deep distress. The final stanza of the preface comments upon his new perception of his own writing and of his beloved Spenser.

He serves the Muses erringly and ill,
Whose aim is pleasure light and fugitive:
O, that my mind were equal to fulfil
The comprehensive mandate which they give—
Vain aspiration of an earnest will!
Yet in this moral Strain a power may live,
Beloved Wife! such solace to impart
As it hath yielded to thy tender heart. (II. 57-64).

The Spenser upon whom 'The White Doe' is modelled is the 'sage and serious' poet admired by Milton, a poet of high moral purpose and elevating narrative: the 'specious miracle' of the romantic Spenser who dominates much eighteenth century Spenserian poetry and Wordsworth's own earliest work is suppressed.¹² The preface of 1815 confirms this in a way that throws interesting light upon the use of personification and anthropomorphism in 'The world is too much with us'. The scriptures and Milton are seen as the 'grand storehouse of enthusiastic and Meditative Imagination'; and although Wordsworth 'cannot forbear' to add Spenser, he implies some reservation, and a reluctant admission of Spenser's inferiority to Milton in this respect. These writers are selected 'in preference to those of ancient Greece and Rome,

because the anthropomorphism of the Pagan religion subjected the minds of the greatest poets in those countries too much to the bondage of definite form.' Milton is said to have a Hebrew abhorrence of such idolatry, but Spenser's allegorical personifications present a more difficult case: his 'allegorical spirit'

at one time inciting him to create persons out of abstractions; and, at another, by a superior effort of genius, to give the universality and permanence of abstractions to his human beings, by means of attributes and emblems that belong to the highest moral truths and the purest sensations—of which the character of Una is a glorious example.¹³

The consequence of the critical decision announced here is to close off for Wordsworth the stylistic possibilities that had been in effect the theme of the Spenserian passages in his work that I have been discussing. Perhaps inevitably, Milton is preferred before Spenser¹⁴: the tendency of Spenser's imagination to betray him into 'the bondage of definite form' is rejected for his more Miltonic aspects. The shift in emphasis from earlier discussions of imagination, language, and decorum is marked. Whereas in the preface to *Lyrical Ballads* Wordsworth had sought to reconcile his suspicion of artifice and 'poetic diction' with the knowledge that a language 'alive with metaphors and figures should be the natural language of passion, in 1815 he determines all in the perspective of religion and morality. The stern Protestant instincts that had no doubt been largely responsible for projecting Wordsworth into a search for a rigorous plainness of language now override all else, and the stylistic and epistemological questions that stimulate much of his best work are radically simplified, even abandoned. The pastoral Spenser, the poet of art and nature, is gone. In the Snowdon episode from the *Prelude*, the calenture passage from 'The Brothers', and the sonnet, Colin Clout standing on the 'pleasant lea' had irresistibly suggested to Wordsworth a type of poetry, indeed a type of poet, uniting art and nature, imagination and fact, language

and truth. But Wordsworth also saw how *Colin Clout's Come Home Again* deliberately exposes the precariousness of such an achievement, and came to share the devastating disappointment experienced by Colin on Mount Accidale¹⁵ at the transience and fragility of the poet's vision.

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Notes and References

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2. *The Prose Works of William Wordsworth*, ed. W. J. B. Owen and Jane Worthington Smyser (Oxford, 1974), II. 241. For Dorothy Wordsworth's original account in a letter of 21 October 1818, see *Ibid.*, pp. 367-8.
3. E.g. *inter alia*, 'Simon Lee' II. 61-72, 'The Idiot Boy' II. 312-46, 355, 450-51. 'Resolution and Independence' II. 50-56. References are to E. de Selincourt and Helen Darbishire (eds.) *Wordsworth's Poetical Works* V. vols. (Oxford 1950-).
4. See Z. S. Fink, *The Early Wordsworthian Milieu* (Oxford, 1958), pp. 40-41, 125-6n., *et passim*. See also C.P. Barbier, *William Gilpin: His Drawings, Teaching, and Theory of the Picturesque* (Oxford, 1963), esp. pp. 104-6, 140-42.
5. *The Minstrel* I. xxi. *cit* Wordsworth, Abrams, and Gill, *Op. cit.*, p. 460n. Fink, *Op. cit.*, pp. 45-8, 126n. discusses Wordsworth's admiration for Beattie's poem.
6. *The Castle of Indolence*, I. xxx, *cit.* Wordsworth, Abrams, and Gill, *Op. cit.*, p. 118n.
7. The sonnet was written in 1803-4.
8. *Prose Works*, I, 130-2.
9. *Prose Works*, I, 131.
10. *Prose Works*, I, 137.
11. See G. H. Hartman, *Wordsworth's Poetry 1787-1814*, (New Haven and London, 1971), pp. 283-88.
12. Milton 'Areopagitica', *John Milton's Complete Poems and Major Prose*, ed. J. M. Roberts, (London, 1952), pp. 11-12.

Prose ed. Merritt Y. Hughes (New York, 1957), pp. 728-9. Hartman, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 324-30, 333, and *passim* for a discussion of Wordsworth's relationship with Milton and Spenser. On assessments of Spenser in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see H. Cory, 'The Critics of Edmund Spenser', *University of California Publications in Modern Philology* II, no. 2 (June 1911), 81-182. Edward Dowden's essay on 'Spenser, The Poet and Teacher' in his *Transcripts and Studies* (2nd ed., London, 1896), 269-304, deals perceptively with Wordsworth's place in the conflict between the romantic and 'sage and serious' Spensers. On Wordsworth and eighteenth century Spenserianism and Romance, see A. Johnston, *Enchanted Ground* (London, 1964), p. 37 *et passim*.

13. *Prose Works*, III, 34-5. The language of poetry is dealt with in a similar mood in the second 'Essay upon Epitaphs', which insists on the discipline of 'bringing words rigorously to the test of thoughts; and then again to a comparison with things, their archetypes'. (*Prose Works*, II, 77).
14. De Selincourt and Darbishire note a possible collocation of Spenser and Milton (*Paradise Lost* III 604-5) in the penultimate line of 'The World is too much with us'.
15. *The Faerie Queene*, VI, x, 18.

Munir Ahmad

FROM CHINA TO PERU: THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHEY'S MYTHOLOGICAL POEMS

By the blessing of God, you will see my hippocriff touch at Hindostan, fly back to Scandinavia—and then carry me among the fire worshippers of Istakher: you will see him take a peep at the Jews, a flight to Japan and an excursion among the saints and martyrs of Catholicism.

—Southey

By the time of Southey's birth in 1774, eighteenth century society had considerably expanded through establishing its contact, largely literary, with the rest of the world. A huge mass of foreign materials on the literature, history mythology, customs and manners of different nations of the world had become a part and parcel of the English heritage. It was perhaps on the strength of this accumulated wealth of universal knowledge and learning that Dr. Johnson had earlier claimed:

Let observation with extensive view
Survey Mankind from China to Peru.¹

An eager curiosity in many readers and writers to know the outside world formed one of the main tendencies of the age. Southey also, being sensitive to the atmosphere, decided to begin his 'researches of mankind' by exhibiting the most remarkable forms of mythology from India to Peru and by making each of them the ground work of a narrative poem.²

Why he excluded China from his grand project, especially when Chinese culture had a distinct influence on English life then and he himself knew a good deal about China, I have not been able to account for. His interest in mythology sprang partly from his youthful reading and partly from his innate taste for magic, superstitions and fairy lore.

Southey's knowledge of the Orient, as is evident from his industrious collections published under *Orientalia* and *Ideas and Studies for Literary Compositions* in his *Common-Place Book*³, was quite extensive and he hardly seems to have left any book, giving useful information on the East, unread. I think a satisfactory bibliography of important oriental works published and translated up to his time could be easily drawn up from his reading list. It is not difficult to find Southey's sources of reading for he himself wrote that 'it has ever been a rule with me when I have imitated a passage or borrowed an expression to acknowledge the specific obligation'.⁴ He thought that knowledge and erudition were indispensable to epic-writing and that many writers before him—he excepted Milton, Homer and Glover—were deficient in learning. 'Homer is in deed all miracle, he knew everything, and Milton has ornamented with the whole range of knowledge a story which admitted the immediate display of none'.⁵ Impelled by the examples of these writers he set before him the task of acquiring a sound knowledge of his subjects for mythological epics and had started reading and collecting materials for them as early as 1792. Coleridge thought 'he was a jewel setter; whatever he read, he instantly applied to the formation or adorning of a story'.⁶

Among Southey's poems his oriental epics, *Thalaba the Destroyer* and *The Curse of Kehama* are generally considered to be the embodiment of his oriental learning and knowledge. It is true that in them oriental myths and legends have received proper poetic treatment for the first time by a notable

poet who knew no oriental language and who had never visited any Eastern country. But there are other poems and passages in his poetical work which are strongly tinged with oriental influences. I will discuss them here in relation to Southey's early reading and later literary contacts with some orientalists which jointly stimulated and developed his interest in the Orient.

Southey's early reading before he went to Westminster school in 1788 shows that he had acquired considerable information through stories and romances about the countries of the Middle East and was familiar with the contemporary political affairs of the East India Company. His father was a regular reader of *Felix Farley's Bristol Journal*⁷ that gave from time to time full reports of the Warren Hastings trial and the wars with Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultan,⁸ under the heading, *East India Intelligence*. Also Southey may have read with interest the following prologue to the *New Comedy of East India* written by George Colman which was printed in the July issue of 1782 :

When the East Indian gives our play a name
With what a glow the writer's breast should flame!

.....
Moguls and Nabobs should in judgment fit,
O'er 'crores' of humour, and a 'lak' of wit.
Methinks I hear some alderman, all hurry,
Cry, where is the 'Pellow'? bring me out the curry ?
Be quiet, says his lady; siience, man!
Where is the old China? Show me the Japan
Psha--cries a wit, the plot's an Indian Screen!
The muse should enter in a palanquin.

.....
.....
Her Indian host, or guest of this night's feast,
Is just imported, neat as from the East;

.....
Take him for what he is, humanely greet him,
And like a stranger, as you like him, treat him.⁹

But during his childhood his familiarity was closer to the Moslem world of the Middle East, its culture and civilization, than to the far Eastern countries. He had read almost all the Arabian and mock-Arabian tales when only nine or ten years old. His father's library consisted of a few books and magazines which included a complete set of *The Spectator*. Addison's *Vision of Mirza*¹⁰ and other oriental stories were popularly read in the eighteenth century and sometimes used as models for literary compositions. When Southey wrote his *Vision of the Maid of Orleans* he borrowed heavily from Addison.¹¹ Tasso's *Jerusalem Delivered* and Ariosto's *Orlando Furioso* in Hoole's translation which Southey perused and reperused for the sake of their stories brought an acquaintance with the Moors and the Arabs and possibly created a prejudice against them which he found difficult to shake off in his later life. It is interesting to note that the overthrow of the Moors in his last epic, *Roderick, the Last of the Goths*, was foreshadowed in his childhood when he had planned his first and the earliest epic on the theme of *Orlando Furioso*. 'Arcadia was to have been the title and the scene; and thither I meant to carry the Moors under Marcilius after their overthrow in France and there to have overthrown them again by a hero of my own name Alphonso'.

Hitherto it has not been pointed out that the first and the most important stimulus to Southey's imagination came from some prints in *The Christian's Magazine* which directed his attention towards mythologies of the world. At a later stage when he went to Westminster School Picart's *Ceremonies* simply developed and strengthened his childhood impressions. These prints were copied from Picart as Southey found out afterwards but nevertheless they establish the important fact that Southey's interest in mythologies and superstitions of different nations, and his unabating zeal to put an end to the atrocious systems of priestcraft in India and Mexico, began

when he was quite a child. The seed of spreading the truths of the Gospel among the heathens was probably sown at this time, and the aim of the magazine 'to awaken in the minds of their reader, sentiments of thankfulness for the blessedness of revealed religion was fully realized in Southey who held Christianity superior to all religions of the world. He wrote to Rev. John Martyn Longmire:

At a very early age, indeed, when I was a school boy, my imagination was strongly impressed by the mythological fables of different nations. I can trace this to the effect produced upon me when quite a child, by some prints in the *Christian Magazine*, copied, as I afterwards discovered from the great work of Picart.¹⁶

I have seen these prints in the *Christian's Magazine* now in the British Museum to which Southey refers in his letter. At least two of them seem to have inspired him to the composition of some lines in *Madoc* and *Kehama*. The August issue of 1760 includes an article, "On the Ceremonies of the Banians (in India) at the Birth of their Children and concerning the barbarous custom of exposing them". A detailed account of this horrid custom is described and the whole ceremony is represented for the reader's view upon a plate which contains three striking features, namely, (a) The mother offers to suckle the child (b) a sling on the tree with an abandoned child after it has refused the breast (c) A woman depicted in the act of throwing a child in the river. Southey came to know of this custom later on from the *Periodical Accounts of the Baptist Missionaries* but the original germ of these lines in *Kehama* was produced by this plate :

Others more hapless in their destiny
 Scarce having first inhaled their vital breath,
 Whose cradles from some tree
 Unnatural hands suspended
 Then left, till gentle Death,
 Coming like Sleep, their feeble moanings ended:

Innocent Souls! thus get so early free
 From sin and sorrow and mortality,
 Their spotless spirits all-creating Love
 Received into its universal breast.¹⁸

Similarly another print on the "Idols of Tobasco" (a province in Mexico) showing the horrid sacrifices of the natives who used to rip open the victim and tear out his heart, impressed his imagination and found its expression afterwards in *Madoc* :

Ye shall worship God alone,
 The One Eternal—That Beloved One
 Ye shall not serve with offer'd fruit, or smoke
 Of sacrificial fire, or blood, or life :
 Far other sacrifice he claims,... a soul
 Resigned, a will subdued, a heart made clean
 From all offence.²⁰

With this background of mythological knowledge Southey went to Westminster school where at the house of his friend Strachey he came across Picart's *Religious Ceremonies* and spent many truant hours delightfully over its pages. The boy whose favourite play was *Titus Andronicus* might have looked with great interest at those pages which contained illustrated designs of the ten incarnations of Vishnu and of Indian women casting themselves into the flames after their husband's death. The first book of *Kehama* is based on the latter scene. Picart widened his knowledge of the world and its inhabitants and Southey knew almost all the customs and religious rites of the whirling Dervishes and the penitent Brahmans, of the Laplanders and the Icelanders, of the Siamese and the Chinese, of the Brazilians and the Mexicans. His mind was crowded with the impressions of various countries and he wrote to his friend Charles Collins on 10 December 1791 about his plans for the vacation :

In my journeying down a train of ideas crowded into my mind about the holiday's task, and I fancy I shall succeed. First invoke winter, describe his seat amongst the Andes—Iceland—the Glaciers, Lapland, Siberia, the exiles there. Then paint the climate of India and the insufferable heat.²⁴

Gibbon and Voltaire further acquainted him with the history and traditions of the Moslem religion. Southey was an ardent admirer in his youth of Voltaire whose *Zadig*, *Mahomet*, and essays on Moslem fatalism must have added to his knowledge of Islam. *Thalaba* is mainly a story of Mohammedan fatalism.

There was an atmosphere even at the school of imitating and writing stories after an oriental fashion—a fashion introduced by Dr. Johnson's *Rasselas* and Goldsmith's *Citizen of the World*. *The Trifler*, a weekly paper edited by senior students of the school, often introduced stories in the Johnsonian manner. 'In the city of Bassora lived Zayder, the son of Alzorad...' ²⁵

Thus before Southey left school his design of exhibiting all the important and 'poetical forms' of mythologies was fully conceived with the aid of books.²⁶ But it is doubtful whether books alone could have proved effective for the execution of his magnificent project. If he had not visited Portugal, and come into contact with some influential personalities later in his life, his mythological epics, particularly the oriental ones, would have been poorer.

Southey's relations with Charles Fox, the Bristol orientalist has not been mentioned by any of his biographers. Haller writes about Southey: 'To be sure he knew no eastern language, he had never visited an eastern country, nor was he at all intimately acquainted with anyone who could supply these lacks',²⁷ although Southey was well known to Charles Fox and there are many evidences of his friendship with him in his correspondence. Southey was a frequent visitor to the Foxes at 5 James Place, Bristol, where he first met Dr. Adam Clarke, another orientalist, who derived much help from Fox while learning Persian. Fox was extremely hospitable to

young persons with a literary taste; 'his fireside and instructive conversation ever welcomed them. He encouraged them in all pursuits, directed their studies and relieved their necessities'.²⁹ It was at Fox's house that Southey examined his collection of Persian books and manuscripts and commented that 'I have seen illuminated manuscripts that must have been the toil of many years, every page painted, not with representation of life and manners, but usually like the curves and lines of a Turkey carpet'.³⁰ He also saw there an illuminated copy of Firdausi's Poems containing a picture of Simorg and was disappointed to see the ugly physiognomy of this bird³¹ whose legendary story he has interposed in *Thalaba*:

In Kaf the Simorg hath its dwelling place,
The all-knowing Bird of Ages, who hath seen
The world, with all its children, thrice destroyed,
 Long is the path,
And difficult the way, of danger full,
But the Unerring Bird
Could to a certain end
Direct thy Weary search.³²

Fox may have brought to his notice this couplet from Hafiz referring to the utter impossibility of finding the Simorg to which Southey alludes in his poem:³³

Do not expect faith from any one; if you do deceive yourself in searching
for the Simorg and the philosopher's stone.

(Hafiz)

I could not find this distich in any of the translations of Hafiz made by Jones, Nott, Champion or Hindley, well-known to Southey. Presumably it came from Fox.

When Southey was staying at Falmouth before his second journey to Portugal in 1800, he wrote to Cottle,

I have heard a good story of our friend, Charles Fox. When his house, at this place was on fire he found all effort to save it useless, and being a good draughtsman he went up the next hill to make a drawing of the fire! the best instance of philosophy I ever heard.³⁴

In his letters to Danvers from Portugal, he remembered Fox and his own promise to collect Persian manuscripts for him in Lisbon, 'Tell Charles Fox I might as well look for Persian manuscripts in Kamschatka as in Lisbon.'³⁵ Fox is also mentioned in Southey's *Espriella Letters* and some relics of his friend were preserved by him after his death. He possessed a drawing of the bridge at Almaraz over the Tagus made by Fox and his card as a bookseller.³⁶ Also Southey wrote to Caroline Bowles about Fox :

I knew him well and met Dr. Adam Clarke at his house. I have profiles of him, his wife and the parrot which used to take its place upon the tea board, make free with the sugar, and call him father.

Fox was also a personal friend of Joseph Cottle who published his book, *A Series of Poems Containing the Complaints, Consolations, and Delights of Achmed Ardebeili, A Persian Exile*, in 1797 and suffered great loss. Coleridge mentioned this to Southey, 'You are a strong swimmer and have borne up Joey with all his leaden weights about him, his own and other peoples'. Nothing has answered to him, but your works. By me he has lost somewhat—by Fox, Amos and himself very much.'³⁸

There are four insertions by Fox, in his hand, in the Joseph Cottle Album, now in the Wordsworth Collection at Cornell ;

No. 2829 (2 brief poems in Persian, written ? 1795), No. 2830 (*To Selims*; four 8-line stanzas, signed and dated 27 June 1796); No. 2831 (*On Luxury*; 8 lines, signed, ? 1796); No. 2832 ("Tho' you proud Khan with elephantine port"; 12 lines, signed and dated July 1796).³⁹

When Coleridge was staying for a few days at Racedown in June 1797, a copy of *Achmed* was sent to Wordsworth.⁴⁰ It is evident that Fox was a prominent member of the literary circle at Bristol in which the Lake Poets moved. Although his personality has been eclipsed by other Foxes of the time yet his influence can be traced not only on Southey but also in Davy's *Song of Pleasure*. Probably Coleridge's *Kubla Khan*

and many other oriental poems of the age received their inspiration from an oriental atmosphere in Bristol of which Fox was certainly the nucleus. *The Critical Review* could not identify 'Achmed Ardebeili' but rightly suspected 'the fancy's coinage in this affair and that he is, bonafide, the off-spring of a Bristol brain, instead of a province of Persia'.⁴¹

On various other matters concerning his epics Southeby also received instructions from 'William Taylor, the all knowing', and probably Manning and Major Scott Waring added to his oriental knowledge. His visit to Portugal was another blessing. Portugal's naval conquests and discoveries in the past had brought a world of information in the country from the far East and far West. It was perhaps Portugal's greatness in the past and her relationship with the rest of the world which inspired Southeby to undertake the *History of Portugal*. When he visited Lisbon in Nov. 1795 his uncle's library was well-stocked with books and manuscripts that were 'indeed a treasure to explore'. His acquaintance with Major Alexander Jardine, the British Consul,⁴² who had published some letters from Barbary, France, Spain and Portugal, was an advantage to him, and the story of Dom Daniel he perhaps came to know in Portugal from *La Suite Des Mille et un Nuits Contes Arabes* (translated into English as *Arabian Tales, or the Continuation of the Arabian Nights Entertainments*)⁴³ purporting to be translated from the Arabic by Dom Chavis (an Arab) and M. Cazotte. It appealed to Southeby's imagination and he decided to build upon it the structure of his Arabian epic, for immediately after his return to England he informed Bedford of his future literary plans which included his 'Oriental poem of the Destruction of the Dom Daniel',⁴⁴ Portugal thus contributed to the planning of *Thalaba* and during his second visit the poem itself was finished at Lisbon, where he also planned and began his Hindu epic, originally called *The Curse of Keradon* whose materials were first suggested by his *History of Portugal*.⁴⁵

His tour of Spain undertaken during his residence in Portugal acquainted him with the history, architecture and customs of the Moors. He visited the ruins of Moorish palaces and cities and his impressions are clearly traceable in *Joan of Arc* which Southey was then revising for publication :

But with what odours did their blossoms load
The passing gale of eve! Less thrilling sweets
Rose from the marble's perforated floor,
Where kneeling at her prayers, the Moorish Queen
Inhaled the cooled delight and whilst she asked
The Prophet for his promised paradise,
Shaped from the present bliss its utmost joys.⁴⁶

The *Lovers' Rock* written at Westbury is an elegy on the death and immortal love of Laila and Manuel who eloped from Granada and leapt from a rock after being discovered by her father :

No Moorish maid might hope to vie
With Laila's cheek or Laila's eye
No maiden loved with purer truth
Or ever loved a lovelier youth.⁴⁷

LaCaba, a monodrama, is founded upon a passage in the *Historia Vedadera del Rey Don Rodrigo*, which Miguel de Luna translated from the Arabic manuscript. LaCaba's speech in the poem embodies Southey's own hostile attitude to the Moors :

... Oh do not spread thy hands
To me! and put on that father's look!
Moor! turbaned misbeliever! renegade!
Circumcised traitor! Thou Count Illan, Thou!⁴⁸

Numerous references to the history and mythology of the Middle-East countries in Southey's early poems are indications of his wide reading of oriental books in preparation for his epic of Islam. Some eastern allusions have found expression in *Madoc* and *A Tale of Paraguay*. It is interesting to watch how his mind moved chronologically in this direction.

The Triumph of Woman written in 1793 is no doubt based on the third and fourth chapters of the first book of *Esdras*, but there are many passages in the poem which depict the situation and character in a truly oriental spirit. The feast proclaimed by the Persian monarch Darius is described with realistic touches:

And now the perfumed lamps stream their light
And social converse cheers the live long night.⁴⁹

The poem deals with the liberation of Jerusalem, which is attained not by war or bloodshed but through pleasing the characteristic whim and fancy of an oriental despot for whom the Persian saying goes: 'At times a bow invites their wrath. But often a robe is given for reproach.' A song in praise of 'resistless woman's charms' wins the monarch and Jerusalem is set free.

The *Joan of Arc*, begun in 1794, has some lengthy allusions to Arabian myths and legends which unnecessarily swell the bulk of the poem. Most of them are forced upon the narrative in the form of metaphors and similes contributing nothing to its merit. But they might be interpreted as having a bearing on Southey's early fascination with Moslem mythology. The fourth book of *Joan of Arc* contains a reference to the Angel of Death, Azrael and his dreadful mane:

So he said and frowned
Austere as he who at Mohammed's door
Knocked loud and frequent, at whose dreadful mane
Stricken with terror, all beholders fled.
Even the prophet almost terrified
Scarcely could bear his presence; for he knew
That this was the Death-Angel Azrael,
And that his hour was come.⁵⁰

Some historical facts about the heroism of Ali, the battles of Beder and Ohud, the legend of the invisible prophet 'Khizr', (Kheder) have found their way into the narratives.

because erudition was one of the principles of Southey's poetics :

For many a month, such ardor for the fight,
 Burnt in each bosom as young Ali felt,
 Then when Mohammad of the assembled tribe
 Asked who would be his vizier...
 Prophet of God, lo .. I will be the man
 And well did Ali merit that high post,
 Victorious upon Beder's fertile vale,
 And on Mount Ohud and before the walls
 Of Chaiber when down-cleaving to the chest
 His Giant foe, he grasped the massy gate
 Shook with strong arm and tore it from the fort,
 And lifted in the air, portentous shield.⁵¹

Conrade's coming through the camp with terror is compared with that of Kheder :

As when Chederles comes
 To aid the Moslem on his deathless horse,
 Swaying the sword with such resistless arm,
 Such mightiest force as he had newly quaffed--
 The hidden waters of eternal youth,
 Till with the copious draught of life and strength
 Inebriate, such, so fierce, so terrible,
 Came Conrade through the camp.⁵²

The Vision of the Maid of Orleans received its inspiration from Addison's *Vision of Mirza*. William Taylor called it worthy of Dante but Southey does not seem to have read Dante by then. He borrowed Boyd's translation of Dante from the Bristol library⁵³ long after he had composed his vision on the pattern of Addison.

Many parallels between the *Vision of Mirza* and *The Vision of the Maid of Orleans* can be traced. The Maid 'favoured of Heaven' is 'given to view the secret realms' of Heaven and so is Mirza. Aided by the Genius of the Rock, Mirza beholds a 'prodigious tide of water rolling through' a huge valley—the valley of Misery. The Maid, also, helped by an angel, sees

the 'lazar house' of the world. She descends into a cavern and reaches a 'stream rolling onward' in 'its perpetual course noiseless and undisturbed'. In both cases celestial music and songs are means of establishing communion with the heavenly spirits.

The Retrospect written in 1794 contains an allusion to the Arabs and the Turks :

Oh while well pleased the letter's traveller roams
Among old temples, palaces and domes
Strays with the Arab o'er the wreck of time
Where erst Palmyra's towers arose sublime,
Or marks the lazy Turk's lethargic pride.⁵⁴

Southey was an admirer of Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law, whose saying "The remembrance of youth is a sigh" serves as a motto to his poem *Remembrance* and forms the main theme of the lyric :

Life's vain delusions are gone by
It's idle hopes are o'er
Yet age remembers with a sigh
The days that are no more.⁵⁵

Even in the unfinished story of *Robin Hood* Southey wanted to introduce the character of Mothanna, an Arab, who was brought from the Holy Land by Robert's father and who had taught young Robert to like the Moslems and long for the liberties of the Bedouines.⁵⁶

Allusions to the Arabs and Arabian mythology occur again and again in Southey's poetry, but often, too, we come across Persian references. We find a collection of oriental maxims mainly Persian in his *Common-Place Book*⁵⁷ which were probably meant for his Persian romance, and in 1828 he imitated a prayer from the Persian:

Lord! who art merciful as well as just,
Incline thine ear to me, a child of dust!
Not what I Would, O Lord! I offer thee,
Alas! but what I can . . .

Accept my sacrifice and humble prayer,
 Four things which are not in thy treasury,
 I lay before thee, Lord, with this petition
 My nothingness, my wants,
 My sins, and my contrition.⁵⁸

Mr. W.C. Brown thinks that 'the fact that Southey although personally hostile to his materials was impelled to begin his series of poems by using a Near-East Mythology, clearly indicates the strength of English interest in this region and its ideology'.⁵⁹ Southey no doubt criticised the religion and literature of the Near-East but he was never hostile to its mythologies which formed the main bulk of his materials. On the contrary, he admired some of the Arabian traditions and considered them to be fine materials for noble poems.⁶⁰ Also when he planned his epics he did not have any idea of English interest in these regions. It was a juvenile ambition born partly out of his early reading that urged him to undertake his grand project of representing the mythologies of various nations in narrative poems.

A survey of Southey's original memoranda and letters written to friends fully reveals how far he endeavoured to realise the dreams of his childhood. His plan of representing the mythologies of the world in heroic poems was an ambitious one. He could complete only three (*Thalaba*, *Kehama* and *Madoc*—and the last of these is only semi-mythological); some were partly written, others only sketched in outline, while some remained entirely in embryo. It was Southey's practice to work on two or sometimes three projects at a time. When in the middle of writing a poem, he always kept in mind his next project and in most cases prepared at least the ground plan of his succeeding task. He wrote to Davy once, 'You may smile but by writing two poems at once I expect to save time, because I may write a book on one, while the story for a book of the other matures'.⁶¹

So when *Madoc* was in progress the *Dom Daniel* was also receiving his attention. He informed Bedford, 'I have done a great deal in the planning way since I have been in Herefordshire; you would, I think, be pleased with the skeleton of a long poem upon the *Destruction of Dom Daniel*, of which the outline is almost completed; when it will get farther I know not. I have much on my hands—my 'Kalander' will probably fill three volumes.'⁶² Cottle was also informed that the beginning, middle and end of his Arabian epic was ready in outline and that he had combined two stories; 'the tale of the Adite' and 'the Destruction of the Domdanyel' :

There is a tolerable skeleton formed. It will extend to ten or twelve books, and they appear to me to possess much strong conception in the Arabian manner... My intention is to show off all the splendour of the Mohammedan belief, I intend to do the same to the Runic and oriental systems; to preserve the costume of place as well as religion.⁶³

Thus *Madoc* was being written but Southey's mind was full of his future works, the Arabian, Persian and the Runic romances. Informing William Taylor of the progress with *Madoc* he wrote from Hereford: 'I have also another plan for an Arabian Poem of the wildest nature; the title—*The Destruction of the Dom Danyel*... It will have all the pomp of Mohammedan fable, relieved by scenes of Arabian life and these contrasted again by the voluptuousness of Persian scenery and manners'.⁶⁴ Taylor's reply was encouraging and he considered Southey's 'mythological imagination' aptly suited for such works : I am glad you are intending to build with the talisman of song a magic palace on the site of the Domdaniel of Carotte. It remained for you to assert a claim to a certain wildness of fancy—to what shall I call it?—to mythological imagination.⁶⁵ *Madoc* was finished on July 12, 1799 and *Dom Daniel*, now rechristened as *Thalaba, the Destroyer*, begun the next morning for Southey had all the preparations ready for it. During the progress of *Thalaba*, as

was his habit, Southey was working with Coleridge on his next project, the epic on Mohammed which was abandoned for many reasons afterwards, but his heart was set on the Persian Romance. He procured a copy of *Zend Avesta*, translated by Anquetil Du Perron, through John May. Within a week he read the whole book thoroughly and wrote to Taylor: I have now extracted the kernel of *Zend Avesta*. The outline of the mythology is fine and well adapted for poetry, because the system is comprehensible.⁶⁶ He read other works of Anquetil du Perron and made himself acquainted with the religious system of Zoroaster, 'a system more fit for poetry' according to Southey. The outline was distinct and completely different from the 'unconnected and unsystematizable fables of Hindoo absurdity'.⁶⁷

Thalaba was finished at Lisbon in July 1800 and the story of his Persian romance was completely drawn up for his next poem. He informed Davy:

I design a romance founded upon the creed of Zoroaster, the scene of course is Persia; the leading character one of the sons of a great king; persecuted by the evil powers, but every evil that they inflict develops in him some virtue which his situation had smothered.. A Greek slave is a prominent character, and the conclusion is, that the Persian prince is exalted into a citizen of Athens. Here is an opportunity of seasoning the dish to my taste—no farther has the story got'⁶⁸

His letter of July 23, 1800 from Cintra to W.W. Wynn clearly indicates that the Persian romance was to be written after *Thalaba*.⁶⁹ The story was communicated to Wynn as well, but it is more clearly sketched in Southey's *Common-Place Book*:

Zoroaster was a bad and bloody priest. Other personages their history offers not, for Cyrus is anterior to the system of Zend-Avesta. Thus then; A Persian satrap, persecuted by the powers of darkness. Every calamity that they inflict develops in him some virtue which prosperity had smothered, and they end in driving him to emigrate with a Greek slave, and becoming a citizen of Athens. Here then the whole mythology and the

whole hatefulness of oriental tyranny comes into the foreground. The Athenian slave who chooses his master for his pupil and son-in-law, may be as Jacobinical as heart could wish.

So far Southey was engaged upon the Persian story and the Hindoo and the Runic mythologies existed only in his mind. He had no immediate intention of presenting them in poems. The Persian fables he considered superior to the Hindoo for their distinctness of outline and he was favourably disposed towards them. The Persian poems now formed his next project. But there occurs a long interval from July 1800 to April 1801 in which we hear nothing of his mythological poems. His proposed *History of Portugal* certainly came in their way. And what seems more surprising is that when he wrote to Wynn again after this gap, the Persian romance had receded into the background, yielding its place to the Hindoo: 'The Hindoo romance, *The Curse of Keradon*,⁷¹ has matured into a very good and very extraordinary plan, which has become a favorite with me.⁷² He even started writing this poem in the following month, and wrote to Bedford, 'And have you received *Thalaba*? and would you like another story to the same tune?... I have fixed the ground plan of the Persian. The Hindoo is completely sketched. You can make little of its title, 'The Curse of Keradon'.⁷³

So in 1804 the new order of publishing and writing his mythological poems was arranged thus :

My dreams of future work are in this order. When Madoc is off my hands, to finish the Curse of Kehama, of which two books and a half are done, then to write a Persian romance, built on Zend-Avesta; than a runic one and perhaps one upon what Pinker calls-Schamanism, and lastly if I can find no better English hero, none to make the personages of an heroic poem, to write a romance in Honour of Robin Hood.

Southey only wanted four years of life to complete them all; he was allowed much more than that but still could not realise his dreams fully. Why he jumped from the Persian to the Hindoo romance has not been fully explained. But at

least two probable reasons can be offered for the change of plan.

It was in September 1799 that Southey had made up his mind to undertake, one great historical work, the *History of Portugal*. He was busy with *Thalaba*, Mohammed and the Persian romance, and other small periodical employments that tended to fritter away his time. He needed uninterrupted leisure, time wholly his own, to execute his plans. But in the early part of the year, 1800 before revisiting Portugal, he had already busied himself with the History and found that the materials on Indian relation with Portugal were too much for an episode and that they must be discussed in a separate volume.⁷⁵ Portugal's discovery of India and her settlements in the country formed an integral part of the *History* and Southey was led to acquire sufficient knowledge of India at this time. This provided an occasion not only to stimulate his interest in Indian affairs but also to collect materials for his distant Hindoo romance which gradually began to draw nearer and nearer till it completely superseded his execution of the Persian epic. Three quarto volumes were to comprise the *History* out of which one was to be entirely devoted to 'the great Indian Episode'. The plan was sketched, as he wrote to May, in February 1800, 'Here is a great plan; and the embryo skeletons of chapters on the religion and manners and literature of the country are now floating before me.'⁷⁶

When he reached Portugal in April 1800, *Thalaba* kept him busy until July but as soon as it was finished Southey's desk was full of materials for the *History* which he wanted to arrange and translate on his return to England. He laboured assiduously at preparing the material for his work throughout his stay in Portugal and so from July 1800 till April 1801 we seldom hear of his mythological projects. It was out of these materials, particularly on Indian matters, that the plan of Kehama was born and developed and matured. The Persian seed was sown no doubt but it was put by in favour of the

Hindoo romance. The Indian section of the *History* and the plans of *Kehama* were mutually feeding each other and it seems that they were both developing simultaneously. The MS of the *History of Portugal* is still untraceable but if it ever comes to be known it will surely throw more light on the genesis of *Kehama*.

In the meantime some friends of Southey suggested that he should try his fortune at an Indian law-court and this may have been another reason for Southey to give priority to his Hindoo poem. He ruled out the possibility of visiting India for various reasons but he was tempted by the suggestion for some time and might have foreseen an advantage in the writing of *Kehama*—perhaps that of promoting his popularity among the Hindoos. He wrote to May, 'I have been advised to think whether it be not advisable to try my fate at the East Indian bar—(for fortune)... I do long to become acquainted with old Brama and see the great Indian Fig-tree'.⁷⁷ He considered this plan not to be lightly and hastily rejected and informed Taylor: 'My constitution unhappily requires a warmer climate than England; of this my health here is convincing proof. Moreover Old Brama would be an interesting acquaintance'.⁷⁸ Thus *Madoc* was published and *Kehama* completed; the plan of the Persian was laid down though it did not get on further and we have some idea of the Runic story as well from his *Common-Place Book*: 'The conquests of Odin were suggested by Gibbon; but Odin must be the God, not the hero. The story must be wholly imaginary. The history of savages is never important enough to furnish an action for poetry'.⁷⁹

Besides these Southey had the intention of writing sketches characterising the manners and mythologies of some other nations. The Jews and the Scandinavians offered a rich field of civil and religious custom to him. He could find some system in the Celtic superstitions and wanted to embody 'the superstitions of the dark ages' in his unfinished epic on

Robin Hood.⁸⁰ Later on he was also contemplating a missionary poem on 'the times and country of Eliot, the apostle of the Nituencer Indians.'⁸¹

When he was planning his *Dom Daniel*, Taylor had thrown out a suggestion for an epic on Noah. Southey was half tempted and wrote to his wife that he had 'the deluge floating in his brain with the Dom Daniel and the rest of his family'.⁸² Another mythological poem, again suggested by Taylor, on *The Taking of Seringapatem* might have been under Southey's consideration. And yet another and more serious poem he was planning with the Persian romance, making 'the establishment of the Inquisition to serve as subject; St. Domini (more properly Domingo) the hero a man indulging the blackest feelings of malignity and cruelty, and believing them religious virtues'.⁸³ All these poems remained in his mind and could not see the light of the day but they give some conception of the greatness and magnitude of Southey's projects.

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Manju Jaidka

FUSING CONTRARIES: A NOTE ON ROBERT LOWELL

If *The Waste Land* by T. S. Eliot is a watershed in literary history, Robert Lowell's *Life Studies*, too, is a significant landmark. Lowell has been hailed as a liberator, opening new vistas for the growth of poetic history. His contribution has been acknowledged by his own contemporaries : 'I've been very excited by what I feel is the new breakthrough that came with, say, Robert Lowell's *Life Studies*, this intense breakthrough into very serious, very personal experience which I feel has been partly taboo . . .', said Sylvia Plath in a British Council interview.¹ *Life Studies* is Lowell's fifth book. His earlier volumes, *Land of Unlikeness* (1944), *Lord Weary's Castle* (1946), *Poems 1938-49* (1950), and *The Mills of the Kavanaughs* (1951), are written in what could be called the traditional style of Eliot and Auden. They focus attention on the chaos of the external world. After a silence of eight years *Life Studies* (1959) shifts its focus from the outer to the inner world—the world within the self. The subject matter, thus, undergoes a significant change.

One may begin by looking at a poem each from *Lord Weary's Castle* and *The Mills of the Kavanaughs*. 'The Dead in Europe' from the former volume begins thus :

After the planes unloaded, we fell down
Buried together, unmarried men and women . . .

The scene, obviously, is the war-torn Europe and the dead are the victims of the war. The impression of things falling apart,

civilisations breaking up, world disintegrating, is reinforced by the poet's use of words like 'unloaded,' *unmarried*, 'fell down' and 'buried'. Variations on these words echo through the poem. Images of violence—'crown of thorns', 'grilled and spindle spires', 'jellied fire', rubble, bones and bodies—are strung together, symbolic of the anarchy of the world. A note of desperation is seen in the refrain : 'Our sacred earth in our day was our curse'. The 'was' changes in the last line of the poem: 'Our sacred earth in our day *is* our curse' (stress added), implying that we who are living are like 'the dead in Europe'. The subject is not 'I' but 'we'—not the individual alone with his thoughts but the entire human race.

The second poem, the little poem of *The Mills of the Kavannahs*, has as its epigraph the well-known lines from 'Dover Beach': 'Ah, love let us be true/To one another! . . .' We are told that the late Harry Kavannah was 'a naval officer who was retired after Pearl Harbour'. Once again the context is clear and the violence of the world is insinuated (with the reference to Pearl Harbour). Lowell creates fictitious characters, Harry and Anne Kavannah, but his intention is not merely to tell a story. The paragraph preceding the poem tells us of Anne in her garden pretending to play solitaire with her Bible. In one corner of the same garden is the grave of her husband. The main ingredients of the picture are:—(i) Anne playing solitaire; (ii) the Bible; (iii) the grave, that is, Life, Religion and Death, the three major concerns of the poet. We are further told that the house of the Kavannahs 'is on a *hill*, and at its foot, there is a mill *pond*, and by it a marble statue of Persephone, the *goddess* who became the queen of *the dead*' (stresses added). The contraries may be noted—'hill' and 'pond', 'the goddess' and 'the dead'. Again, they bespeak Lowell's concern: Life (the hill, the abode of the Kavannahs), Death (the pond and 'the dead'), and Religion (the goddess). These themes are woven into a fictitious whole but kept at a distance. The crisis of civilisation is not yet felt on the personal level; it is not yet internalized.

The structure of the poems of *Lord Weary's Castle* should also be noted. As Richard Fein points out, the poems are beautiful 'museum pieces', 'all those poems so formally propped up, chiseled, and gilded, sometimes entwined in rhyme and containing all that heavy molded history'.² Probably Lowell's attempt, through the structure of the poems, is to 'withstand present despair'. Through his technique he hoped 'that doom would be both comprehended and propitiated'.³ He tries to impose an order on the disorder of the world. In his later poetry, however, as the chaos is internalized, the structures loosen, the verse becomes free, the language more conversational. Whereas in the earlier poetry the poet tended to lapse into rhetoric, now he appears to think aloud, musingly, unabashedly. In '91 Revere Street' all external trappings are dropped and we have a personal, autobiographical prose piece. The poet assumes the role of a man talking to another —to the reader.

Apparently Robert Lowell realised that the style of the earlier poems had outlived its appeal. By the time he came to writing the poems of *Life Studies*, it seemed, as he put it,

distant, symbol-ridden and wilfully difficult . . . I felt my old poems hid what they were really about, and many times offered a stiff, humorless and even impenetrable surface . . . My own poems seemed like prehistoric monsters dragged down into the bog and death by their ponderous armor.⁴

The style and the subject-matter undergo a change after 1959. No longer is Lowell merely concerned with the violence of the war; he also speaks of violence that is emotional or psychological. Sometimes it is implied or incipient violence, ready to break out at the slightest provocation—the theme, for instance, of mental illness that runs through his work after *Life Studies*. The mind gone awry is merely a metaphor for a disturbed world. The 'dead of Europe', the rubble, the bones, fires and spires are now located within the mind. Lowell tells us of his stay at McLean's Asylum, the house for the

'mentally ill' where his shattered self was reconstruc'ed. In 'Home After Three Months Away,' the subject is again his return from the asylum. The self, after a nervous brakdown, may be equated with the world bruised and torn after the war. In both cases, return to complete normalcy is not possible. 'Is Richard now himself again?' voices the question whether or not the clock can be set back at normalcy again. The answer follows: 'Cured, I am frizzled, stale and small.' There is a sensation of emotional numbness, of having 'frizzled' just the way the world has frizzled in the aftermath of the war. It is under the pressures of the outer world that the inner gives way.

Christopher Ricks tells us that in the work of Lowell we find different kinds of violence: national violence (war), domestic (nagging, infidelity, divorce, murder), and personal or psychic violence (madness, suicide).⁵ This is Lowell's criticism of his age. One cannot wish away all the evils of the world but, by acknowledging their existence, it is possible to be wary of them. Physical violence is related to psychic violence. As Robert Philips points out, the psychic wounds of the poet are given physical manifestations in poems that deal with physical injuries and discomforts.⁶ 'Eye and Tooth' (*For the Union Dead*) speaks of a cut cornea in a manner that is also adopted by Sylvia Plath:

My whole eye was sunset red,
the old cut cornea throbbed;
I saw things darkly...

Blurred vision, seeing things darkly, is the subject of more than one poem in this volume. In 'The Drinker,' the 'drinker' '... looks for neighbours, their names blur in the window,/his distracted eye sees only glass sky.' And in 'Myopia: A Night' are 'the blurred titles', the 'familiar faces blur'. This emphasis on the inability to see recalls the quotation from 'Dover Beach' that forms the epigraph to 'The Mills of the Kavanaughs'. The idea, not spelt out but implicit

is that we are 'as on a darkling plain . . . where ignorant armies clash by night.' Whereas Arnold uses 'darkling' metaphorically, in Lowell the darkness is both, figurative and literal. Literally, as we have seen in the above examples, it involves a physical disability, an impaired vision. Figuratively, the darkness and the blurring become expressive of the age which inspires in the poet a mood of despair sounded in lines such as—'I am tired. Everyone's tired of my turmoil.' Or, with greater desperation in 'Fall 1961' (*For the Union Dead*):

We are like a lot of wild
spiders crying together,
but without tears.

This sense of world-weariness is the outcome of a feeling of futility and aimlessness. Lowell feels that 'there is no utility or inspiration/in the wind smashing without direction.' A 'glass sky' looks down at man indifferently and his despair has 'the galvanised color/of the mop and water in the galvanised bucket.'⁷

The same idea is repeated in the later volumes, 'In the Ward' (*Day by Day*) tells us—

Nothing you can see now
can mean anything;
your will is fixed on the light bulb,
its blinding impassivity
withholding disquiet . . .
Somewhere your spirit
led the highest life;
all places matched
with that place
come to nothing.

The repetition of 'nothing' in the first and the last lines is significant. In this passage, the sight ('nothing you can see'), the will and the spirit are rendered ineffectual in combating the horrors of life. These horrors—emotional turned into physical—have their roots in the upheavals of international

politics, in Mussolini the Duce, the mad negro confined at Munich, Pius XII, Marie de Medici, Eisenhower, Abraham Lincoln, the Red Revolution, the crash and the Depression—all of which figure in Lowell's poems.

The erosion of authority—the authority of the older poets, of the old law, of Calvinism, of God the father—is symbolised by the loss of the father in Lowell's work ('Terminal Days at Beverly Farms,' *Life Studies*). Religion, too, is no stay against the chaos that the poet experiences. As early as 1959, Lowell had announced his decision to abandon God—'I left the city of God where it belongs' ('Beyond the Alps', *Life Studies*). Apparently, Lowell *knows* where the city of God belongs—its geographical location, where 'the skirt-mad Mussolini unfurled the eagle of Caesar'. What remains an unanswered question is—where does the poet himself belong? Obviously he does not belong to the city of God or he would not have left it. His task, therefore, is to find his bearings in a Godless world.

Is there no way to cast my hook
out of this dynamited brook?

he says in 'The Drunken Fisherman' (*Land of Unlikeness*). He is seeking not the ability to master the situation but an escape—a way '*out of* this dynamited brook'. The tension in these two lines, with contradictory urges, may be noted. 'Hook' has parasitic connotations—to cling, to fasten. But the 'hooking' act, paradoxically, may bring a release by showing a way *out of* the chaos (the dynamited brook). The tension is maintained between the hooking, the casting and the searching for a way out. Such a tension, which sums up the very nature of our lives, is to be found throughout Lowell's poetry.

Thus we have a fusion of contraries in Lowell's work: the feeling of being trapped in what Yeats would call 'the frog-spawn of a blind man's ditch', and the desire to get out of it. The will to escape is not a consistent one. Randall Jarrell points out that Lowell wavers between the 'stasis and inertia

of the stubborn self' and the willingness to grow and change.⁸ George Lensing, however, feels that there is a consistency of outrage and personal torment throughout the volumes.⁹ The truth is that Lowell's protest is by no means consistent: its modulation and frequency keep changing. If, in *For the Union Dead* the protest is the loudest, in *Day by Day* it is considerably subdued because Lowell, realising the futility of a struggle against a powerful, directionless wind, finally reconciles himself to it. I do not mean to suggest that he acknowledges defeat: he merely turns his attention elsewhere. Seeking a way out of the 'dynamited brook', he first foregoes religion; then he turns towards life and finds it full of violence. Next he muses on death—the deaths of the loved ones—and wonders if death would be the answer to his needs:

...I often sigh still
for the dark downward and vegetating kingdom
of the fish and reptile.
('For the Union Dead')

The three motifs presented in 'The Mills of the Kavanaughs' are explored and then Lowell turns to look down the annals of history. Perhaps there he may find the object of his search—that is, some values to be cherished in a distorted world.

In *History*, Robert Lowell moves from the present into the past. He begins at the very beginning with Biblical times, and comes down gradually to the present. Important personages from history—Alexander, the two Marcus Catos, Cicero, Attila, Hitler, Mohammed, Richard II, Marlowe, Mary Stuart, Rembrandt, Robespierre, Beethoven, Coleridge, Abraham Lincoln, and others—are brought back to life briefly in all their power and glory, in poems of fourteen lines (I would not call them sonnets because apart from their fourteen-line structure they have no other resemblance to this form). It is almost as though the poet were resurrecting these characters and reliving their magnificence in order to contrast it with the sordidness of today's world—the world described in *Life*

Studies. However, the scrutiny of the past appears to be disappointing, for

History has to live with what was here,
 Clutching and close to fumbling all we had—
 it is so dull and gruesome how we die,
 unlike writing, life never finishes.

(‘History’)

If death in the contemporary world seems violent and uncalled for, history appears to be a single, prolonged form of death (—or suicide, if you will). If there is violence in the world today, historical times were by no means free of it. Abel was killed by his brother; Cato ‘bloodied his hand on the slave who hid his sword’ and ‘when they tried to put/his bowels back, he tore them’; Pound’s *Cantos* were visualised ‘lost in the rockslide of history’. Marlowe ‘died swearing, stabbed with friends.../was it the bar check?’ (cynicism of the query to be noted); and Napolean and his men were all ‘gone like the smoke of his own artillery’. Lowell takes up different spheres of human activity—history, politics, art, literature and religion—to show that nowhere can we find a ‘still centre’. The past has always been as violent and unpredictable as the present.

In a way, by drawing parallels between the past and the present, Lowell is carrying on the tradition of T.S. Eliot who finds Jerusalem, Athens, Alexandria, all places, all times, all power structures collapsing. Lowell, as Donald Sheehan says, is ‘our link to the now nearly mythic father of contemporary poetry, T. S. Eliot. By virtue of an analogy which both have struck between private neurosis and cultural crack up, Eliot and Lowell have both written poems which are at once aesthetic objects and social commentaries.’ There are, no doubt, important differences, but the basic concern remains the same: both explore the link between the outer and the inner waste land.

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Priya Lakshmi Gupta

THE DRAMATIC ELEMENT IN HARDY'S FICTION

That Hardy's genius was in many ways essentially poetic has been widely recognized. What has not been sufficiently realized is that Hardy had considerable dramatic talent which manifests itself time and again in his novels and short stories. Marguerite Roberts has suggested that 'Hardy's gifts were essentially dramatic' and that Hardy's fiction contains elements readily adaptable to stage presentation.¹ Alexander Fischler, who has studied Hardy's use of the dramatic techniques in his short stories, remarks :

It is difficult to read Hardy's short stories without being aware of an element of theatricality in the setting, in the positioning of characters, and in the use of 'things' almost as stage properties to further plot development. To a large extent this may be due to convention, to the period style; but with Hardy the use of stage device goes also beyond mere convention : it becomes an important technique for the realization of his basic theories about fiction.²

One may add that it is not only in his short stories but also in his novels that Hardy's dramatic talent is demonstrated. Broadly speaking, the form of Hardy's novels is best seen in terms of dramatic categories like tragedy, tragi-comedy, and comedy. In form, structure, and characterization Hardy's major novels have the essential features of classical and Shakespearean tragedy, while some other novels can be classified as tragi-comedies and comedies. However, in addition to being essentially dramatic in form and structure, Hardy's novels contain dramatic elements and devices which enhance

the artistic richness of the novels. Among these devices the most salient are theatrical settings, foreshadowing, dramatic irony and soliloquy.

Like the director of a play or a film, Hardy knew the importance of 'composing' the stage and setting his characters on it at the appropriate moment. As Fischler remarks, 'He opened a number of short stories with the presentation of a prepared and waiting stage, or with what in effect is a theatrical tableau used for establishing mood or atmosphere'.³ In *The Woodlanders* Hardy carefully prepares the stage before Barber Percomb arrives. Hardy gives details of the road and sets the atmosphere of 'solitude' and 'a tomb-like stillness' of the 'deserted highway' before Percomb appears on the scene:

At this spot, on the louring evening of a bygone winter's day, there stood a man who had thus indirectly entered upon the scene from a stile hard by, and was temporarily influenced by some such feeling of being suddenly more alone than before he had emerged upon the highway.⁴

In *Tess* also the stage is set with meticulous care. The appearance of John Durbeyfied walking homeward is carefully described as in a stage direction so that the reader may visualize him as carefully as if he had seen him on the stage.⁵ The highly theatrical opening of *The Mayor of Casterbridge* is justly celebrated. The action begins on an evening of late summer when 'A young man and woman, the latter carrying a child' appear on the scene. Again, the details of their appearance and mutual relationship are described with scrupulous care, thus preparing the reader for the drama to unfold.⁶

In the short stories also, the setting tends to have unmistakable stage properties. As Fischler remarks, 'The setting described becomes a stage, and Hardy asks the reader to be an audience to whom he can present characters and backgrounds with the formality of a program, prologue, or first act.'⁷ In the introduction to 'A Few Crusted Characters' Hardy goes so far as to give what seem to be specific stage directions:

It is a Saturday afternoon of a blue and yellow autumn time, and the scene is the High Street of a well-known market-town. A large carrier's van stands in quadrangular forecourt of the White-Hart Inn, upon the sides of its spacious tilt being painted in weatherbeaten letters: 'Burthen, Carrier to Longpuddle.'

Then the characters arrive one after the other, enter the van, and build a play within a play, using characters from their own narratives. David Lodge, who rightly describes Hardy as a 'cinematic novelist,' says :

Hardy uses verbal description as a film director uses the lens of his camera—to select, highlight, distort and enhance, creating a visualized world that is both recognisably 'real' and yet more vivid, intense and dramatically charged than our ordinary perception of the real world. The methods he uses can be readily analysed in cinematic terms : long shot, close-up, wide-angle, telephoto, zoom, etc.⁸

In many of his works Hardy uses the setting for the purpose of foreshadowing. In stories like 'The Three Strangers' and 'What the Shepherd Saw, the grandiose stage setting foreshadows the action. The classic example of the use of setting to foreshadow action is the opening description of Egdon Heath in *The Return of the Native*, where the sombre, brooding atmosphere evoked prepares the reader for the tragic events to come.

It is not only through the setting but also through dialogue and narrative comment that Hardy foreshadows action and prepares the reader emotionally for the events to come. Thus in *Desperate Remedies* the dark forebodings in Cytherea Graye's mind about Miss Aldclyffe, the 'reckless adventuring' of whose youth seemed to Cytherea 'connected with deeds of darkness rather than of light,' prove true at the end. Later in the same novel the narrator's comment on Owen's mental state makes the reader entertain misgivings about Cytherea's marriage with Mr. Manston. When old Mr. Springrove tells Owen that he has heard of something very serious concerning somebody who lives in the parish, the narrator remarks: 'It

seems singular enough, even to minds who have no dim beliefs in adumbration and presentiment, that at that moment not the shadow of a thought crossed Owen's mind that the some body whom the matter concerned might be himself, or any belonging to him."¹⁰ As it turns out, Mr. Manston was already married. Similarly, in *Two on a Tower* the conversation between Swithin St. Cleeve and Lady Constantine foreshadows their future loss of happiness :

'I can tell you in a moment, but I must begin at the beginning. All this ruinous idleness and distraction is caused by the misery of our not being able to meet with freedom. The fear that somebody may snatch you from me keeps me in a state of perpetual apprehension.'

'It is too true also of me! I dread that some accident may happen, and waste my days in meeting the trouble half-way.'

This conversation prepares the reader for dark events which subsequently occur to mar the happiness of the lovers. In *Tess*, immediately after Tess and Clare are married, Tess suffers from an unnatural sense of oppression, and Angel mentions to her the well-known superstition of the country about the d'Urberville Coach:

'Well—I would rather not tell it in detail just now. A certain d'Urberville of the sixteenth or seventeenth century committed a dreadful crime in his family coach; and since that time members of the family see or hear the old coach whenever—But I'll tell you another day—it is rather gloomy.'

The catastrophic events which overtake Angel and Tess and ruin their lives fully justify, and are foreshadowed by Tess's misgivings. It is Alec who finally tells Tess about the legend, and the legend proves true when Tess murders him. The complications which arise because of Tess's entanglement with Alec, who is now turned an Evangelist, are foreshadowed in the narrative comment that although 'The inferior man was quiet' in Alec now, 'it was surely not extracted, nor even entirely subdued,' and in Alec's own remark that 'women's

faces have had too much power over me already for me not to fear them!' ¹³

In *Jude the Obscure* Jude asks Sue to meet him at the Cross which marked the spot of the Martyrdoms. Sue's remark to Jude that 'the place you chose was so horrid—I suppose I ought not to say horrid,—I mean gloomy and inauspicious in its associations'¹⁴ foreshadows their future relationship which is always unhappy or on the verge of unhappiness. Later, at the time of Sue's marriage to Phillotson, Sue's nervous behaviour and the narrator's remark about her 'colossal inconsistency'¹⁵ prepare the reader for the subsequent unstable and immature conduct.

Through his use of foreshadowing Hardy is able to create suspense which, as F.L. Lucas remarks, is a more effective and powerful weapon than surprise.¹⁶ Like Shakespeare, Hardy gives us not surprise but expectation. The hints and premonition about the dark events to come create in Hardy's fiction a tense, overcharged atmosphere which contributes greatly to the effectiveness of the novels.

Closely allied to the use of foreshadowing in Hardy's novels is the use of the dramatic irony which not only governs the plot but also throws oblique light on the characters. There are several occasions in the novels when, in a particular statement or speech, the reader is made to see an ironic meaning of which the speaker himself may be wholly unconscious. Examples of dramatic irony are to be found in Hardy's minor as well as major novels. In *The Hand of Ethelberta*, early in the novel, Ethelberta asks her younger sister Picotée if she has got a lover. Picotée replies that she has but does not disclose the lover's name, and in turn asks Ethelberta if she also has a lover. Ethelberta replies that she does and continues :

'I am afraid he's only a commoner as yet, and not a very great one either. But surely you guess, Picotée? But I'll set you an example of frankness by telling his name. My friend Mr. Julian, to whom you posted the book. . . . What is the matter?'

'Only a pain!'

'My dear Picottee—'

'I think I'll sit down for a moment, Berta.'¹⁷

Picottee's discomfiture is caused by the fact that Mr. Julian is the person she herself loves, a fact which the reader knows but of which Ethelberta herself is not aware. In *Two on a Tower* Louis Glanville tries to persuade his sister Lady Constantine to marry the Bishop of Melchester by telling her that she is 'getting on to be a middle-aged woman'¹⁸ in whom young men are not likely to be interested. He also implies that a woman should not marry a man younger than herself. What Louis Glanville does not realize, but the reader does, is that his sister is already secretly married, and that to a man younger than herself. At the end of the novel, another example of dramatic irony occurs when Mr. Torkingham informs Swithin that Lady Constantine has a child;¹⁹ he does not realize, but again the reader does, that it is Swithin's own child that he is talking about.

In *Far From the Madding Crowd* Pennyways writes a note informing Bathsheba that her husband Sergeant Troy is alive. Bathsheba refuses to read the note and comments that it is likely to be about 'some little scandal or another connected with my work-people'.²⁰ The reader, however, knows that the subject of the note is not 'some little scandal' but concerns Bathsheba's own deepest interests and concerns. In *The Mayor of Casterbridge*, when Lucetta refuses to meet Henchard, Henchard indirectly tells his own story to Farfrae without realizing that Lucetta's coldness is due to nothing else than her interest in Farfrae, who himself is unaware of Lucetta's relations with Henchard. The conversation which ensues is fraught with dramatic irony :

'Do you remember,' said Henchard, as if it were the presence of the thought and not of the man which made him speak, 'do you remember my story of that second woman—who suffered for her thoughtless intimacy with me?'

'I do,' said Farfrae.

'Do you remember my telling 'ee how it all began and how it ended?'

'Yes.'

'Well, I have offered to marry her now that I can; but she won't marry me. Now what would you think of her—if put it to you?'

'Well ye owe her nothing more now,' said Farfrae heartily.

Later in the novel, when Jopp delivers to Lucetta the letters written to Henchard in the past, she reduces them to ashes and 'is inclined to fall down on her knees in thankfulness that at last no evidence remained of the unlucky episode with Henchard in her past'.²² The irony, however, is that already the whole Casterbridge knows about the affair. Towards the end of the novel, Elizabeth-Jane tries to dissuade Henchard from going away, not knowing that it is Henchard who has just driven away her real father Newson, telling him that she had died.

An excellent example of dramatic irony is to be seen in *Tess* when Angel tells his mother about the girl he has married (and whom, although his mother does not know it, he has already deserted) :

'Cannot you describe her? I am sure she is very pretty, Angel.'

'Of that there can be no question!' he said, with a zest which covered its bitterness,

'And that she is pure and virtuous goes without question?'

'Pure and virtuous, of course, she is.' . . .

'You were her first love?'

'Of course'.²³

Earlier in the novel, when Angel relates to Tess the story of 'a lax young cynic' with whom his father had had an unpleasant scene, he does not realize that this very person had ill-used Tess and will be the source of great future unhappiness in both their lives.²⁴

One may also mention at this point Hardy's highly skilful use of the dramatic soliloquy in his novels. The soliloquy gives us insight into the innermost recesses of the character's

mind, into his conscious and subconscious motives and feelings. Examples of soliloquy are to be found in Hardy's minor as well as major novels. In *Desperate Remedies* Hardy takes the reader into the inner emotional world of Cytherea Graye as she expresses in a soliloquy her romantic fancies about the unknown prospective man in her future life :

She whispered idly, 'I wonder who and what he will be?

'If he's a gentleman of fashion, he will take my finger so, . . . and with some fluttering of the heart, . . . slip the ring so lightly on that I shall hardly know that it is there . . .

'If he's a bold dashing soldier, I expect he will proudly turn round, take the ring as if it equalled her Majesty's crown in value, and desperately set it on my finger thus. . . .

'If he's a sailor, he will take my finger and the ring in this way, and deck it out with a housewifely touch and a tenderness of expression about his mouth, as sailors do . . .

'If he should be rather a poor man—noble-minded and affectionate, but still poor. . . .'

This soliloquy indicates that Cytherea is a romantic and sentimental girl, quite unlike the cold and calculating Miss Aldclyffe. Later in the novel, when Manston realizes that the man whom he took to be Cytherea's lover and of whom he was intensely jealous is in fact her brother, he castigates himself for his folly in a soliloquy :

'That I should be such a fool—such an utter fool. Good God! to allow a girl to influence me like this, day after day, till I am jealous of her very brother. A lady's dependent, a waif, a helpless thing entirely at the mercy of the world; yes, curse it; that is just why it is; that fact of her being so helpless against the blows of circumstances which renders her so deliciously sweet!'²⁶

When Manston recalls Miss Aldclyffe's remark that Cytherea was in love with Edward Springrove, his perturbed mind finds an outlet in a soliloquy : "'How I am harrassed : 'he said aloud, after deep thought for half an-hour, while still continuing his walk with the greatest vehemence. "How I am

harrassed by these emotions of mine": He calmed himself by an effort. "Well, duty after all it shall be, as nearly as I can effect it"²⁷

It is usually in moments of intense emotion or distress that Hardy's characters express their feelings in a soliloquy. When in *The Return of the Native* Eustacia, frustrated in her married life with Clym, resolves to conceal her sorrow, she exclaims: "'But I'll shake it off. Yes, I *will* shake it off! No one shall know my suffering. I'll be bitterly merry, and ironically gay, and I'll laugh in derision! And I'll begin by going to this dance on the green'".²⁸ Later in the novel, when Clym bitterly but unjustly scolds Eustacia for not opening the door to her mother, she thus soliloquizes: "'How I have tried and tried to be a splendid woman, and how destiny has been against me! ..I do not deserve my lot!' she cried in a frenzy of bitter revolt. "O, the cruelty of putting me into this ill-conceived world! I was capable of much; but I have been injured and blighted and crushed by things beyond my control! O, how hard it is of Heaven to devise such tortures for me, who have done no harm to Heaven at all"!²⁹ The narrator interestingly adds a comment on this soliloquy: 'When a woman in such a situation, neither old, deaf, crazed, nor whimsical, takes upon herself to sob and soliloquize aloud there is something grievous the matter'.³⁰

In *The Mayor of Casterbridge* the reckless and impetuous Henchard often expresses his annoyance and distress through a soliloquy. After selling his wife, he extenuates his conduct in a soliloquy: "'Yet she knows I am not in my senses when I do that'! he roared out. "She wasn't queer if I was. 'Tis like Susan to show such idiotic simplicity. Meek—that meekness has done me more harm than the bitterest temper!"³¹ Later, when he learns that the young Farfae is going to be the Mayor, he expresses his annoyance in a soliloquy: "'A fellow of his age going to be Mayor, indeed! "he murmured with a corner-drawn smile on his mouth. "But 'tis her money

that floats on upward. Ha-ha-how cust odd it is! Here be I, his former master, working for him as man, and he the man standing as master, with my house and my furniture and my what-you-may-call wife all his own".³² Towards the end, when he thinks of what he considers the perfidious behaviour of Farfrae and Lucetta Templeman, he brokenly expresses his feelings in another soliloquy.³³

From the above examples it can be clearly seen that the use of soliloquy is an important part of Hardy's technique in his fiction and gives his characters a depth, complexity, and dramatic immediacy they would not otherwise have possessed. For the most part Hardy's soliloquies are self-analytical in nature and bring out the thought processes and the deepest subconscious ponderings of the characters involved.

Another dramatic device that one encounters in Hardy's novels is the use of chorus characters. Like Greek and Elizabethan drama, Hardy's novels have chorus characters whose main function is to convey important information and to comment on the passing events but who also serve the additional function of providing comic relief. Hardy's chorus characters are his inimitable groups of rustics: Bathsheba's labourers: Joseph Poorgrass, Jan Coggan, and others in *Far From the Madding Crowd*; Christopher Coney, Mother Cuxsom Solomon Longways, and other gossips in *The Mayor of Casterbridge*; the Choir in *Under the Greenwood Tree*; the grave-diggers in *A Pair of Blue Eyes*; the turf-cutters in *The Return of the Native*; and the cottagers of Little Hintock in *The Woodlanders*.

In *Two on a Tower*, when Swithin and Lady Constantine are in the observatory, Hezzy Biles, Sammy Blore, and Ned Chapman discuss Lady Constantine's future prospects with a candour that discomfits Swithin who happens to overhear the conversation.³⁴ In *The Woodlanders*, when Grace and Fitzpiers are finally reunited, Creedle, John Upjohn, and Farmer Cawtree discuss the reunion and their prospects of marital

happiness with an embarrassing intimacy of detail which provides a finishing touch to the foregoing drama.³⁵ There is an intensely theatrical scene in *The Return of the Native* in which Humphrey and Sam discuss Clym's expected return from Paris and Eustacia's prospects if she marries him, a discussion which, ironically enough, Eustacia herself overhears.³⁶ In *The Mayor of Casterbridge* Jopp and his friends discuss the love letters of Lucetta in a scene which is, again, rich in dramatic possibilities.³⁷

A. Alvarez points out that all through his novel-writing period, Hardy 'showed his dissatisfaction with the form'.³⁸ Hardy's dissatisfaction with the constraints of the traditional novel form drove him to make use in his fiction of devices not usually encountered in the fiction of his time. By employing in his novels techniques and devices which are normally associated with drama, Hardy may be said to have rendered himself vulnerable to the charge of having violated the integrity of the novelistic form. But at the same time, by relying on non-novelistic traditions, he succeeded in a remarkable degree in heightening and intensifying his themes and characters and in broadening and diversifying his range of effects, and thus gave his novels a unique depth, richness, and complexity.

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SAMUEL BECKETT : FREEDOM FROM STORY-TELLING

The baffling Beckettean quibble, 'Nothing is more real than nothing'¹ is the central issue of his fiction in respect of both substance and art. His *Trilogy* is an expression in narrative terms of his aesthetics of void, its basic preoccupation being an obligation to express that there is nothing to express. It is strictly in conformity to his prescription of art of a new order that has freed itself from the realm of the feasible, from the 'farce of giving and receiving' and has directed itself to the discovery of its 'insuperable indigence' in representing self and world, in identifying the perceiver and the perceived. This art of new order is an admission that 'there is nothing to express, nothing with which to express, nothing from which to express, no power to express, no desire to express together with the obligation to express'.²

Beckett's *Trilogy*, written in ruthless fidelity to his conception of art, can be described as fiction of the void. By directing our attention to the defective media of consciousness and language with which the novel as an art form attempts to give substance, form and meaning to self and the world, the *Trilogy* undermines the very basis of the novel and its assumptions, convictions and conventions. What Beckett writes, therefore, is not fiction but sub-fiction. He forces us to see his fiction not as a narrative composition but as a narrative decomposition. Simultaneously as his protagonists, preoccupied with the single task of 'finish dying', are dispossessed of their material possessions and physical and mental faculties,

the novel gets dispossessed of its treasured properties of omniscient consciousness, story, character, plot and finally its power of speech. As their body and mind suffer decomposition due to old age, the novel experiences the same until it is reduced to a state resembling Unnamable—a limbless and decomposed human trunk, or just a nameless voice resounding in the void.

Beckett's fiction is the ultimate in the novel of subjectivity. His object of study is the self of the self, or self and its 'pale imitations', the essential 'I' among 'They' who are myriad variations on the 'I'. Beckett's preoccupation with the definition of self and its cognitive structure results on the one hand in an increasing distancing from the objective world till the latter is fully excluded, and on the other gradual enlargement of the inner space to the point where self confronts itself as a void. The turning inward process initiated by modernist fiction meets its horrifying end, its final annihilation, in Beckett's fiction. The realization of self being non-existent makes Beckett's narrator characters dread speaking of themselves. Unnamable fears that his speech 'can only be of one and here.'³ To avoid the painful task of admitting himself as void, Unnamable tells stories which are inventions, lies—stories of Murphy, Molloy, Moran, Malone, Basil, Mahood, Worm etc. He is fully conscious that he is just fooling himself—'All these Murphys, Molloys and Morans do not fool me'⁴—in order to escape the task of speaking of himself. Malone too begins his narration with the task of 'looking at myself as I am.'⁵ but diverts to telling stories about Sapo, Moll, Macmann (Mockman)—his pretexts for avoiding the disastrous truth. Beckett's narrators are forced to create fiction which is a series of hypotheses and assumptions, engage themselves in ceaseless process of narration to postpone the calamitous truth. Unnamable admits that story-telling is 'idle talk,' an 'imposed task' undertaken to console himself :

Ah yes, all lies. God and man, nature and the light of day, the heart's outpourings and the means of understanding, all invented, basely, by me

alone, with the help of no one, since there is no one, to put off the hour when I speak of me.

In Beckett's hands thus, fiction loses its very *raison d'être* and becomes fiction per se or fiction of narration. And writing of fiction finally becomes a desperate quest for means to abolish fiction. *Unnamable* describes the process of fiction's self-immolation :

One starts things moving without a thought of how to stop them. In order to speak. One starts speaking as if it were possible to stop at will. It is better so. The search for the means to put an end to things, an end to speech, is what enables the discourse to continue. No, I must not try to think, simply utter. Method or no method I shall have to banish them in the end, the beings, things, shapes, sounds and lights with which my haste to speak has encumbered this place. In the frenzy of utterance the concern with truth. Hence the interest of a possible deliverance by means of encounter.⁷

The crucial awareness of Beckett's narrator characters regarding the futility of the task of representing self and reality in art, of the narrative resources and modes of comprehending reality and shaping it into an organic form with a beginning, a middle and an end and of defining and naming objects by means of language, issue from the problem of knowledge, consciousness and the identity of being. Beckett's fiction projects the problem of one's apprehension or comprehension of reality as grounded in the enigma of the nature of consciousness. One of the agonised voices in *Texts For Nothing* murmurs, 'Ah yes, we seem to be more than one, all deaf, gathered together for life'.⁸ Each individual is composed of a heterogeneous and temporal series of selves. The way one self sees the world at a point in time appears to be illusory to another self of the same consciousness at a different point in time. It results in an endless process of one's view of reality, one's explanation of universe cancelled by the other 'one' of the same consciousness. The heterogeneous selves within the same consciousness fail to reach a consensus

regarding their perception of reality and thereby the attempt to give reality an intelligible structure is undermined.

This awareness infuses in Molloy the futility of his efforts to describe persons and scenes. While talking of his resolutions, he says in innuendo, 'But to tell the truth (to tell the truth!)'.¹⁰ He makes us doubt the connection between the account of his adventures and those adventures as they really happened. He warns us that the 'limpid language' he now uses expresses nothing more than his 'merely complying with the convention that demands you either lie or hold your peace. For what really happened was quite different'.¹¹ Molloy the participant in the action and Molloy the narrator of action are different because, as he explains, 'simply somewhere something had changed, so that I too had to change, or the world too had to change, in order for nothing to be changed'.¹² As the last part of the sentence subverts the earlier one, so Molloy's fiction subverts reality. Whatever Molloy tries to say, define or describe appears to be incorrect. He cannot name the night he spent in the fields on his way to his mother's house, 'I say that night, but there was more than one perhaps. The lie, the lie, to lying thought'.¹³ All Beckett's narrators experience and articulate the act of story-telling as 'Rhetoric' of lies and obscurities, or as 'aporia'—endless speech composed of 'affirmations and negations invalidated as uttered'.¹⁴ Molloy experiences story-telling as a 'senseless, speechless, issueless misery'¹⁵ because of this ceaseless and unproductive dialectics of 'yes' and 'no', what the 'Calmative' voice in *Texts for Nothing* describes as 'no's knife in yes's wound' :

And whose the shame, at every mute micro-millisyllable, and unshakable infinity of remorse delving ever deeper in its bite, at having to hear, having to say, fainter than the faintest murmur, so many lies, so many times the same lies lyingly denied, whose the screaming silence of no's knife in yes's wound, it wonders.¹⁶

Molloy is a queer memory novel in which the narrator character is seen engaged in patching together a period of his

life. The objective world described by Molloy is vague, ambiguous and featureless. He confuses times, places, persons, objects as a result of which everything in the world recalled by him loses distinction and identity. He is sure of nothing—whether it was A & C or A or C he saw, whether he visited the house of Mrs. Louse or Loi, or whether his old lover was called Ruth or Edith. The interesting inner drama of *Molloy* is constituted of the collision between the experiencing self and the remembering self.¹⁷ They look identical but they are not so and are as unlike as the two crosses joined by a bar (an object which he stole from Mrs. Louse's house and one of his most treasured possessions) an upper with its opening above and the other lower with its opening below. The dilemma that Molloy as a story-teller faces issues from his inability to locate his identity, a single perceiving, knowing and operative self. This results in the disappearance of stable and definite perspective. 'Here' and 'there', 'now' and 'then', and persons all get mixed up, and hence time, place and objects, when represented in art, are necessarily deprived of features and dimensions.

The ultimate 'problem in story-telling is 'entirely a matter of voices' as *Unnamable* makes us aware again and again. As the heterogeneous selves come in turn to talk, replacing each other without warning, the mediating voice of the narrator gets lost and Beckett's fiction turns into a babble of voices. Literary narrative being a mediatized and not an immediate language, the narrator has to retain the identity of his voice in order to mediate between the story and the reader and to maintain perspective or narrative angle on which depends the organisation of the story and projection of meaning. Since Beckett's narrator finds his 'I' being usurped by his characters or suffers his characters' tyrannical attempts to impose their voices on him, he is seen in perpetual quest for a voice of his own. Beckett chose autobiographical mode to highlight this impasse.

The self and the world being unintelligible, the writer's sole task is to reveal this shattering truth through writing on

the process of writing in which we find Molloy, Malone, Unnnmable and the unnamed narrator of *Texts For Nothing* are engaged. David H. Hesla very correctly observes that Beckett's *Trilogy* is 'about the writing of a novel when the author's sense of the nature of human self and human existence has invalidated the novelist's traditional material. Or, the trilogy is what a writer writes when, horrified and desperate, he realizes that for him there is nothing about which to write, the felt obligation to write continuing, however, to persist.'

The 'felt obligation to write continuing' is born out of the writer's belief in the cathartic effect of writing on the author. Writing is a process of shedding illusions regarding the possibility of ascertaining the identity of self and its relation to the world. It is journeying towards non-being and non-meaning, a quest for a shelter from the 'elements of mankind'.¹⁹ Molloy's journey to his mother's house and his narration of the same both are directed to this end. In the opening part of *Molloy* we find him confined in his mother's room where he was brought in an ambulance after he had fallen in a ditch during his journey towards his mother's house. 'Here is the beginning', he says. The narration begins with the description of A and C moving slowly towards each other on 'a road remarkably bare.' The purpose of his journey, he says, is to establish his relation with his mother 'on a less precarious footing':²⁰

All my life, I think, I had been bent on it. Yes, so far I was capable of being bent on anything all a lifetime long, and what a lifetime, I had been bent on settling this matter between my mother and me, but had never succeeded.²¹

Molloy's relationship with his mother is overtly Oedipal. According to John Fletcher the phrase 'precarious footing' refers to Molloy's incestuous desire for his mother, and his sense of guilt caused by his rejection of his father.²² The fundamental desire of Molloy's life has been to be 'all for the

mother' and replace his father. He refers to his father only once while talking about his mother :

She never called me son, fortunately, I could not have borne it, but Dan, I don't know why, my name is not Dan. Dan was my father's name perhaps, yes perhaps she took me for my father.. I called her Mag, when I had to call her something. And I called her Mag because for me, without my knowing why, the letter *g* abolished the syllable *Ma*, and as it were spat on it, better than other letter would have done.²³

Molloy's relation with his mother, however, has an ontological dimension. In this context, Molloy's journey towards his mother's house needs to be interpreted as the writer's journey (the process of his writing) towards freedom from writing. Molloy's quest, through writing, for a definite identity is made problematic by his confronting the enigmatic multiplicity of selves, his prompters, his premonition of 'the last but one but one.' The quest for self becomes an unending and hopeless task of pursuing something which is infinitely changing and receding into nothing. He, therefore, marks the end of his quest as 'to be beyond knowing anything, to know you are beyond knowing anything, that is when peace enters in, to the soul of the incurious seeker'.²⁴ In fact, he is seeking deliverance from consciousness and speech—the elements of mankind. It, therefore, calls for interpreting the purpose of his journey as his desire, to return to the state of foetus in his mother's womb, since a foetus has life but it has not the faculties of consciousness and speech.

This desire is first unknowingly projected by Molloy during his interrogation at the police station. When asked about his identity, he suddenly remembers his name and cries out 'Molloy'. When the sergeant further asks whether his mother's name is Molloy too, Molloy assents, 'very likely. Her name must be Molloy too'.²⁵ The name of the town where his mother's house is located is 'Bally', which sounds like 'Belly'. It has been made sufficiently clear by Molloy that his desire is to be reduced to the embryo state in his mother's womb

where only he can find the meaning of life. 'And if I am ever reduced to looking for a meaning to my life, you never can tell, it's in that old mess I'll stick my nose to begin with'.²⁶ On his way to mother he keeps on 'losing' his hat, which is symbolic of freedom from consciousness. The last part of his journey through the dark forest and his falling into a ditch at the end of it is symbolic of the circular movement of the foetus in the dark womb of the mother :

But there was always present to my mind, which was still working, if laboriously, the need to turn, to keep on turning, and every three or four jerks I altered course, which permitted me to describe, if not a circle, at least a great polygon, perfection is not of this world, and to hope that I was going forward in a straight line, in spite of everything, day and night, towards my mother.²⁷

His lying unconscious in the ditch refers metaphorically to the foetus, which has no consciousness, lying in the mother's womb is the first stage of his life. As a post-modernist version of *Sons and Lovers*, *Molloy* is a reversal of the Lawrentian quest. While Paul's basic desire is to break out of the walls of his mother's womb in order to emerge as an independent consciousness, Molloy's fundamental urge is to return to the foetal state in his mother's womb in order to find a kind of life which is free from consciousness. Hence Molloy happily takes up a uterine position.

In Beckett's fiction the urge for deliverance from consciousness is interlinked with the desire to dispense with words. Though talking is felt to be the only guarantee of identity, it prevents one from being beyond knowing. Hence the quest is for 'a voice of silence, the voice of my silence'.²⁸ Beckett's narrators are acutely aware of the failure of language to express the being, convey meaning or represent objects. Reality is captive of language as soon as it begins to speak. Molloy describes words as 'sounds unencumbered by precise meaning,' 'pure sounds, free of all meaning'.²⁹ He finds it impossible to express his sense of identity through words.

When he tries to represent objects in words, the object becomes a thingless name and the world dies when 'fouly named'. The substance of knowledge and character being words, both become insubstantial, empty. Speaking (writing) becomes filling the void with meaningless sounds. Hence Molloy communicates with his mother through gestures, a non-verbal means. In *Texts For Nothing*, Beckett parodies Conrad's desire expressed in the Preface to *Nigger of the Narcissus* to use language in an ingenious way to make the reader see, hear and feel, when mockingly he speaks of his plan 'to tell a story, in the true sense of the words, the word we hear, the word tell, the word story.'³⁰ Susan Sontag in 'The Aesthetics of Silence' echoes Beckett's experience of art as a highly *problematic activity* when she states :

The 'spirit' seeking embodiment in art clashes with the 'material' character of art itself. Art is unmasked as gratuitous, and the very concreteness of the artist's tools (and, particularly in the case of language, their historicity) appears as a trap. Practised in a world furnished with second-hand perceptions, and specially confounded by the treachery of words, the artist's activity is cursed with mediacy. Art becomes the enemy of the artist, for it denies him the realization—the transcendence—he desires.

Beckett's fiction projects two opposing realizations. The first is the manifestation of the shattering truth about the treachery of words—how and why words fail the author. This agony is further intensified by an acute awareness that the artist deals in second-hand perceptions. The artist says in despair, 'The sky, I've heard—the sky and earth, I've heard great accounts of them, now that's pure word for word. . . .'³¹ This twin awareness induces in Beckett's narrators a sense of despair and guilt. Their attempt to convey in words the 'extravagant meaning' of life is seen by them all as an indulgence in the act of lying. As a result of this mistake they lie imprisoned in the cell of art. One of Beckett's narrators cries out in agony, 'But who can I have offended so grievously, to

be punished in this inexplicable way. . . ."³³ *Texts For Nothing* contains a trial scene (Section V) which reminds one of Mersault's trial in Camus's *The Outsider* in its situation and implications. The scene describes a court room where the soul of the narrator is accused of a guilt of which he is unaware. The narrator's soul is condemned to stay in the dark cell of art before it is finally executed. In metaphorical terms it is the execution of the artist by art.

The second and positive realisation is that art is anti-life. The artist's soul is condemned for the act of murdeing life in art. This realization forces the artist to reject art in favour of life. Imprisoned in the dark cell of art, Beckett's narrator longs to see the sky again, to 'be free again to come and go, in such sunshine and in rain. . . .'³⁴ Unnamable speaks of 'one or two manifestations the meaning of which escapes me.'³⁵ But the narrator of *Texts For Nothing*, which brings the *Trilogy* to its finale, has grown to know the meaning of such manifestations. He is now fully aware that his crime lies in his attempt to tell a story for himself and his diverting to story from life, 'that's the mistake I made, one of the mistakes, to have wanted a story for myself, whereas life alone is enough.' He finally resolves to dispense with story-telling and turn to life as to experience, like Mersault, the immediacy and beauty of the natural world. The heart of the matter of Beckett's fiction, thus, is the paradoxical awareness that freedom from story-telling is achieved through the act of narration, that through its phoenix death fiction can effect the resurrection of life.

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Notes and References

1. Samuel Beckett, *The Beckett Trilogy: Molloy, Malone Dies, The Unnamable* (London, 1976), p. 177. In subsequent reference, this

book is referred to as *Trilogy*. A.J. Leventhal has traced the source of this proposition to Gorgias of Lentini, a Sicilian rhetorician and sophist of the fourth century B.C. See *Samuel Beckett : A Collection of Critical Essays*, edited by Martin Esslin (New Delhi, 1980), p. 46.

2. Samuel Beckett, *Proust; Three Dialogues* (London), p. 103.
3. Samuel Beckett, *Trilogy*, p. 276.
4. Ibid., p. 278.
5. Ibid., p. 174.
6. Ibid., pp. 278-79.
7. Ibid., pp. 274-75.
8. The philosophical basis of Beckett's fiction has been discussed in detail by David H. Hesla, *The Shape of Chaos : An Interpretation of the Art of Samuel Beckett*. (Minneapolis, 1971), and by Ruby Cohn in 'Philosophical Fragments in the Works of Samuel Beckett,' *Samuel Beckett : A Collection of Critical Essays*, op. cit.
9. Samuel Beckett, *Texts For Nothing* (London, 1974), p. 7. Subsequent page references are to this edition.
10. *Trilogy*, p. 31
11. Ibid., p. 81.
12. Ibid., p. 81.
13. Ibid., p. 13.
14. Ibid., p. 267.
15. Ibid., p. 14.
16. *Texts For Nothing*, p. 63.
17. Unnamable describes this collision : 'Two shapes then, oblong like man, entered into collision before me. They fell and I saw them no more.' *Trilogy*, p. 272.
18. David H. Hesla, *The Shape of Chaos : An Interpretation of the Art of Samuel Beckett*, p. 90.
19. *Trilogy*, p. 70. The two principal elements are consciousness and speech.
20. Ibid., p. 80.
21. Ibid., p. 60.
22. John Fletcher, 'Interpreting Molloy,' in *Samuel Beckett Now*, edited by Melvin J. Friedman, (Chicago and London), pp. 157-70. The relationship between the oedipal theme and Molloy's journey has been further highlighted by Thomas J. Cousineau in 'Molloy and the Parental Metaphor,' *Modern Fiction Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 1, (Spring 1983), pp. 81-91.
23. *Trilogy*, p. 18.
24. Ibid., p. 59.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
28. *Texts For Nothing*, p. 52.
29. *Trilogy*, p. 47.
30. *Texts For Nothing*, p. 35.
31. William J. Hand and Max Westbrook, eds. *Twentieth Century Criticism : The Major Statements*, (New Delhi, 1947), p. 454.
32. *Texts For Nothing*, p. 27.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
35. *Trilogy*, p. 269.
36. *Texts For Nothing*, p. 24.

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CLASSIFIER CLAUSES IN ENGLISH

1. Introduction :

In this paper we want to present a semantico-syntactic analysis of clauses with the *NP+Cop+N* structure where the symbols are to be interpreted as follows :

NP = noun phrase

Cop = copula

N = noun

The clauses with the *NP+Cop+N* as well as *NP+Cop+A* (*directive*) structures are called by Halliday (1967) 'attributive' and by Lyons (1977 : 469-475) 'ascriptive'. In order to differentiate the attributive clauses with the *NP+Cop+N* construction from those with the *NP+Cop+A* construction we have termed the former as 'classifier' clauses and the latter 'characterizing' clauses.

A convenient entry point for the analysis of classifier (as also of characterizing) clauses is, we think, provided by a consideration of the kinds of constituent classes functioning as subjects and complements in such clauses. That is to say, we can begin our analysis either by looking at the semantico-syntactic structure of the subject expression or of the complement expression in the clause. A complete grammar of attributive classifier clauses will also require a detailed analysis of the lexical realizations of the copulative verbs functioning in such clauses. However, in this paper we shall confine our analysis to the clauses with the copulative verb

be only and shall leave out of our consideration copulative verbs such as *remain*, *turn out*, *seem*, *become*, *look*, *appear*, etc.

Before we begin our analysis it is necessary to point out that the complement expression in the clauses with the *NP+Cop+N* structure is not a noun-phrase expression but a noun expression. Consider the following clauses :

(1) a. My son is a writer
 b. My sons are writers

Note that the occurrence of the indefinite article *a* in the complement expression ('a writer') in (1a) is "a purely automatic consequence of the fact that the NP is singular and 'writer' is a countable noun" (Lyons, 1977 : 472). Since the subject NP in (1b) is plural there is no article attached to its complement (The attachment of the definite article *the* to the complement noun 'writers' in (1b) will change the clause from a classifier into a characterizing construction.) It is also to be noted that the complement expression in (1a) and (1b) are not referring expressions but non-referential nouns since they do not designate any entity. It is also therefore significant that an attributive complement in a classifier clause cannot be a pronoun or a proper name, and, further, that definite noun phrases normally do not occur as complements in classifier clauses. Semantically, the attributive complements, realizing the transitivity feature ATTRIBUTE, assign the nominal functioning as the subject and realizing the transitivity role of ATTRIBUANT to a particular class or ascribe to it a certain property, quality, etc.

It is interesting to note that it is not only the clauses with the *NP+Cop+N* structure that are semantically classifier clauses but even generic action process and mental process clauses describe properties to an individual or assign an individual to a class and are thus semantically attributive. Consider the following examples :

- (2) a. Mary eats meat
- b. Mary is a non-vegetarian
- (3) a. John teaches in a University
- b. John is a University teacher
- (4) a. John hates women
- b. John is a misogynist

The (b) clauses in (2-4) are clearly attributive classifier clauses. And since the (a) clauses are synonymous with their corresponding (b) clauses, they too are semantically attributive. (Note also that to a question such as 'What is your father?', both 'He is a University teacher' and 'He teaches in a University' are appropriate answers.) The surface structure objects in the clauses such as (2-4 a) are generic, but the clauses describe the properties of their non-generic subjects. But properties can also be associated with the grammatical objects rather than with the subject, as the following clauses show :

- (5) a. Students dislike the Principal
- b. Girls love John

In the above two clauses, it is the subject rather than the object noun phrases which are generic. It appears therefore that non-relational clauses with generic plural subjects and singular objects describe the property of the grammatical object rather than of the subject.

2. Classifier Clauses

Let us first consider the *NP+Cop+N* structure exemplified by (1a) (which we repeat for convenience) and (b) below :

- (1) a. My son is a writer
- b. An elephant is a mammal
- (6) a. Mary is an American

If we use the semantic relation of paraphrase as a tool to establish the semantico-syntactic relationship between clauses with the same grammatical structure *NP+Cop+N*, we find

that the above clauses accept the same paraphrase. For example, (1a), (6a) and (6b) can be paraphrased by (7a), (7b) and (7c) respectively:

(7) a. My son belongs to
 is in the class of writers
 is a member of
 belongs to
b. Mary is in the class of
 is a member of Americans
 belongs to
c. An elephant is in the class of
 is a member of mammals

As the paraphrases show, in the clauses in (1a), (6a), and (6b) individuals (*My son* and *Mary*) and a species (*an elephant*) are assigned to a class and the semantic relation is that of class membership. A clause with a class-membership relation can be termed an attributive 'classifier' clause. The attributes in these clauses are count nouns and the attribuents are realized by a definite noun phrase (1a), a proper noun (6a), and an indefinite noun phrase used in the generic sense (6b).

Let us consider the clause in (6a). The predicate nominal *an American* can be treated to have a locative meaning as the following clause attests :

(8) Mary is from America

(8) Mary is from America

It appears that when predicative nouns denote nationality and are formed on the basis of the names of countries, states, etc. (e.g. *Indian*, *Egyptian*, *America*, *Maharashtra*, etc.), they locate individuals in a country, state, etc. It is interesting to note that *an American* can only mean 'a person from America', and not 'a thing from America'. Though as a predicative or attributive adjective *American Indian*, etc. can attribute properties to a person or thing, the predicative noun can function as a complement in a relational clause only with a human noun subject. That is, though we can say

(9) a. The girl is (very) American
 b. The American girl
 c. The girl is an American
 (10) a. The T. V. is American
 b. The American T. V.

we cannot say

(10) c. ★The T. V. is an American

Though we are not dealing with *NP + Cop + A* clauses in this paper, we would like to mention here that the predicative adjective in (9a) (*American*) can be paraphrased as 'like all girls from America'. Thus a noun phrase such as an *American girl* is ambiguous between a compound meaning 'girl from America' or an adjective plus noun head construction meaning 'like all girls from America'. In the second meaning we can say

(11) Miss X is an Indian but she is very American in her behaviour and accent.

It is to be noted that when an attributive relational clause such as (12a) below has a predicative adjective derived from a nationality noun and a subject noun referring to a country, not to something or somebody from it, the adjective has the meaning 'resembles' (12a) is thus synonymous with (12b).

(12) a. Iran is very American
 b. Iran is very like America

Let us now have a short discussion of the clause in (6b) (*An elephant is a mammal*). That the subject noun phrase *an elephant* in (6b) is not an indefinite noun phrase referring to an individual but a generic noun phrase referring to all members of the class of elephants is clear from the following paraphrases:

(13) a. All elephants are mammals
 b. Every elephant is a mammal
 c. If something is an elephant it is a mammal
 d. Anything that is an elephant is a mammal

It is to be noted that an indefinite noun phrase with a generic meaning (e.g. *an elephant*) can itself function as a classifier complement apart from functioning as a classificand subject:

(14) Gomati is an elephant

We can mention here that in attributive classifier clauses the indefinite noun phrase subject can be ambiguous between a universal and an individual reading. Consider the following clauses:

(15) a. A wife is a finance minister
b. A boy is a loser
c. A politician is a manipulator

The subject noun phrases in the above clauses are normally (and most naturally) interpreted as generics and can be paraphrased as *every N* or *all N plural*. And as such the clauses in (15) are synonymous with their corresponding clauses in (16) below :

(16) a(i) Every wife is a finance minister
(ii) All wives are finance ministers
b(i) Every boy is a loser
(ii) All boys are losers
c(i) Every politician is a manipulator
(ii) All politicians are manipulators

However, the indefinite subject noun phrases in (15) can also be interpreted as referential noun phrases with an individual reading. And in such a case, the clauses in (15) can be paraphrased by

(17) a. Some woman is a finance minister
b. Some boy is a loser
c. Some politician is a manipulator

In some cases only the individual reading of the indefinite subject noun phrases is possible, for a *NP+Cop+N* clause. For example, clauses such as

(18) a. A barrister is a Chief Minister
 b. A young girl is a member of the University Senate

can be interpreted only as

(19) a. Some barrister is a Chief Minister
 b. Some young girl is a member of the University Senate

and not as

(20) a. All barristers are Chief Ministers
 b. All young girls are members of the University Senate

It appears that when noun phrases with generic meaning function as subjects in attributive classifier clauses, the predicative classifier nouns impose the reading of 'definition' on such clauses. The definitional reading is also found in clauses where the subject is realized by mass nouns whether concrete or abstract. Consider the following

(21) a. Linguistics is a science
 b. Mathematics is a subject/discipline

(22) a. Badminton is a game
 b. Milk is a liquid

It is interesting to note that though the clauses in (21-22) are classifier clauses with a definitional reading, they express two different kinds of classifying relation as the following examples show:

(23) a. Linguistics is a kind of science
 b. Mathematics is a kind of subject/discipline

(24) a. Badminton is a kind of game
 b. Milk is a kind of liquid

The acceptability or unacceptability of the 'kind of' paraphrase relations thus distinguishes two kinds of membership relation in classifier clauses with a definitional reading: (a) the membership of an 'individual' (in the absence of a better term) in

a class of different kinds. Though the predicative nouns *science*, *subject* and *discipline* in (21) and *game* and *liquid* in (22) are classifier nouns (and hence the four clauses are classifier clauses), the difference between the two types of membership relation is the result of the fact that whereas the latter (*games*, *liquids*) fall into kinds, the former (*sciences*, *subjects*, *disciplines*) do not fall into kinds—there are just different sciences, subjects, disciplines, etc. This difference is evident from the fact that though the clauses in both (21) and (22) are appropriate answers to the definitional Question :

(25) What is linguistics/ mathematics/ badminton/ milk ?
it is with the 'kind of' nouns like *game* and *liquid* that a 'What are the different kinds of ?' question is appropriate :

- (26) What are the different sciences/disciplines/subjects?
- (27) What are the different kinds of games/liquids?
- (28) ★What are the different kinds of sciences/subjects/ disciplines?

The evidence so far given therefore suggests that classifier clauses in English with the structure *NP + Cop + N* can be either non-definitional or definitional. It is interesting to note the difference between non-definitional and definitional classifier clauses in Hindi with respect to the realization of the predicative noun-phrases in them. Consider the following:

- (29) a. bhasha: vigya:n ek vigya:n he:
'Linguistics is a science'
- b. loha: ek dha:tu he:
'Iron is a metal'
- c. Manushya ek chintashi:l pra:ni: he:
'Man is a thinking creature'
- d. Kabu:tar ek pakshi: he:
'A pigeon is a bird'
- (30) a. mohan pahareda:r he:
'Mohan is a watchman'

- b. mohan da:ktar he:
'Mohan is a doctor'
- c. rahma:n pa:kista:ni: he:
'Rahman is a Pakistani'

It is to be noted that it is only in the definitional classifier clauses in (29) that the unstressed *ek* ('a') obligatorily appears before the predicative noun; in non-definitional classifier clauses such as those in (30) predicative nouns are normally not modified by the unstressed 'undefined article' *ek* ('a'). Thus the syntactic evidence from Hindi also supports the classification of classifier clauses in English into non-definitional and definitional.

Before we discuss some other examples of *NP+Cop+N* classifier clauses, we must digress a little. We would like to mention here the three types of entities and the three types of nominals which characteristically refer to them. Lyons (1977 : 442-446) has made a three-way distinction between 'first-order', 'second-order' and 'third-order' nominals in terms of their referential function. First-order nominals refer to first-order entities—persons, animals and things—which are "relatively constant to their perceptual properties : .. are located at any point in time, in what is, psychologically at least, a three-dimensional space; and .. are publically observable" (Lyons, 1977 : 443). Second-order nominals refer to second-order entities—events, processes, states-of-affairs, etc—which are observable and are located in time but not in space and which are said to occur or take place rather than to exist. Third-order nominals refer to third-order entities—abstract entities such as propositions—which cannot be said to occur or to be located in space and time. To quote Lyons (1977 : 443-444) again :

The distinction between first-order nominals and second-order nominals clearly shows up in the following pair of clauses :

- (31) a. *John/the cat/the book is on Sunday

b The match/the exhibition/the operation is on Sunday

The clause in (31a) is unacceptable because a temporal adverbial is made to function as the complement of a first-order nominal subject. The clause in (31b) with a second-order nominal subject and a temporal complement is, on the other hand, perfectly acceptable. The possibility or otherwise of a temporal adverbial to function as a complement in a relational clause can therefore be used as a test to distinguish a first-order nominal from a second-order nominal with subject function.

In the following pair of clauses, though the same nominal *John's arrival* is used, in (32a) it is a second-order nominal whereas in (32b) it is a third-order nominal. (The examples are from John Lyons, 1977 : 445.)

(32) a. I witnessed *John's arrival*
 b. *John's arrival* has been confirmed

With this background, let us now consider the following clauses in which the subject is realized by a nominalized finite or non-finite clause (third-order nominal) and the complement by a third-order nominal (abstract underived noun) :

(33) a. Quarrelling with your teacher was a mistake
 b. *Quarrelling with your teacher was a table
 c. *A book is a mistake

(34) a. That the emergency lasted 19 months is a fact
 b. *That the emergency lasted 19 months is a book
 c. *John is a fact

(35) a. Evading income tax is a crime
 b. *Evading income tax is a pen
 c. *A car is a crime

(36) a. Driving a car in Bombay is a problem
 b. *Driving a car in Bambay is a chair
 c. *A table is a problem

The (a) clauses in (33-36) are acceptable because the grammatical complements of the nominalized dependent clause subjects are third-order nominals. A first-order nominal such as *table, book, pen, chair* in the subject position is incompatible with a third-order nominal functioning as complement. All the (c) clauses in (33-36) are therefore unacceptable. The unacceptability of the (b) clauses in (33-36) further shows that when the subject is realized by a third-order nominal in an attributive classifier clause, the complement cannot be realized by a first-order nominal : it has to be a third-order nominal.

It should, however, be noted that though in attributive classifier clauses third-order nominals normally do not function as classifiers of first-order nominals, we do get clauses such as

(37) a. My brother is a problem
 b. A car is a mistake

where the subject noun phrases are first-order nominals. Notice that such clauses are understood as having a (dependent) nominalized clause or a third-order nominal functioning as subject :

(38) a. The way my brother behaves
 is a problem

My brother's behaviour
 b. Having a car is a mistake

It should also be noted that the third-order nominals can function as complements of second-order nominals such as *examination, strike, match, explosion operation, exhibition, etc*. Witness the following clauses :

(39) a. The match was a success
 b. The strike was nuisance
 c. The exhibition was an event (of the year)

It is interesting to note that though some third-order nominals have related (derived) adjective forms which function

as predicative adjectives in attributive clauses with nominalized clause subjects, others do not :

(40) a. *Quarrelling with your teacher was mistaken
 b. *That the emergency lasted 19 months was factual
 c. Evading income tax is criminal
 d. Driving a car in Bombay is problematic

We may mention here in passing that adjectival complements of nominalized third-order nominal subjects have the meaning 'constituting', 'forming', 'being'. (cf. Ljung, 1970 : 157.) That is to say, a clause such as (40c) apart from having the related NP+Cop+N construction in (35a) can also have the following paraphrase :

(41) Evading income tax constitutes a crime

Other such adjectives (i.e. adjectives derived from third-order nominals) are : *essential, exceptional, normal, conventional, habitual, erroneous, scandalous, traditional, ominous*, etc. Notice also that attributive clauses with third-order nominal subjects and third-order nominal complements (or complements realized by adjectives from third-order nominals) can all be paraphrased by an 'it + be + third-order nominal/adjectival complement + (postposed) third-order nominal (nominalized clause)'

(42) a. It was a mistake to quarrel with your teacher
 b. It was a fact that the emergency lasted 19 months
 c. It is criminal/a crime to evade income tax
 d. It is problematic/a problem to drive a car in Bombay

To sum up the discussion of classifier clauses with third-order nominals as complements :

1. First-order nominals interpreted as first-order entities cannot appear in the position of subject;
2. Nominalized clauses (i.e. third-order nominals) and

second-order nominals can function as subjects;

3. The complement cannot be realized by a first-order nominal when the subject is realized by a third-order nominal.

3 Pseudo-classifier clauses

Let us now briefly discuss some examples of clauses with the *NP + Cop + N* structure which we would call 'pseudo-classifier clauses'. Consider the following :

(43) a. John is a fox
b. John is a Croesus
c. The world is a stage
d. Mary is a man
e. A pen is a weapon
f. Love is a flower

These clauses cannot be paraphrased by

(44) *NP₁* is in the class of *N₂* (plural)
is a member of

but rather by

(45) NP_1 is like (in some respect) a N_2 (singular)

That is, (43 a-f) are roughly paraphrasable respectively by

(46 a-f) :

(46) a. John is like a fox (in some respect)
b. John is like a Croesus (in some respect)
c. The world is like a stage (in some respect)
d. Mary is like a man (in some respect)
e. A pen is like a weapon (in some respect)
f. Love is like a flower (in some respect)

The semantic difference between the attributive classifier clauses in (1a, 6, 21, 22) and the clauses in (43), which are also attributive, can be characterized by saying that the former classify literally and the later figuratively. The clauses in (43) are understood by analogy, since we know that John does not belong to the class of foxes, the world is literally

not a stage, nor is Mary literally a man, etc. An interesting characteristic of these predicative nouns is that they all have a meaning which can be called 'resembling' and that they hardly ever express straightforward simple relationship like 'X looks like Y' but they make use of an intervening variable as in 'Z of X is like the Z of Y'.

It is pertinent to mention here that pseudo-classifier clauses as in (43) are not distinguishable from the (true) classifier clauses by the type of nouns : both in (1a, 6, 21, 22) and in (43) the grammatical subjects are realised by definite count nouns, count nouns used generically, and mass nouns. Similarly, the complement is realized by first-order nominals in both the types of clauses.

It appears to us that the copula in pseudo-classifier clauses is used metaphorically. It relates the subject noun phrases with the complement noun phrases, or rather their referents, by comparing them in one respect : e.g. in one respect John and a fox show likeness, in one respect the world and a stage are similar, etc. Pseudo-classifier clauses are semantically characterizing clauses rather than classifier clauses and as such can be paraphrased in most cases with an *NP+Cop+A* construction :

(47) a. John is cunning (= (43)a. John is a fox)
 b. John is rich (= (43)b. John is a Croesus)

In some cases, it is necessary to find a verb which spells out in which respect the referents of the subject and the complement noun phrases are similar : For example, (43d) and (43e) can be paraphrased respectively by (48a) and (48b) :

(48) a. Mary behaves like a man
 b. A pen serves as a weapon

4. Prospect

Before we close the discussion of attributive classifier clauses, we would like to point out the direction in which

further on classifier clauses should be headed. Since classifier clauses by definition have two nominals, one functioning as the subject and the other as the complement, it is necessary to make an indepth study of the nominals in the language under study from the point of view of their syntactic behaviour, semantic interpretation, and selectional restrictions holding between the subject and the complement nominals. Though Lyons' (1977 : 442-446) classification of nominals into first-order, second-order, and third-order, and a further subclassification of first-order nominals into persons, animals, and things is very insightful, it is necessary, for a fuller treatment of classifier clauses, to take into account finer distinctions. We therefore suggest that the first-order nominals be classified on the lines suggested in the systemic diagram given in (49) on the following page.

Let us consider the following clauses :

- (50) a. My car is a Fiat
- b. Fiat is a car
- c. A car is a vehicle
- d. A vehicle is an object
- e. A car is an object

- (51) a. A Fiat is my car
- b. *A car is a Fiat
- c. *A vehicle is a car
- d. *An object is a vehicle
- e. *An object is a car

All the clauses in (50) are acceptable. (50a) is a non-definitional classifier clause and is interpreted as 'My car belongs to the class of cars named Fiat'. The use of a proper noun as a classifier constitutes a special case and we shall leave this use out of our present discussion. But it is important to note that level 1 nouns can classify either a proper noun (50b), or a demonstrative pronoun (e.g. *This a car*); level 2 nouns can

classify level 1 nouns (50c) and also proper names and demonstrative pronouns (e.g. *Fiat is a vehicle, This is a vehicle*); level 3 nouns can classify all nouns of lower levels (50 d-e) and proper names and demonstrative pronouns. The clauses in (51 b-e) are anomalous precisely for the reason that lower level nouns are made to function as classifiers of higher level nouns. (Proper nouns and demonstrative pronouns are normally not used as classifiers.)

Notice also that the clauses in (51 b-e) cannot be treated as involving a reversal of the mood elements subject and complement. (51a) is, of course, acceptable, but is very much syntactically restricted and there is a very particular intonation pattern associated with it. The clauses in (50a) and (51a) contain the same elements but in a reversed order. The contrast between the two clauses is one of theme only : (50a) has unmarked subject theme, the structure on the mood dimension being S(subject) P(redicator) C(complement); (51a) has marked complement theme and the structure CPS. Notice also that though all the clauses in (50) are classifier clauses, only the clause in (50a) has a non-definitional reading, the remaining clauses (i.e. 50 b-e) having a definitional reading and being analytically true. That is to say, the denial of (50a) is not a contradiction but the denials of (50 b-e) are contradictions.

(52) a. My car is not a Fiat
 b. ?Fiat is not a car
 c. ?A car is not a vehicle
 d. ?A vehicle is not an object
 e. ?A car is not an object

Clauses with a definitional reading such as the ones in (50b-e) do not allow the permutation of the subject and the complement elements. As is clear from the clauses (51 b-e) permutation of the subject and the complement nominals

leads to either deviant clauses or from true to blatantly false clauses.

The relevance of classifications of nouns by level in clauses involving non-concrete and non-human nominals is evidenced in the following :

- (53) a. Linguistics is a subject
b. *A subject is linguistics
- (54) a. Hinduism is a religion
b. *A religion is Hinduism
- (55) a. A dog is an animal
b. *An animal is a dog

In the systemic diagram in (49) we have not classified human nouns into levels. But such a classification is also relevant to such nouns. Consider the following :

- (56) a. A professor is a teacher
b. *A teacher is a professor
- (57) a. A general is a soldier
b. *A soldier is a general
- (58) a. A vice-chancellor is (basically) an administrator
b. *An administrator is (basically) a vice-chancellor
- (59) a. A king is a ruler
b. *A ruler is a king
- (60) a. Man is a species
b. *A species is man

All the a. clauses in (56-60) are irreversible because the subject nouns in them are classified by higher level complement nouns. But notice that reversibility is possible in a non-definitional classifier clause, if a proper name or a personal pronoun is classified by a level 1 noun. Witness the following pairs of clauses :

- (61) a. John is a leader
b. A leader is John
- (62) a. I am a professor
b. A professor am I
- (63) a. She is a child
b. A child is she

The acceptability of both the (a) and the (b) clauses in (61-63) shows that no deviance results if in non-definitional clauses the subject and the complement are permuted.

It is also interesting to note that when a human noun is classified by a human-like noun (e.g. *god*, *angel*, *devil*, etc.) or a non-human noun, a pseudo-classifier clause results; for example:

- (64) a. John is an angel
b. Tom is an ass
c. He is a beast

The metaphorical readings of clauses such as the following can also be accounted for by the fact that the classificand and the classifier nouns belong to different classes. For example,

- (65) a. Literature is a mirror of society
b. A camel is a ship of the desert.

The ability of the fluent speaker to recognize tautology, analytic truth, entailment relations, and contradictions is based on the relationship by level that he can recognize between two levels.

A. Tautology: (66) a. A Prime Minister is (after all) a Prime Minister.
b. Boys will be boys
c. A thief is a thief

B. Analytic Truth : (67) a. All uncles are men

C. Entailment : (69) a. My brother is a lecturer
b. My brother is a teacher

D. Contradiction: (69) a. ? A cat is not a animal
b. ? Milk is not a liquid

A point which deserves mentioning is that there is not so much clarity about the truth conditions of classifier clauses which have agent nouns functioning as complements. For example, if some one is a teacher it does not necessarily mean that he teaches; and hence, there is nothing wrong about clauses such as the following :

(70) a. He is a teacher, but he does not teach
b. He is a doctor who does not practise
c. He is an engineer by training but a politician by profession
d. I am not a teacher but I teach my children at home every day

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Robert Kimbrough

SIDNEY'S INVENTION : THE FICTION OF DISCOVERY

While Sir Philip Sidney was justly celebrated in his own time and in after ages as the embodiment of the Renaissance courtier, today we look beyond his chivalry and grace, into his mind where we find the traditional aspects of Renaissance thought firmly rooted and nurtured by some of the newest, most daring and bold, philosophical implications of that thought that was discovered and elaborated by such as Alberti and Cusanus, Ficino and Pico, Leonardo and Michaelangelo, Paracelsus and Agrippa, Bruno and Dee. Yet we can be thankful that Sidney's method was that of the Renaissance, for we find in his *Defence of Poesie* all of the commonplaces of his day on learning and the humanities, art and the artist. We need not start with the Greeks, the Romans or the Italians and other 'moderns'; Sidney has done our reading for us. But he has done more than just read; he has followed his own advice: he has devoured them whole and made them wholly his. As a result, the *Defence of Poesie* is not a report of past knowledge; it is itself an advancement of learning.

Sidney's *Defence* is, then, a bold distillation, an intelligent synthesis; and a clear articulation of the assumptions and implications of that amorphous, strange, eclectic body of humanistic materials which we label 'Renaissance Thought'. For Sidney, writing the *Defence* was an act of discovery. His invention of fiction can become our discovery.

Sidney's thesis is that poetry is a living, forceful, multidimensional art which with a 'sweet charming force' does

both 'teach and delight' in order to promote, encourage, and stimulate inner growth and development, which, in the humanities, we call learning. Poetry moves one to see, think, judge, and act. Poetry shapes. Poets 'make to imitate, and imitate both to delight and teach, and delight to move men to take that goodness in hand, which without delight they would fly as from a stranger, and teach, to make them know that goodness whereunto they are moved.' The end of poetry may be said to move auditors through delight, to move them to know, and to move them to put learned knowledge into action. 'And that moving is of a higher degree than teaching,' as Sidney so eloquently states, 'it may by this appear, that it is well-nigh both the cause and effect of teaching.' A poem is more effective than any other kind of instruction because

It moveth one to do that which it doth teach. For, as Aristotle saith, it is not *gnosis* but *praxis* must be the fruit. And how *praxis* cannot be, without being moved to practise, it is no hard matter to consider . . . Nay truly, learned men have learnedly thought that where once reason hath so much overmastered passion as that the mind hath a free desire to do well, the inward light each mind hath in itself is as good as a philosopher's book.

The operative words here are *reason*, *mind*, *free desire*, and *inward light*. Because God's gift of the rational soul inhabits the mind, each mind contains seeds of all the information contained in the Book of Nature authored by God. (In terms of Renaissance Thought, this circular argument is both correct and true.) Hence, when Astrophel hyperbolically represents Stella as a symbol of divine perfection ('perfection's heir') in Sonnet 71, a quite serious, well-informed Sidney is speaking through him:

Who will in fairest book of Nature know
 How virtue may best lodg'd in beauty be
 Let him but learn of love to read in thee,
 Stella, those fair lines which true goodness show.
 There shall he find all vices' overthrow,
 Not by rude force, but sweetest sovereignty

Of reason, from whose light those night birds fly
That inward sun in thine eyes shineth so.

The end or function of poetry is, then, that of all the arts: informed persuasion, or, learning—the process of self-willed humanistic growth and efficacious development. Poetry highlights the copy of the book that is open in each mind (a book 'as good as a philosopher's book'). To use yet another metaphor, poetry brings up, or brings into focus, the lines of information that reside in the book of the mind, unintended, unread, not understood—because not yet discovered. Each phrase which Sidney uses to describe the process of learning (hence, as well the process of poetry) refers to the mind, the seat of the rational soul, the soul of soul, the 'anima' soul: 'This purifying of wit, this enriching of memory, enabling of judgment, and enlarging of conceit, which commonly we call learning, under what name soever it come forth, or to what immediate end soever it be directed, the final end is to lead and draw us to as high a perfection as our degenerate souls, made worse by their clay lodgings, can be capable of.' All of the arts of learning have 'this scope: to know, and by knowledge to lift up the mind from the dungeon of the body to the enjoying his own divine essence.'

To learn is the way to participate in one's own divine essence, and in so doing, participate in the Divine Essence because all acts of learning are a study of nature and God is the Great Maker of all, the Designer of the Universe, the Author of the Book of Nature. Sidney gives examples of the dependency on nature of all major arts, or 'serving sciences,' of his day—the trivium: grammar, rhetoric, logic—the quadrivium: astronomy, geometry, arithmetic, music—and 'graduate studies': physical and natural science, philosophy, law, medicine, and theology. Hinting at the concept of God as the Master Builder, he concludes that all of these serving sciences 'build upon the depth of Nature.' But then he moves on to a key humanist passage in the *Defence*:

Only the poet, disdaining to be tied to any such subjection, lifted up with the vigour of his own invention, doth grow in effect into another Nature, in *making things* either better than Nature bringeth forth, or, quite anew, forms such as never were in Nature, as the Heroes. Demigods, Cyclops, Chimeras, Furies, and such like: so as he goeth hand in hand with Nature, not enclosed within the narrow warrant of her gifts, but freely ranging within the zodiac of his own wit. (emphasis added)

The human mind is not just *like* the Universal Mind; it *is* the universal mind in small, is a universe unto itself ('the zodiac of his own wit'), within which the poet ranges, observing and gathering truths of life ('lifted up with the vigour of his own invention.' his discoveries). The poet is *born* with the gift of imagination which with God-given right reason forms the crucible of energy to mould, forge, and *make* imitations and fictions containing essential truth ('he goeth hand in hand with Nature'), but unencumbered by the trivia and distractions of the fallen or brazen world ('not enclosed within narrow warrant of her gifts'). Therefore, when this imitation, this fiction is delivered, figured forth, led into life, it proves eikastic, efficacious, substantive, effective, and affective. A poem is true gold because it is mined (mind) from the realm of pure Truth: 'Nature never set forth the earth in so rich tapestry as divers poets have done Her world is brazen, the poets only deliver a golden.' Bassanio, upon looking at Portia's picture, her 'counterfeit', casually remarks, 'what demigod/Hath come so near creation? (MV, 3.1.115-16).

When Sidney asks 'why and how' the magical, alchemical poet makes things, he knew he was daringly going further than the Italian critics; that he was opening a new frontier in literary theory when he says:

Neither let it be deemed too saucy a comparison to balance the highest point of man's wit with the efficacy of Nature; but rather give right honour to the heavenly Maker of the maker, who, having made man to his own likeness, set him beyond and over all the works of that second nature, which in nothing he ['man'] sheweth so much as in Poetry, when with the force of a divine breath he [the poet] bringeth things forth surpassing her [second nature's] doings, with no small argument to the

incredulous of that first accursed fall of Adam, since our erected wit maketh us know what perfection [Nature] is, and yet our infected will [fallen, second nature] keepeth us from reaching unto it.

This boldness is rounded off by a sad admission: 'But these arguments will by few be understood, and by fewer granted' Sidney's arguments will never be understood or granted so long as the world thinks of poetry as mere riming and versifying. But the calling of the true or 'right' poet goes hand in hand with the sixteenth-century ideal of learning: 'right poets, . . . having no law but wit. . . . be they which most properly do imitate to teach and delight, and to imitate borrow nothing of what is, hath been, or shall be; but range, only reined with learned discretion, into the divine consideration of what may be, and should be.' These poets range in the zodiacs of their own wits (minds) controlled by what they have learned and do learn ('learned discretion') in order to 'make to imitate, and imitate both to delight and teach, and delight to move men to take that goodness in hand, which without delight they would fly as from a stranger, and teach, to make them know that goodness whereunto they are moved—which being the noblest scope to which ever any learning was directed, yet want there not idle tongues to bark at them.'

The poet is a professor of the humanities, and the teacher and poet share the public's scorn and fear ('weave a circle round him thrice'). But the poet is an artist, not a pedagogue. He 'cometh to you with words set in delightful proportion, either accompanied with, or prepared for, the well-enchanting skill of music; and with a tale, forsooth, he cometh unto you, with a tale which holdeth children from play, and old men from the chimney corner.' But the words, the music, the tale are just the trappings. The heart of the poem lies in the invention.

Invention is the soul of poetry, just as it is the soul of learning and the soul of living, for invention means the uncovering of the truths of life, the facts, the connections,

the relationships, the relative relevances and resonances. Invention functions in the world of the mind, the zodiac of the wit, and what is discovered, uncovered, instantaneously becomes the poet's 'Idea or foreconceit,' which by assumption and definition is true; it is, therefore, potentially 'profitable.' At this point, Sidney discovers the truth of fiction. While the poet's 'Idea, or foreconceit' is potentially efficacious, good, and true, the listener or reader cannot see into the mind of the poet, the poet's field of discovery. The listener must be engaged by the artifact: the words, music, and tale created out of the materials of mind. The word invention at this point becomes an *apo koinou*: a word which simultaneously serves two functions. Here, both the moment of creative impulse (foreconceit) and the act of creation (conceit). A poem can be defined as a fiction built upon 'an imaginative ground plot of a profitable invention.' Whereas a lie is primarily and essentially false because it is simply 'made up' (like castles in the air) to look like truth, a fiction is primarily and essentially true because it is grounded in, or traced from, the patterns of and in the mind. Only secondarily does a fiction look 'made up' (artificial, 'unreal'). A poem, unlike a lie, is real because it is a fiction of discovery. It is an invention.

Essential in Sidney's aesthetic, in Sidney's invention, in Sidney's invention of invention, is 'Idea, or foreconceit'—thought, significant thought. Words are 'the outside of' poetry, the trappings of thought, the clay lodging of the erected wit. They embody the soul of poetry. The Word must precede the word—logos as creating and created, the foreconceit made the conceit, the Idea made idea, Nature creating nature. Words without thought are merely words, empty clothing, even when fancy clothing, if in rime. Of such an empty poem we can say with Kent of Oswald: 'Nature disclaims in thee. A tailor made thee.' A true poem is not only filled with nature, it dis-covers that nature to the on-

looking world. Poetry is invention, invention is the way to knowledge, knowledge is the way to power and control. The invention of fiction is part of the programme of Renaissance learning.

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BOOK REVIEW

Perfume: By PATRICK SUSKIND, Translated from the German by John E. Woods (Penguin Books).

Patrick Suskind's blockbuster hit about the owner of the world's keenest nose has come to India, depicting on its cover the same voluptuous Watteau nude that has intrigued so many western readers. There's every reason to believe that *Perfume*, cover art and all, will enjoy the same success here as it did in the West. Set in 18th-century France, the book exudes smells lush and subtle, beautiful and rank. Odours of sweat, grease, and organic decay fume into our nasal cavities together with those of the loveliest pomades, creams and sachets. They remind us of both the power and irresistibility of smell. 'Odours have a power of persuasion stronger than that of words, appearances, emotions or will. The persuasive power of an odour cannot be fended off,' Suskind reminds us in Chapter 15. The reminder gives pause. Yes, most of us connect to the world more vitally with our eyes than our noses. But, whereas we can always close our eyes to block out an unwanted visual field, we can't shut down our organs of smell without also denying ourselves the oxygen we need to live. The herbs and blossoms the book's main figure stirs and sifts, mixes and distills, also remind us that, by penetrating sinuses and lungs, smells touch us more intimately than sights.

But if that main figure, Jean-Baptiste Grenouille, is a nose, he's nothing else. Suskind wrote *Perfume* from an intriguing, but narrow, premise. He achieves olfactory splendour at the cost of humane insights. This confection of a novel lacks nuance, complexity, and depth; its people are all scurvy and malignant; its irony is heavy-handed, and the scenes comprising it rarely build or blend. Only a master storyteller could make a book like this work. The wonder of *Perfume* consists

in its succeeding as well as it does. A virtuoso of style and melodrama, Suskind manipulates us without making us feel cheated. For one thing, he knows the importance of selection. Like writers as honoured as Jane Austen and E. A. Poe, he proves, in *Perfume*, that literary art often relies heavily on misdirection. Dull, flat, and humourless, his Grenouille turns our attention away from his person to his knowledge, invention, and manual skills. By denying his man an inner self, Suskind profits from the truth that less can be more.

Grenouille's nose links him to the world. He can detect the faintest of scents from a distance, analyse them, and create new ones more beautiful than any the world has known. But he's not content to be the world's greatest perfumer. Any gift, Suskind knows, no matter how unusual, pushes into reality, touching lives, forcing decisions, and sometimes fomenting crises. The small stirs created by Grenouille's uncanny nose grow to epidemic size. Here's why. Amazingly, Suskind's connoisseur of smells emits no odour himself. To correct this flaw, he works for years in perfumeries as an underpaid, mistreated drudge. But he doesn't complain. He's secretly concocting scents that will control other people's responses to him. Depending on the one he wears, he'll be ignored, accepted or loved. But in order to win the fanatical love he craves, he needs to capture the fragrance of beautiful young virgins. And he can't capture this fragrance without first committing murder.

If the ending brought about by Grenouille's murderousness rankles, give your feelings another look. Your indignation may stem from the letdown you feel over seeing your fun end. Its unusual subject matter and approach, along with its vigorous, fast-tracking style (recoverable even in translation), make *Perfume* an art curiosity whose bizarre brilliance will continue to divert readers.

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